EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 3-5-2.1-43 defines 'expedited basis' for voter registration processing timelines. It does not address public verification artifacts, certificates, device records, result signatures, or any downloadable packages related to election result verification or citizen verification. This section is about registration processing speed, not post-election verification infrastructure.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly defines 'marking device' to include pencils, pens, and certain electronic devices that produce marked optical scan ballots. However, subsection (b) specifically states that a voter-verifiable paper audit trail is NOT a marking device, which suggests the statute distinguishes between marking devices and paper trails rather than requiring voter-verifiable paper records. The section does not mandate or require a voter-verifiable paper audit trail; it merely clarifies what is excluded from the definition of 'marking device.'

“A voter verifiable paper audit trail is not a marking device.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electronic mail filing procedures for recount and contest petitions and whether the state recount commission may receive filings by email. It does not establish or address any right for citizens to re-tally election results from published precinct data. The section is procedurally focused on filing mechanisms, not on citizen access to data or re-tally rights.

The section requires inspection and certification that electronic poll book seals show no evidence of tampering before polls open, which mandates tamper-evident seals. However, it does not require logging of tamper events or any tamper-responsive quarantine mechanism—only notification to the election board if tampering is detected.

“shows no evidence of tampering”

The statute prohibits internet and network connectivity on devices used to create ballot layouts and program voting systems, but does not explicitly address connectivity on vote-casting equipment itself (the machines where voters actually cast votes). The criterion asks specifically about vote-casting equipment, which is distinct from ballot programming and creation devices.

The statute requires marking the container with the number of provisional ballots, which is a minimal form of documentation. However, it does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody system requiring detailed documentation of transfers, handlers, or timestamps, nor does it explicitly mandate public availability of such documentation. The requirement is limited to marking container counts.

The section explicitly establishes a criminal penalty (Level 6 felony) for tampering with or disarranging voting systems, which directly addresses unauthorized device access through tamper conduct. This satisfies the criterion's requirement for explicit criminal penalties against tampering with voting hardware.

The statute establishes post-election audit deadlines and procedures, but the secretary of state's authority to issue orders is explicitly conditioned on the absence of a filed petition for recount or contest. This language suggests audits are not universally mandatory for every election, but rather depend on whether a contest has been filed. The section does not clearly mandate audits for all elections regardless of circumstances.

The statute mandates that the secretary of state may conduct procedure audits of elections, but it does not specify the audit method (hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, etc.). The statute grants discretion to define the scope without prescribing a particular methodology, making it a general audit requirement without a defined method meeting the scoring rubric.

“a procedure audit of an election to be conducted”

The section allows for manual recounts of ballot cards when a petition is filed, which can be triggered by challenges. However, it does not establish automatic audit triggers based on close margins or other objective thresholds—it requires an affirmative petition/challenge request rather than triggering audits independently. The mechanism is petition-driven rather than margin-based.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the timing and ballot labeling of elections for state officials (secretary of state, state comptroller, and treasurer of state) in 2026 and beyond. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, observer access, or any audit-related procedures. The section is entirely procedural regarding when these offices are elected and how they appear on ballots.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides only a definitional statement of what constitutes a 'post-election audit' in terms of its statistical methodology and design objectives. It does not address whether audit results are binding on the final certified election result or establish any legal requirement that audit findings must override or correct preliminary outcomes.

The statute requires vendors to escrow source code with an election division-approved agent, which provides access to a certifying authority but does not mandate public disclosure or access by academics. This aligns with scoring level 2 (certifying authority only), though the statute does not explicitly detail who may access the escrowed materials or under what conditions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the physical reproduction of voter registration forms for record-keeping purposes, not software reproducibility or binary builds. It is entirely unrelated to the software development and verification practices contemplated by the criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses network isolation requirements for computers used in ballot creation and voting system programming, which is a cybersecurity measure. It does not address whether ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules are signed and published before polls open, which is the focus of criterion 1.4 on election definition publication.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses post-election audits and county designation procedures, but does not address verification that the actual running binary of voting software matches a committed binary. The criterion concerns software integrity and binary verification, which is a distinct technical matter from post-election audits of vote counts.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the content requirements for a voter challenge affidavit (name, reasons, sources, perjury warning) but does not address observer rights, procedural access for parties, or civil-society observers. The section governs the mechanics of challenging a voter's eligibility, not the observation or transparency procedures that would satisfy criterion 6.1 on domestic observer access.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the submission and distribution of election investigation reports by the election division to the commission and relevant parties. It has no bearing on precinct-level results publication timelines or speed requirements, which is the subject of criterion 6.3.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter correction procedures on electronic voting systems with paper audit trails, but does not establish, require, or mandate a public, signed, append-only election event log. It focuses on individual voter error correction rather than comprehensive election event logging for public transparency and observation.

This section addresses voting system approval renewal and vendor sanctions but does not directly address whether multiple certified vendors may operate in the same election. The section establishes a certification and renewal process for vendors but does not affirmatively permit or prohibit multiple vendors from operating concurrently in a jurisdiction or statewide election.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance reporting systems and electronic filing procedures for candidate committees, not voting formats, device protocols, or election equipment standards. It has no relevance to the criterion regarding open and publicly documented vote-format or device-protocol standards.

The section establishes that precinct election officer appointments are temporary and expire after canvassing is complete, which prevents perpetual lock-in for that specific role. However, the criterion asks about vendor contracts generally, and this statute addresses only precinct election officers (independent contractors for election administration), not vendor contracts for goods or services. The duration cap here applies to election-specific temporary staffing rather than ongoing vendor relationships.

The statute explicitly requires vendors to provide documentation that the voting system's source codes have been escrowed with an escrow agent approved by the election division. This mandatory requirement is a condition of the application for certification of voting systems in Indiana.

The statute directly mandates that ballot card voting systems must enable voters to cast votes in secrecy, which establishes voter–ballot unlinkability as a legal requirement enforceable through the system's design specifications.

Indiana law mandates comprehensive accessibility standards for polling facilities, requiring compliance with federal ADA standards (52 U.S.C. 20101-20107) and specifying detailed accessibility requirements for parking, paths, entrances, interior travel paths, and voting system areas. The statute explicitly requires that elderly voters and voters with disabilities receive the same opportunity for access, participation, privacy, and independence as other voters, covering vision, motor, and functional accessibility across all critical polling place components.

The statute establishes a mandatory floor requiring at least one vote center (polling place) per 10,000 active voters, with an additional vote center required for any remaining fraction of 10,000 voters. This creates a clear legal minimum density requirement for voter access.