EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the eligibility, qualifications, and conduct requirements for members of the Central Electoral Commission. It does not address election verification mechanisms, downloadable packages of certificates, device records, result signatures, or any technical infrastructure for public verification of election results.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates that voters must physically mark a paper ballot by affixing a stamp, creating a hand-marked paper record. This constitutes a voter-verifiable paper trail as voters create and can visually verify the paper record before depositing it in the ballot box.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 97 establishes the competence of public authorities to examine appeals and disputes, but it does not confer any right upon individual citizens to independently re-tally votes or verify precinct-level data. The authority to examine appeals and recount votes (e.g., subsection 2(b) regarding vote recounts) is reserved to the Central Electoral Commission and other specified state bodies, not to citizens acting on their own initiative.

The section requires checking seals on ballot boxes before opening them, which indicates a tamper-evident standard (seals that show if boxes have been opened). However, the statute does not specify what happens if seals are found to be broken, nor does it mandate any logging or auto-quarantine procedures, limiting the score to the basic tamper-evident level.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses media outlet coverage of elections and journalistic rights, including fair treatment of candidates, right of reply, and journalist access to electoral proceedings. It does not concern vote-casting equipment, network isolation, or any technical security measures related to voting machines or their connectivity. The criterion asks about prohibition of internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity on voting equipment, which is entirely outside the scope of this media regulation article.

The section requires seal-checking and presence of observers during ballot box opening, which demonstrates some procedural safeguard and documentation through witness presence. However, it does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation nor does it mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The statute addresses ballot handling procedures but lacks explicit requirements for comprehensive chain-of-custody records.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the settlement of appeals within the electoral administration and court procedures, not criminal penalties for unauthorized access to devices or equipment. It deals with remedies and enforcement of electoral rules, not device tamper protections.

The section mentions the Court of Auditors and references an 'audit report' in paragraph (3), suggesting that some form of audit occurs. However, the text does not explicitly state that a post-election audit is legally mandatory for every election; it only requires reporting after audit approval without mandating the audit itself in this provision.

“the Court of Auditors”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 77 addresses the organisation and physical arrangement of polling station premises, voter flow, accessibility, and supervision of voting operations. It does not contain any provisions regarding post-election audit methods or procedures. The section is entirely focused on pre-election and election-day logistics rather than post-election audit mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section grants some access to observe counting and verification of vote counts to 'persons authorised to attend electoral operations,' but it does not explicitly establish whether parties, media, and citizens have guaranteed observer access to post-election audits. The provision addresses transparency during the initial vote count at polling stations, not comprehensive audit procedures, and does not define who qualifies as 'authorised persons' or guarantee broad public observation rights.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section outlines the Central Electoral Commission's tasks in supervising and controlling political party and election campaign financing. It does not address whether audit results are legally binding on the final certified election result. The section concerns financial oversight and reporting mechanisms, not the legal effect of audits on election certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates electoral agitation, campaign periods, and voter conduct during elections. It contains no provisions addressing voting system source code accessibility, vendor disclosure, certification authority review, or technical transparency of voting systems.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 68 addresses the registration of electoral competitors (candidates), including document submission, timelines, and publication of candidate lists. It does not address the signing or pre-election publication of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules, which are the focus of criterion 1.4. The section is about candidate eligibility and registration procedures, not ballot design or tabulation rule verification.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly grants both national (party/civil-society) and international observers comprehensive procedural access to electoral operations, meetings, information, and documentation. National observers are specifically authorized to submit complaints and receive binding responses, and all observers can access electoral rolls, minutes, and may conduct photography/video recording, which constitutes full procedural access to observe and document the electoral process.

The section permits international observers but only if they are 'accredited by the respective electoral bodies'—this is conditional access rather than admission 'by default.' The criterion asks about default admission for OSCE/EU/IFES observers specifically, but the statute grants access only through an accreditation process controlled by electoral bodies, which does not guarantee automatic or default admission.

The statute mandates submission of constituency-level results to the Central Electoral Commission within 48 hours of poll closure, meeting the 48-hour threshold in the scoring rule. However, the criterion specifically asks about publication of precinct-level (polling station) results within 24 hours, and this section does not require public publication within 24 hours—it only requires submission to the CEC within 48 hours, which falls short of the 24-hour public disclosure standard.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses cooperation between the Central Electoral Commission and various government ministries and agencies in organizing and conducting elections. It contains no provisions regarding certified vendors, multi-vendor capability, or vendor independence in election systems. The section is focused on institutional coordination and administrative responsibilities, not vendor management or election technology procurement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 27 describes the Central Electoral Commission's administrative powers and responsibilities for managing elections, including supervising electoral bodies, coordinating procedures, and distributing materials. It does not address whether vote-format or device-protocol standards are open or publicly documented. The section is about electoral governance structure, not technical standard transparency.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 70 addresses electoral agitation, campaign periods, voter transport restrictions, use of administrative resources, and advertising requirements. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, their duration, or caps on contract length. This section is entirely unrelated to the criterion of vendor contract duration caps.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute legally mandates structural arrangements that guarantee ballot secrecy by requiring voters to use secret ballot booths before depositing ballots, making voter-ballot unlinkability a physically enforced requirement. The section also explicitly assigns the electoral bureau responsibility for 'secrecy of voters' expression,' establishing an enforceable duty to maintain this protection.

The section mandates that polling station premises must comply with accessibility regulations for people with disabilities, as determined by the Central Electoral Commission. However, the statute does not itself specify the actual accessibility standards (vision, motor, language accommodations); instead, it delegates those standards to a regulation to be approved by the CEC. The mandate exists but the concrete standards are not articulated in this section.

The section establishes a ceiling on polling-station size (maximum 3000 voters, up to 3300 with mayoral proposal) but does not establish a density floor—that is, a requirement for a minimum number of polling stations per voter population or per geographic area. The minimum of 30 voters per station is a lower bound on station size, not a floor on density provision. A density floor would require something like 'at least one polling station per X voters' or 'at least one per Y square kilometers,' which is absent.