EAdIElection Administration Index

The section establishes incompatibility rules (family ties, financial support, public advocacy) that members must observe, creating grounds for removal. However, it does not mandate PUBLIC DISCLOSURE of financial interests, vendor relationships, or party positions—it only prohibits certain activities and provides for removal if violated. COI.1 requires affirmative disclosure mechanisms (e.g., filing statements, public registers), not just prohibition and removal.

The section codifies a statutory right to judicial review of election-authority decisions with explicit venue allocation (district courts for lower bodies, Court of Appeal for the Central Electoral Commission) and a defined appellate ladder. It establishes clear standing (any party may appeal actions/inactions/decisions) and procedural framework by reference to the Administrative Code and Code of Civil Procedure, satisfying the core institutional accountability requirement.

The section establishes the Central Electoral Commission's existence and core mandate (organizing and conducting elections and referenda) in statutory law (the Electoral Code), satisfying the minimum threshold for institutional grounding. However, the criterion specifically asks whether this grounding is constitutional rather than statutory alone. This text is from the Electoral Code statute, not the constitution, so it scores 1 rather than 2. The statute provides clear legal foundation, but constitutional-level protection would provide stronger institutional entrenchment.

Article 35(4) establishes multi-branch appointment of second-level constituency council members: the judiciary (district courts) appoints two members, the legislature (local councils/People's Assembly) appoints two members, and political parties represented in Parliament each appoint one member. The chairperson is appointed by the Central Electoral Commission but subject to civil service law protections. This structure ensures no single branch unilaterally controls composition and satisfies the multi-branch appointment requirement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural allocation of parliamentary mandates following elections and the role of alternates in filling vacancies. It does not address the composition, terms, appointment, or removal of election commissioners. There is no statutory definition of commissioner term length, staggered cycles, or grounds for removal in this text.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the procedural logistics of relieving electoral officials from their primary jobs, their remuneration, and their employment arrangements during electoral periods. It contains no statutory language establishing or requiring political balance in the composition of any electoral commission. The section does not address appointment mechanisms, party representation, supermajority voting, judicial appointment, or any structural safeguard against single-party capture of the commission.

The section establishes that election expenditure is part of the CEC's budget line, satisfying the separation requirement. However, it lacks statutory protection against mid-cycle reallocation: paragraph (6) permits the Government to reallocate funds from its reserve fund if the initial budget is insufficient, and paragraph (8) requires unused funds to revert to the State budget, both mechanisms that undermine true independence. The statute does not guarantee multi-year funding, protected carve-outs, or prevent executive reduction during an electoral cycle.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance ceilings and contribution limits to electoral funds, not election administration budgets or infrastructure funding. It provides no statutory framework for multi-year funding cycles for election administration institutions or staff. The criterion requires evidence of independent, multi-year budget setting for election administration; this section concerns only the regulation of political campaign financing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 70 addresses electoral agitation, campaign conduct, and voter outreach — not the funding of the election authority itself or its vendors. The section contains no statutory prohibition on foreign funding of the Central Electoral Commission, election administration staff, or election administration contractors. The criterion requires structural safeguards against foreign-source funding of the *institutional machinery* of elections; this section regulates campaign speech and candidate conduct.

The section establishes that the chairperson of second-level constituency councils is appointed on a permanent basis and is explicitly subject to Moldova's civil-service law (Law No 158/2008). However, the other council members are appointed on an ad-hoc, election-cycle basis by district courts, local councils, and political parties — not as career civil servants. The section addresses one permanent staff position but does not establish a broader professional career civil-service structure for the Central Electoral Commission's staff or continuous election administration operations.

The statute mandates that the Central Electoral Commission organize specialized training for electoral officials and other subjects involved in the electoral process through the Centre for Continuous Electoral Training. While the phrase 'at their request' introduces an element of discretion regarding uptake, the core statutory duty to organize and provide such training is clearly established. The section also establishes the certification/attestation procedure for electoral knowledge and competence, creating a framework that supports mandatory qualification standards. This satisfies STAFF.2 by establishing statutorily-grounded training requirements for election officials.

The section establishes a duty to report irregularities to prosecutorial authorities, which addresses accountability mechanisms. However, it imposes a mandatory reporting obligation rather than protecting whistleblowers who report voluntarily or in good faith. True whistleblower protection requires statutory shields against retaliation, anti-intimidation safeguards, confidentiality provisions, or safe channels for reporting—none of which are codified here. This section creates a reporting duty but not the institutional protections that define whistleblower safeguards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 58 governs financial reporting and campaign-finance disclosure requirements for electoral competitors and initiative groups. It does not address voting-equipment certification, evaluators, testing criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. This section is orthogonal to vendor oversight or equipment certification.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.