EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 17-5-14.1 regulates disclosure by separate segregated political funds (corporate PACs), not by election commissioners or senior election staff. The section requires funds to file financial disclosures with the Secretary of State, but this applies to fund custodians as political actors, not to the institutional leadership of election administration. The statute contains no conflict-of-interest disclosure requirement for commissioners or senior election staff.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 17-15-5 is a ministerial duty statute requiring the judge of probate to publish notice of elections. It does not establish a right to judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it define standing, timeline, or venue for challenges to election administration. The section addresses notification procedures only, not accountability mechanisms or judicial review pathways.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Fair Ballot Commission is created by statute (Code of Alabama § 17-6-81), not by constitution. While the section provides clear statutory grounding for the commission's existence and core mandate (fair and accurate explanation of ballot measures), it does not meet the criterion's requirement that the commission be established in the constitution rather than statute alone.

The Fair Ballot Commission is composed of members appointed by multiple branches: executive (Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner, Secretary of State), legislative (Speaker of House), and academic/institutional entities (three universities). No single branch unilaterally controls the 18-member composition, and appointment authority is explicitly distributed by statute across distinct power centers.

“The Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Secretary of State, or their designees, shall each serve as a member on the commission and shall each appoint to the commission one member who is an attorney licensed in the state and one member who is a private citizen of the state who is not an attorney. The Alabama State University School of Public Policy, the Samford University School of Public Policy, and the Miles College School of Law shall each appoint a member to the commission.”

The statute establishes fixed-term lengths (2 years initial, 4 years thereafter), staggered appointment cycles (alternating 2-year and 4-year initial terms), and term limits (two consecutive full terms maximum). These are statutorily defined structural protections against at-will removal and unlimited re-appointment. While the section does not specify statutory grounds for removal, the fixed terms and consecutive-term limits themselves provide constitutional-level protection against arbitrary removal during the term.

“The initial terms of the members appointed by the Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Lieutenant Governor shall be for two years while the initial terms of the members appointed by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries and the Secretary of State shall be for four years. After the initial term, each subsequent member shall be appointed to a four-year term. No appointed member of the commission shall serve more than two full consecutive terms.”

The section requires political balance at the precinct level (inspectors and clerks must be from opposing parties 'if practicable'), but this applies to poll workers, not to the election commission itself. COMM.4 measures whether the commission's composition is statutorily balanced. This statute does not address commission appointment, composition, or balance requirements; it only governs how precinct election officials are selected. The 'if practicable' language also weakens the requirement, making balance discretionary rather than mandatory.

“one inspector and at least three clerks shall be appointed for each county from members of opposing political parties, if practicable”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs corporate and nonprofit political action committees and voluntary contribution funds — it does not address election authority funding, budget structure, or protection from mid-cycle reallocation. It contains no statutory framework for independent election administration funding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains legislative findings regarding congressional redistricting principles and community-of-interest definitions. It does not address election administration funding mechanisms, budget cycles, or fiscal independence for election infrastructure. The section is entirely about redistricting policy, not election administration governance or funding structures.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section imposes criminal penalties for failure to return ballots and supplies but contains no statutory framework governing career staff employment, civil-service protection, merit-based hiring, or professional staffing standards for election administration. It addresses prosecutorial consequences for misconduct, not institutional safeguards for professional independence or career protection.

The section mandates that absentee election officials be trained 'in the same manner as prescribed for regular election officials,' establishing a requirement for training by cross-reference. However, this section does not itself define the content or frequency of that training—it delegates to other statutory provisions ('as prescribed for regular election officials'). The criterion requires content and frequency to be defined by statute; this section satisfies the existence of a requirement but fails to provide the substantive detail necessary for full compliance.

“Absentee election officials are to be appointed and trained in the same manner as prescribed for regular election officials.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section codifies certification criteria (Federal Election Commission standards, paper-ballot requirement) and establishes that evaluation and testing must occur before certification, but does not codify specific evaluator qualifications, timelines for evaluation/certification decisions, or public-comment periods. The statute permits the committee to employ experts and use independent testing authority certification, but leaves the mechanics of the evaluation process to administrative discretion.

“The committee shall invite any vendor or company interested in selling an electronic vote counting system in Alabama to submit its equipment for examination. The vote counting system shall be certified after a satisfactory evaluation and testing has been performed to determine that the equipment meets the requirements of this article and performance and test standards for electronic voting systems issued by the Federal Election Commission.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns political action committee registration and disclosure requirements, not election system vendor oversight or recertification. CERT.2 addresses whether voting equipment or election software vendors must be recertified after material updates, defects, or on a fixed schedule. Alabama § 17-5-5 imposes no codified recertification triggers for vendors; it merely requires PACs to file organizational statements and report material changes to the Secretary of State. The institutional structure for vendor recertification is entirely absent from this section.

No matching sections in corpus.