EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs periodic updating of the statewide voter registration database through change-of-address verification procedures. It contains no requirement, mandate, or reference to downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures—all elements central to the criterion of public verification artifacts for election integrity.

No matching sections in corpus.

Alabama Code § 17-2-4(b)(2)a explicitly mandates that voting systems produce a permanent paper record with manual audit capacity. This permanent paper record is available as an official record for recounts, satisfying the requirement for a voter-verifiable paper trail.

“The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires posting of election results for public inspection at the courthouse, but it does not grant citizens any legal right to conduct a re-tally or audit of those results. The statute mandates transparency in result posting but does not establish a mechanism or authority for citizens to independently verify or re-count from the posted data.

The statute mandates tamper-evident seals (envelopes with signatures across the seal) for election records, which satisfies the basic tamper-evident requirement. However, it does not mandate tamper-responsive systems or logging mechanisms beyond the signature protocol, falling short of the higher ordinal levels.

“the inspectors and any poll watchers present shall sign across the seal”

The statute explicitly requires that electronic vote counting systems shall not be capable of connecting to the Internet, cell phone networks, or possessing modem technology. This directly mandates network isolation on vote-casting equipment, fully satisfying the criterion.

“Is not capable of connecting to the Internet or cell phone networks and does not possess modem technology.”

The statute requires election officials to certify records and sign containers, establishing some chain-of-custody documentation for voted ballot containers. However, the section does not explicitly mandate that such documentation be publicly available, nor does it specify comprehensive chain-of-custody procedures beyond sealing and signing requirements. The criterion requires both 'full' documentation and public availability, neither of which is clearly established here.

“Each election official shall certify to the accuracy of the record and shall sign the envelope or container across the seal.”

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties (Class A misdemeanor) for unauthorized access to voting machines, including tampering, injury, misuse, and unauthorized possession of machine keys. This directly addresses the criterion's requirement for explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Any election officer or other person, who shall tamper with, injure, or attempt to injure any electronic voting machine to be used or being used in an election, or who shall willfully misuse any such machine, or who shall prevent or attempt to prevent the correct operation of such machine, or any unauthorized person who shall make or have in his or her possession a key to a voting machine to be used or being used in an election, shall be guilty, upon conviction, of a Class A misdemeanor.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section permits the Secretary of State to conduct an audit at discretion (using 'may') for only a single, specific election (November 8, 2022). It does not establish a mandatory audit requirement for every election; rather, it grants optional authority limited to one past election.

Alabama Code § 17-16-20 mandates a recount when margins are 0.5% or less, involving machine counting with hand recount of discrepancies. This constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount triggered by a narrow margin threshold, not a risk-limiting audit or comparison audit approach. The statute applies only to close elections, not as a statewide post-election audit method.

“The recount shall consist of reading the ballots through the counter. Any ballot that was counted in the original election, but is rejected by the counter in the recount, shall be counted by hand.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the alphabetical ordering of candidates on ballots and the sequence of offices—it addresses ballot layout and presentation, not election audits or observer access to audit procedures. It contains no provisions regarding audits, observation rights, or public access to audit processes.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the filling of vacancies on boards of registrars by appointment authority. It contains no language regarding post-election audits, audit results, or the binding force of any audit findings on certified election results. The section is entirely procedural regarding registrar board composition and is unrelated to the criterion.

The statute mandates that the voting system must have 'capability for auditing' the source code, which suggests some level of access for review purposes. However, the text does not specify who may conduct such audits, what access mechanism is provided, or whether the code is publicly available or restricted to certifying authorities. This indicates a requirement for auditability without clarifying the scope of accessibility, placing it between vendor-only and full public disclosure.

“The capability for auditing the secure remote voting application source code, and the capability for this application to be executed on a clean computer which, at a minimum, has a baseline operating system on its hard disk and no other software or driver installed.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions of voting equipment and systems terminology but contains no provisions requiring or addressing the publication or signing of ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules before polls open. It is a definitional statute unrelated to pre-election publication requirements.

The section requires capability for auditing source code and executing the application on a clean baseline system, but does not explicitly grant a right to verify that the running binary matches a committed one. The statute addresses source code auditability and clean execution environment, which are related to but distinct from post-election binary verification.

“The capability for auditing the secure remote voting application source code, and the capability for this application to be executed on a clean computer which, at a minimum, has a baseline operating system on its hard disk and no other software or driver installed.”

The statute provides political party and organization watchers with comprehensive procedural access, including rights to observe election conduct, monitor poll opening, remain throughout the election, observe ballot counting, and access all relevant election records. These provisions clearly establish full procedural access for authorized observers.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains legislative findings and declarations regarding congressional redistricting principles and communities of interest. It addresses traditional redistricting principles, population deviation, contiguity, compactness, and community preservation. The section does not address international observer access, OSCE/EU/IFES observer admissions, or transparency through international observation mechanisms.

The statute explicitly requires precinct-level (voting place) election results to be posted for public inspection no later than two hours after polls close, which far exceeds the 24-hour requirement specified in the criterion.

“No later than two hours after the polls are closed, the voting place election results as tabulated by the inspectors shall be posted by the inspectors for public inspection at a place in the county courthouse designated by the judge of probate.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the timeline for examination and certification of voting systems (90 days), but contains no language regarding whether multiple certified vendors may operate concurrently in the same election. It is procedural and does not address multi-vendor capability.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses publication of voter registration lists in newspapers and does not concern vote-format or device-protocol standards. It is about voter list management and public notice, not about technical standards for voting devices or open protocols.

The statute explicitly caps the duration of vendor contracts at a maximum of eight years, preventing perpetual lock-in to a single electronic voting system vendor. This temporal limit is a clear contractual safeguard.

“lease purchase agreement or contract of not more than eight years in length”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly guarantees that every voter has a right to vote a secret ballot and mandates that the ballot 'shall be kept secret and inviolate,' which directly addresses the legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. The statutory language is mandatory ('shall') and establishes an enforceable right.

“Every voter in Alabama shall have the right to vote a secret ballot, and that ballot shall be kept secret and inviolate.”

The statute mandates accessibility for individuals with disabilities (vision, motor) and requires at least one accessible voting system at each polling place. It also requires alternative language accessibility per the Voting Rights Act. However, the requirement is limited to "at least one" accessible system per polling place rather than comprehensive accessibility across all machines, and motor accessibility is not explicitly detailed (though DRE systems may provide it).

The statute explicitly establishes a legal floor for polling-place density by requiring at least one voting place for every 2,400 voters when precinct boundaries are changed. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for a legal floor on polling places per number of voters.

“the county governing body shall forthwith designate and establish at least one voting place for every 2,400 voters in each election precinct so created”