ECIElection Campaign-Finance Index

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute for both natural and legal persons, specifying precise numerical ceilings (6 average monthly salaries for citizens, with reductions for public officials and benefit-recipients, and 12 average monthly salaries for legal entities). The limits are enumerated exhaustively by donor category and are statutorily grounded, not delegated to administrative discretion. This satisfies the CONT.1 criterion for statutory codification of the contribution-limit framework.

Article 54(5) establishes a statutory prohibition on financing by certain classes of persons, including anonymous persons and third parties (54(5)(c)), which touches on independent expenditure control. However, the section does not clearly define what constitutes 'independent expenditure' as distinct from candidate-committee spending, does not enumerate separate registration or disclosure requirements for independent spenders, and does not establish a distinct compliance or enforcement regime for third-party spending separate from candidate committees. The provision addresses who cannot fund campaigns but lacks the procedural clarity needed for independent-expenditure governance (registration thresholds, disclosure timing, coordination rules, etc.).

The statute explicitly prohibits anonymous contributions (Art. 54(5)(c)), satisfying the first procedural element (statutory grounding of the prohibition). However, while Art. 54(7) states that amounts received in violation of these restrictions 'shall be paid to the state budget, under a decision of the Central Electoral Commission,' the statute does not enumerate the specific procedures for identifying, segregating, or disposing of anonymous contributions at the point of receipt. The provision relies on CEC discretion ('under a decision') rather than defining exhaustive handling procedures in the statute itself (e.g., how to detect anonymity, timelines for disposition, treatment of partial-anonymity or cash gifts). This leaves the procedural clarity incomplete.

“c) anonymous persons or on behalf of third parties;”

The statute establishes contribution limits (thresholds) and specifies that cash donations up to an average national salary are permitted, creating an implicit disclosure threshold. However, the statute explicitly delegates to the Central Electoral Commission the determination of 'the procedure for collecting and depositing cash donations' and in paragraph (6) states that 'the conditions and the manner in which they are recorded, and the procedure for reporting them, shall be laid down in regulations approved by the Central Electoral Commission.' This means the specific disclosure reporting threshold and mechanism are not fully defined in statute but left to administrative regulation, satisfying the criterion only partially.

Article 58(3) explicitly enumerates filing deadlines in statute: weekly reports per approved timetable, a final report within 3 days after voting day, and for initiative groups a final report within 3 days of subscription-list submission. The filing schedule is codified with specific temporal benchmarks rather than delegated to administrative discretion. Paragraphs (4) establish the same structured deadlines for independent candidates in local elections.

The statute explicitly requires disclosure of multiple contributor-identity elements: full name and surname, residence, place of work, position held (occupation/type of activity), and for legal persons, state identification number and name. This satisfies the full-identity requirement (employer/occupation/employer identification). The requirement is statutorily enumerated in Art. 58(1) with no delegation to administrative discretion for the identity fields themselves.

Article 58(8) provides a clear statutory requirement that campaign-finance reports must be made publicly accessible online within a defined and specific timeframe (24 hours after receipt and verification). The statute mandates both the mechanism (website publication) and the deadline, satisfying the procedural-clarity requirement. Paragraph (9) further specifies which personal data elements are to be redacted for privacy compliance.

The section establishes that violations incur 'criminal or administrative liability' but does not define penalty amounts, fine scales, or criminal grades within the statute itself—it delegates to external law ('in accordance with the law'). This provides statutory authorization for penalties but fails to codify a specific penalty schedule with enumerated amounts or offense grades. The statute thus establishes enforcement authority without the procedural clarity of a detailed, self-contained penalty matrix.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the tasks and powers of the Central Electoral Commission in campaign-finance supervision but does not address how the Commission is appointed, by which branches, or what protections exist against in-cycle political control. The statute delegates enforcement authority to the CEC but does not establish the structural or procedural safeguards (multi-branch appointment, term protections, removal limits) required to satisfy ENF.2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 59 establishes procedural mechanisms for governmental supervision and control of campaign financing by the Central Electoral Commission and electoral constituency councils, but contains no provision creating or enabling a private right of action for citizens or parties to sue for campaign-finance violations. The enforcement authority is exclusively vested in administrative bodies operating ex officio or on-the-spot review; no statute text here grants standing to private parties.

Article 54(5)(g)–(h) explicitly and statutorily prohibits financing by foreign legal persons and foreign states/international organizations. The prohibition is codified in the Electoral Code itself, not delegated to regulation or administrative discretion. This directly addresses the FOR.1 criterion: a clear statutory prohibition on direct foreign contribution to electoral competitors, referendum participants, and initiative groups.

“foreign legal persons, including foreign or joint ventures”

The statute directly prohibits foreign natural persons (§5(b)), foreign legal persons and joint ventures (§5(g)), and anonymous contributions or pass-throughs to third parties (§5(c)). However, the prohibition does not enumerate verification procedures, ownership-tracing mechanisms, or how domestic entities with foreign control are to be identified and screened. The statute states what is banned but does not define the procedural apparatus—audit protocols, disclosure of beneficial ownership, documentation requirements—necessary to detect and enforce indirect channels.

Article 54(5) clearly prohibits foreign-source financing by statute, which satisfies the existence of a rule. However, the section does not specify verification procedures that campaign committees must follow to verify contributors are not foreign-source. Paragraph (3) assigns responsibility for 'recordkeeping' but does not mandate affirmative verification methods, due-diligence requirements, or the documentation standards needed to distinguish foreign from domestic sources, leaving potential reliance on self-attestation.

Article 57 establishes mandatory account-based donation procedures and reporting requirements (paragraph 6 delegates specifics to CEC regulations), but the statute itself does not specify a record-retention period, the scope of records to be retained (contributor lists, bank statements, expenditure documentation), or audit-access requirements. While the framework is statutorily grounded, the operational detail critical to TRACE.1 is deferred to administrative regulation rather than enumerated in statute.

The section establishes that control/audit of campaign financing occurs within 6 months post-election and describes audit methods (factual, desk, full, partial, thematic, operational, counterbalancing), but does not specify whether audits are mandatory for all committees, randomly sampled, threshold-triggered, or routine. The statute delegates detailed procedures to regulations approved by the Central Electoral Commission (art. 6), leaving the triggering mechanism and scope of mandatory audit access undefined in statutory text rather than enumerated exhaustively.