EAdIElection Administration Index

This section imposes conflict-of-interest restrictions (disqualifying candidates and committee members from board service) but does NOT establish a disclosure requirement. COI.1 requires PUBLIC DISCLOSURE of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, and candidate connections—a transparent reporting mechanism. This statute merely bars certain persons from serving; it does not mandate that commissioners or staff disclose conflicts or financial interests to the public. The restriction is prophylactic (preventing conflicts before they arise), not accountability-based (requiring transparency and documentation).

This section establishes a certification mechanism for judicial determinations in election contests but does not itself codify the right to seek judicial review, define standing, establish timelines, or specify venue for challenges to election-authority decisions. It presupposes that judicial review already exists (by reference to 'section 17') but does not provide the structural codification of those procedural safeguards that the criterion requires.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes the election commission by statute (Ind. Code Title 3, art. 6) rather than by constitution. While statutory grounding provides clear legal authority, the criterion specifically asks whether the commission's existence and core mandate are set in the constitution, which earns a score of 1 (statute) rather than 2 (constitution). The institutional structure is legally grounded but not at the constitutional level.

The provided text is incomplete and truncates mid-sentence before explaining the appointment mechanism. While it references 'state chairman of the major political party,' the clause ends with 'may' without stating what power follows (nominate? appoint? recommend?). The incomplete excerpt does not establish whether appointment involves multiple branches or is controlled by a single branch. Full statutory text is required to assess multi-branch appointment structure.

“the state chairman of the major political party of the state represented by that member may”

The statute defines fixed two-year terms for appointed board members, satisfying the 'fixed length' element. However, the section provides no staggered cycle (all terms expire simultaneously), no statutory grounds for removal, and the clerk's ex officio status lacks term protection. Moreover, appointment authority rests entirely with county party chairmen—a single-party mechanism—rather than multi-branch assignment, which undermines institutional independence. Term definition alone is insufficient without removal protection and staggered renewal.

“serve a term of two (2) years or until their successors are appointed”

The statute mandates that the two co-directors cannot be from the same political party, establishing a basic political-balance requirement. However, the structure is incomplete: both co-directors are appointed unilaterally by the governor (a single-branch appointment), and there is no requirement for confirmed appointment by the legislature or independent judicial appointment. Additionally, the secretary of state—an elected executive—has final dispute-resolution authority, further concentrating power within the executive branch. While the sameparty prohibition prevents total single-party capture, the absence of multi-branch appointment or legislative confirmation leaves the framework structurally vulnerable to executive dominance.

“The co-directors may not be members of the same political party.”

The section establishes a dedicated campaign finance enforcement account that does not revert to the general fund, which provides partial insulation from mid-cycle reallocation. However, the account requires 'approval of the budget agency' for fund deployment (subsection b), and the account is funded solely by civil penalties collected under IC 3-9-4 rather than by statutory appropriation or a guaranteed revenue source. This creates vulnerability: penalty-dependent funding is inherently unpredictable and subject to fluctuation, and budget agency approval introduces discretionary control that undermines true independence. The statute lacks multi-year authorization, dedicated general fund appropriation, or explicit protection from executive reallocation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This statute mandates annual budget preparation and submission on the same cycle as other county budgets, with no provision for multi-year appropriations or budget stability. The language explicitly requires yearly estimates and itemization, which invites annual political renegotiation of election funding rather than insulating it on a predictable multi-year basis.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions to candidates and political committees in connection with elections, but does not address foreign-source funding of election authorities themselves or election administration vendors. It concerns campaign finance regulation, not the institutional funding structure or independence of election administration agencies. FUND.3 requires statutory prohibition on foreign funding of the election authority's operations; this section does not satisfy that requirement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the appointment of precinct-level poll workers (inspector and poll clerks), not career professional staff. It provides no statutory protections for civil-service employment, merit-based tenure, or professional career development. The appointment by county election board without reference to civil-service rules does not establish protected career professional staff status.

The statute mandates training by reference (section 40) and disqualifies officers who fail to complete it, confirming training is required. However, this section does not define training content or frequency—those details are delegated to section 40, which is not provided. A binary criterion requiring both requirement AND defined content/frequency cannot be fully satisfied on this excerpt alone.

“The person did not attend training required by section 40 of this chapter.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses absentee ballot signature verification procedures and voter notification requirements. It contains no statutory language establishing whistleblower protections for election staff reporting irregularities, conflicts of interest, retaliation safeguards, or accountability mechanisms. The section is purely procedural for ballot handling, not protective of staff.

The section codifies the basic certification process: it requires tests by an independent laboratory accredited under 52 U.S.C. 20971, designates an evaluator under IC 3-11-16, and specifies that approval expires per section 19(a). However, it does not codify criteria (beyond referencing external HAVA standards), does not establish a timeline for commission decisions, and contains no provision for public comment. The structure is statutorily grounded but incomplete relative to the full scope of CERT.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs voter registration form distribution at social service agencies under the National Voter Registration Act. It does not address vendor oversight, recertification triggers, or quality assurance for election vendors (e.g., voting machine manufacturers, tabulation software providers). The criterion concerns institutional safeguards for third-party election vendors; this section concerns voter registration access at unrelated government agencies.

The statute establishes clear, specific grounds for decertification (use of uncertified systems or unapproved versions) and defines the procedural consequence (revocation of approval and prohibition from marketing/selling for up to 5 years). This satisfies the structural requirement for statutory definition of both grounds and remedial procedure.