Greenlandv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity15.1%8/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access42.9%
3/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs the announcement and verification of candidate nominations before election day, not post-election result reporting or provision of downloadable verification artifacts. It addresses publication of candidate names and communication to electoral boards, which does not involve certificates, device records, or result signatures related to vote tabulation.

§ view source
2026-06-06
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

The section mandates that voters fill out ballots by hand by marking with a cross, creating a hand-marked paper record. The statute further requires voters to fold the ballot before placing it in the ballot box (Stk. 9), and provides for ballot replacement if filled out incorrectly (Stk. 11), all of which preserve the integrity of the paper trail. This constitutes a legally required voter-verifiable paper record.

§ view source
2026-06-06
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses preparations for voting, including publication of voting times, polling places, and candidate nomination deadlines, as well as election official record-keeping and ballot verification procedures. It does not address citizen rights to re-tally or access to published precinct-level voting data that would enable independent verification of results.

§ view source
2026-06-06

Custody Hardware

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The statute requires ballot boxes to be capable of being locked or sealed, which provides a basic tamper-evident mechanism. However, the section does not specify logging, monitoring, or automatic response protocols, nor does it mandate tamper-responsive features that would automatically quarantine compromised hardware.

§ view source
2026-06-06
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 42 establishes requirements for polling places, voting booths, and ballot boxes (their design, security, and functionality), but does not address chain-of-custody documentation or its public availability. The section concerns physical infrastructure and election-day conduct, not documentation procedures for ballot handling.

§ view source
2026-06-06
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06

Post Election Audit

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

The section mandates a recount (genoptælling) of votes on election day itself, requiring two consecutive counts to match before results are finalized. However, this is a same-day procedural recount rather than a post-election audit in the broader sense typically contemplated by election integrity standards, which usually involve statistical sampling, risk-limiting audits, or audits conducted after election day is complete.

Umiddelbart efter optællingen af de afgivne stemmer foretages genoptælling af de afgivne stemmer.
§ view source
2026-06-06
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses in-person recounting of votes on election day to verify the initial count, which is a procedural verification step rather than a post-election audit method. It does not mandate any of the audit methods specified in the scoring rule (fixed-% hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or RLA with reconciliation).

§ view source
2026-06-06
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 57 addresses procedures for declaring elections invalid and ordering new elections when significant errors have occurred, and for correcting voter lists. It does not establish mechanisms for triggering additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges; it only permits the Election Board (Valgnævnet) to invalidate an election if major errors are found. The provision is about election annulment and remedial procedures, not audit triggers.

§ view source
2026-06-06
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the display of voter rolls (valglisten) prior to election day, not the conduct or observation of post-election audits. It is therefore irrelevant to the criterion regarding public observation of audit procedures.

§ view source
2026-06-06
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate alliances (kandidatforbund) for independent candidates in electoral registration. It contains no provisions regarding audit procedures, audit results, or binding force of audits on certified election results. The section is entirely unrelated to post-election audit requirements.

§ view source
2026-06-06

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 49 addresses the validity criteria for ballots cast on election day and advance ballots, focusing on when ballots are deemed invalid (blank, unclear intent, illegally produced, or marked). It does not address publication, signing, or pre-election disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules.

§ view source
2026-06-06
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the role and responsibilities of the Electoral Commission (Valgnævnet) regarding election management, record-keeping, and publication of election information. It contains no provisions whatsoever concerning software verification, binary matching, source code verification, or technical integrity checks of election systems. The criterion concerns post-election software verification—a concept entirely absent from this administrative section about election procedures.

§ view source
2026-06-06

Transparency Observation

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?0/10.0%

The statute requires that ballot counting be public and prohibits candidates from participating, establishing a transparency framework. However, the section does not explicitly grant party or civil-society observers procedural rights of access—it only mandates that counting occur publicly and, if fewer than two eligible voters attend, that two witnesses be called. Full procedural observer rights would require explicit provisions for access, inspection rights, or standing.

Stemmeoptællingen er offentlig.
§ view source
2026-06-06
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?2/540.0%

The statute requires that by the day after the election, the polling station leader must bundle ballots and send them to the electoral board. However, the section addresses transmission of physical materials to the electoral board rather than explicit publication of precinct-level results to the public. The requirement to transmit results by the next day suggests a timeline potentially within 24-48 hours, but the statute does not explicitly mandate public publication within a specific timeframe.

Senest dagen efter valget sammenbinder afstemningslederen de afgivne stemmesedler
§ view source
2026-06-06
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns candidate alliances and nomination procedures in Greenlandic election law. It does not address vendor contracts, contract duration, or procurement lock-in—topics entirely outside the scope of this electoral provision.

§ view source
2026-06-06
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06

Voter Access

42.9% · 3/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The statute explicitly mandates that ballot secrecy ('valghandlingens hemmelighed') must be ensured ('sikret') and protected as a condition for any deviations from electoral procedures. This establishes a legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability that the Electoral Board must maintain and enforce.

valghandlingens hemmelighed og kontrol med valgets gennemførelse i det hele fortsat er sikret
§ view source
2026-06-06
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?2/540.0%

The section addresses accessibility for visually impaired voters by permitting them to request assistance from a person of their choice, and also provides general assistance for voters unable to complete the ballot independently. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards that are legally mandated at every polling place—it only describes accommodations available upon request rather than systematic accessibility requirements.

§ view source
2026-06-06
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes technical requirements for voting booths, ballot boxes, and polling place conduct (secrecy, lighting, writing implements, ballot security, and campaign restrictions). It does not address or establish any floor or minimum standard regarding the density, number, or geographic distribution of polling places relative to the voter population or area.

§ view source
2026-06-06

Other methodologies for Greenland