EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 60 (supervisory services) covers financial oversight, not voter-verification package. Article 57-59 cover electoral funds. Articles 33, 38 cover candidate registration. No downloadable signed verification package for voting results codified.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Article 64 (Voting Procedure) establishes the foundational paper-ballot regime: voters cast ballots at polling stations, ballots placed in sealed ballot boxes. Article 63 (in 7.2 cands) details ballot specifications. Russia uses hand-marked paper ballots in the standard regime; KOIB scanners produce paper records; DEG (remote electronic) is the exception.

Article 72 codifies: 'Commission shall provide for inspection the voting results for each electoral district, referendum district, the territory within the area of responsibility of the commission, referendum results within the scope...' — public inspection of precinct-level data codified. Combined with Article 30 (commissions openness) and Article 78 (right to file appeals about voting results), citizen access to results for verification is codified. Standing for re-tally limited to candidates/observers/CSO standing per Article 75-77.

Article 68(1) codifies: 'Vote counting shall be open and transparent, with all actions and results of the counting of ballots and votes of voters... openly and transparently announced.' Article 64 codifies the voting procedure including sealed ballot boxes. Article 67 codifies the precinct protocol. Article 65 codifies early voting with seal requirements. Ordinal level 2: tamper-evident seals required.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 46 (opinion polls), Article 45 (informing voters), Article 72 (results publication), Article 56 (campaign restrictions), Article 53 (mass campaigning events) — none address network-isolation prohibition for voting equipment. Russia's DEG (remote electronic voting) is by definition network-connected.

Article 69 codifies the chain-of-custody for protocols: 'First original copies of the protocol of voting results...' transmitted up the commission hierarchy. Article 62 codifies absentee certificate custody. Article 58 codifies electoral fund accounting. Article 4 establishes voter eligibility framework. Chain-of-custody documentation is codified.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Article 60 codifies 'Supervisory and Auditing Services' attached to election commissions: 'For the purposes of supervision over proper spending of funds allocated to commissions for preparation and conduct of elections, a referendum, and over sources, proper accounting, and use of electoral funds, referendum funds, for auditing of...' Combined with Article 68 (open vote counting) and Article 77 (cancellation of voting results upon discovered violations), audit framework exists but mostly oriented toward financial oversight, not result verification.

Article 68 codifies the vote-counting method as open, transparent hand-counting at the precinct level. Article 69 codifies protocol-aggregation up the commission hierarchy. Article 77 enables cancellation of voting results upon discovered violations. Ordinal level 2: fixed-mechanism hand recount through commission hierarchy.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Article 60 (Supervisory and Auditing Services) codifies oversight bodies attached to election commissions. Article 30 (in 6.1 cands) codifies commission openness with observer presence at all stages, which extends to audit/recount proceedings. Public observation of audit codified via the general transparency framework.

Article 60 establishes binding nature of audit findings on commission financial accountability. Article 77 (cancellation of decision on voting results) makes audit/violation findings binding on the certified result — the commission may cancel results upon discovered violations. Findings are statutorily binding.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 61 (Polling Station) covers polling-station provision by municipal head. Article 2 (definitions) — neither codifies pre-poll signed publication of ballot layouts/tabulation rules.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Article 30 codifies commission openness with comprehensive observer rights: 'Members of superior commissions and employees of their administration, candidate registered by this or superior commission or his attorney, authorized representative or attorney of election association which list of candidates is registered' may be present. Article 68 codifies observer rights during counting. Article 72 (public results inspection). Article 66 (outside-polling-station voting observation). Strong codified observer framework — though OSCE/ODIHR observer reports document widespread practical restrictions.

Article 30 codifies the openness framework which extends to international observers via Article 23-24 (subject-level commission appointment of foreign observers). However, international observers must be invited by the state and Russia withdrew accreditation invitations to OSCE/ODIHR for the 2021 Duma election. Codified in principle but heavily state-discretionary in practice.

Article 72 codifies that 'Commission shall provide for inspection the voting results for each electoral district, referendum district, the territory within the area of responsibility of the commission, referendum results within the scope of its powers...' — within 48 hours of receiving subordinate protocols per Article 69 chained timeline. Ordinal level 4: within 48 hours codified.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 21 (CEC formation) and Article 23 (regional commissions) describe the state administrative structure. No multi-vendor regime — Russia procures voting equipment (KOIB/KEG scanners) through a single state-controlled vendor (state enterprise + selected suppliers).

Article 68 (Procedure of Counting Votes) codifies open and transparent vote-counting procedures. Article 70 (Establishment of Results) codifies result-aggregation protocols. Statutory protocols are public, though no vote-format/device-protocol specification is codified for the KOIB/DEG systems.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 28 (commission organization), Article 16 (voter registration), Article 37 (signature collection), Article 59 (electoral fund expenditure) — none address vendor-contract duration caps.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Article 7 explicitly codifies: 'Voting at elections and referenda shall be by secret balloting, which shall exclude any control over expression of a citizen's will.' Article 3(1) reinforces ('A citizen of the Russian Federation shall participate in elections on the basis of the universal, equal and direct electoral right by secret balloting'). Constitutionally grounded in Constitution Article 81 (presidential) and Article 32 (general suffrage).

Article 61 (Polling Station) covers polling-place provision; Article 63 (Ballot) covers ballot production. No specific accessibility (visual, motor, language) mandate codified in surfaced corpus — Article 66 (voting outside polling station) provides for some disability accommodation but not a comprehensive accessibility standard. Some accessibility provisions exist (e.g., Article 66 mobile voting for the disabled/elderly) but not the full visual/motor/language mandate.

Article 19 codifies precinct formation: 'Election precincts, referendum precincts shall be formed to conduct voting and votes counting' — geographic precinct structure mandated. Article 27 codifies precinct commission formation. Article 17 (preparation of voter lists) ensures voter-list coverage. Geographic density floor codified though specific voter-cap thresholds aren't FTS-surfaced.