EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

The statute identifies one category of standing with reasonable specificity: an elector of the party that held the primary. However, it is narrowly tailored to primary nomination contests only and does not enumerate standing for general election contests or establish standing for other potential parties (candidates, the opposing party, attorney general, precinct-qualified voters, etc.). The criterion asks whether 'parties with standing to contest an election' are enumerated—a plural suggesting multiple categories should be addressed. This section addresses only one narrow category (primary electors contesting their own party's nominee) and leaves undefined whether other contestants may contest primary or general elections under this chapter. The enumeration is thus partial: clear for the specific context addressed, but incomplete across the full range of election contests contemplated by the statute.

“Any elector of a party desiring to contest the nomination by his or her party of any candidate declared the nominee for any office”

This section specifies the appellate venue (Supreme Court) and appeal deadlines (14 days), but does not specify the court of original jurisdiction for election contests. The text references appeals 'before the judge of probate' and 'from the judgment of the circuit court,' implying these are forums for original jurisdiction, but the statute does not affirmatively establish which court has original jurisdiction or the conditions under which contests are filed in probate versus circuit court. The section addresses appellate procedure and timing clearly, satisfying part of the procedural clarity requirement, but fails to codify the original jurisdiction rule that would allow a contestant to know where to file initially.

“In all contested elections before the judge of probate, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court within 14 days after the rendition of the judgment. From the judgment of the circuit court on the contest of an election of a judge of probate or sheriff or any other officer mentioned in Section 17-16-56, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court within 14 days after the rendition of the judgment.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section codifies a deadline for APPEALS from a contested election judgment (14 days post-judgment), not the deadline for FILING an initial election contest. The criterion requires specification of the deadline for filing a contest itself — i.e., the initial complaint or petition that triggers the dispute resolution process. This section addresses post-judgment appellate procedure. To satisfy CONT.EDRI.3, the statute must specify when a contestant must file their original challenge to an election result (typically measured from certification, election day, or a similar defined triggering event). This section does not provide that information.

§ 17-16-48 codifies procedural notice requirements and timing constraints for presenting evidence of illegal or rejected votes in election contests. It establishes a mandatory notice rule (written notice identifying specific votes, voters, precincts, and recipients) and a 10-day advance notice deadline before testimony. However, the statute does not codify a standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt) or substantive admissibility rules governing what types of evidence are admissible or how they should be evaluated. It prescribes only notice procedure—a gatekeeping mechanism—not evidentiary standards or burdens of proof. Under the scoring rule, this qualifies as partial satisfaction: a procedural evidentiary rule is codified, but the standard of proof and core admissibility doctrine are not.

“No testimony must be received of any illegal votes or of the rejection of any legal votes in any contested election commenced under the provisions of this article unless the party complaining thereof has given to the adverse party notice in writing of the number of illegal votes and by whom given and for whom given, and at what precinct or voting place cast, or the number of legal votes rejected, and by whom offered, and at what precinct or voting place cast, which the party expects to prove on the trial. Such notice must be served personally or left at the residence or usual place of business of the adverse party at least 10 days before the taking of testimony in reference to such votes.”

Alabama Code § 17-16-21 codifies detailed recount procedures directly in statute. Subsection (b) specifies how the recount shall be conducted, including: (1) who counts (a trained and certified precinct election official under supervision, with sheriff present); (2) how (ballots delivered unopened, machine retested, ballots read through counter, hand-counting for disputed ballots, opposing representatives invited to participate); and (3) evidence/safeguards (sealed containers, signed seals, printout of results, chain of custody procedures). Subsection (a) establishes the trigger (petition by person with standing within 48 hours of canvass), cost allocation (petitioner pays, county bears cost if recount alters result), and notice requirements (24 hours to opposing interests). Subsection (c) addresses documentation and sealing. These procedural requirements are not delegated to regulation or administrative directive but are explicitly mandated by statute. The statute uses mandatory language ('shall') for core procedural elements.

The statute establishes a petition-based recount mechanism with a clear temporal trigger (within 48 hours of official canvass) and identifies who may petition (persons with standing under other sections). However, the statute does not enumerate substantive triggers or thresholds (e.g., margin-of-victory thresholds, percentage discrepancies, or specific grounds beyond general standing). It also does not address automatic recount triggers. The section cross-references Sections 17-16-40 and 17-16-47 for standing rules, but those are not provided in this instrument, making independent verification of recount eligibility criteria impossible. The procedural timing is clear, but the substantive grounds for triggering a recount—a core element of RECT.2—remain either undefined in this section or relegated to external statutory provisions.

“Any person with standing to contest the election under Sections 17-16-40 and 17-16-47 may petition the canvassing authority for a recount of any or all precinct returns.”

Section 17-16-20(d) explicitly allocates recount costs by statutory rule, distinguishing between state and county offices. State-level offices are charged to the state; county offices are charged to the county. The statute further clarifies personnel compensation methodology in subsection (c) and cost-minimization requirements in subsection (g). This is a clear, codified allocation rule that answers who pays and under what circumstances (type of office). While Alabama's recount is mandatory when margins fall below 0.5% rather than petition-based, the statute satisfies the criterion because cost allocation is unambiguously prescribed by statute tied to office type.

“The expenses of a recount conducted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be a state charge if the recount is held for an election for a federal, state, circuit, or district office, or the state Senate, state House of Representatives, or any other office that is not a county office. The expenses of a recount conducted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be a county charge if the recount is held for an election for county office.”

Section (e) explicitly codifies that recount findings are binding and mandatory — the canvassing board 'shall amend the initial certification' to reflect recount results. This creates a clear statutory mandate for the legal effect of a recount: the recount result becomes the new official certification. Section (f) further reinforces this by providing that the contest deadline is suspended until 'the vote is recertified, reflecting the results of the recount,' confirming the recount result is the controlling finding. The statute does not leave recount effect to discretion or case-by-case interpretation; it prescribes amendment of certification as mandatory and binding.

“If a recount is conducted pursuant to subsection (a), the appropriate canvassing board or authority shall amend the initial certification of the election to reflect the results of the recount. The results of the recount shall be posted as the initial count and transmitted to the Secretary of State within 24 hours.”

Section 17-12-21 codifies a specific, mandatory certification deadline in statute: the Secretary of State 'shall' furnish certificates of election 'within 10 days after receiving the returns.' This language establishes a clear, binding timeline that is not subject to administrative discretion. The use of 'shall' imposes a mandatory duty with a defined temporal trigger (10 days from receipt of returns). The deadline is statutory, not left to agency discretion or interpretation. This satisfies the criterion that the certification deadline must be 'set by statute, not by administrative discretion.'

“The Secretary of State shall, within 10 days after receiving the returns of election from the judge of probate of each county, furnish, from a count of the actual vote cast, as the same appears by the returns certified to him or her, certificates of election to members of the Legislature and to members of Congress.”

Section 17-16-20(f) provides a mechanism to suspend the time limit for contesting an election during a pending recount, but it suspends the contest deadline rather than explicitly staying certification itself. The statute requires the canvassing board to amend certification to reflect recount results (§17-16-20(e)) and mandates recertification within 24 hours of recount completion. While the recount process delays the contest period, the statute does not explicitly provide for staying the initial certification pending a recount decision. The mechanism partially addresses the underlying concern (preventing premature finality of initial results) but through deadline suspension rather than through an explicit statutory stay of certification. This satisfies the functional purpose of TIME.2 (preventing a lock-in of results while disputes are pending) but lacks clear statutory language establishing a formal stay on the certification itself.

“If a recount is conducted pursuant to subsection (a), the time limit for contesting the election shall be suspended until the vote is recertified, reflecting the results of the recount.”