Francev0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity18.9%10/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability0.0%
0/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware37.5%
3/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation37.5%
3/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access57.1%
4/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

0.0% · 0/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the French Electoral Code concerns the establishment of proxy voting (procuration) procedures, including in-person requirements, teleproceeding options, and delegation arrangements. It does not address election auditing, verification artifacts, certificates, device records, result signatures, or any downloadable public packages related to election integrity verification.

§ view source
2026-06-12
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-12
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?0/10.0%

The section permits hand-marked ballots (bulletins manuscrits) as valid for municipal elections in communes under 1,000 inhabitants, which acknowledges paper ballots. However, the criterion requires a legally mandated voter-verifiable paper trail, and this section merely permits hand-marked ballots rather than mandating them as the voting method or VVPAT requirement for electronic systems. The section addresses ballot validity rules but does not establish a requirement for paper verification.

les bulletins manuscrits sont valides pour l'élection des conseillers municipaux dans les communes de moins de 1 000 habitants
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2026-06-12
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires public display of ballot counts and transmission of official records to the prefecture, but does not establish any legal right for citizens to independently re-tally or verify results from precinct data. It addresses transparency through public posting, not citizen verification rights.

§ view source
2026-06-12

Custody Hardware

37.5% · 3/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The section mandates that voting materials and data be preserved 'under seals' (sous scellés) in a secure location, which constitutes a tamper-evident requirement through physical sealing. However, the text does not specify logged access, monitoring, or tamper-responsive auto-quarantine mechanisms, limiting the standard to basic tamper-evident measures.

les fichiers supports comprenant la copie des programmes sources et des programmes exécutables, les matériels de vote, les fichiers d'émargement, de résultats et de sauvegarde ainsi que l'ensemble des données à caractère personnel enregistrées sur le traitement prévu à l'article R. 176-3 sont conservés sous scellés, dans un lieu sécurisé
§ view source
2026-06-12
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the administrative costs and reimbursement procedures for postal communications related to electoral matters. It contains no provisions whatsoever concerning vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, internet access, Wi-Fi, cellular connectivity, or hardware isolation mandates.

§ view source
2026-06-12
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

The statute mandates secure custody and control of voting materials, files, and data under seals, with oversight by an independent expert and electoral commission. However, the text does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation or mandate that such documentation be publicly available—it addresses custody arrangements and oversight mechanisms but not the documentation and transparency aspects of the criterion.

les fichiers supports comprenant la copie des programmes sources et des programmes exécutables, les matériels de vote, les fichiers d'émargement, de résultats et de sauvegarde ainsi que l'ensemble des données à caractère personnel enregistrées sur le traitement prévu à l'article R. 176-3 sont conservés sous scellés, dans un lieu sécurisé par le ministère des affaires étrangères, sous le contrôle de l'expert indépendant
§ view source
2026-06-12
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?1/1100.0%

The section establishes an explicit criminal penalty of ten years imprisonment for unauthorized tampering with ballot materials during the counting process. While the language addresses ballot tampering rather than 'devices' in the modern technological sense, it applies criminal penalties to unauthorized access and manipulation of election materials in custody.

La violation du scrutin faite, soit par les membres du bureau, soit par les agents de l'autorité préposés à la garde des bulletins non encore dépouillés, sera punie de dix ans d'emprisonnement.
§ view source
2026-06-12

Post Election Audit

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

The section establishes a control commission responsible for general vote tallying and result proclamation, but does not mandate a post-election audit in the technical sense (systematic verification of voting equipment, ballot counts, or electoral processes after results are declared). The commission's functions focus on controlling regularity during the consultation and certifying results, not on post-election auditing as typically understood in election integrity frameworks.

De procéder au recensement général des votes et à la proclamation des résultats.
§ view source
2026-06-12
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the French Electoral Code addresses criminal penalties for ballot fraud and tampering by election officials, not audit methods. It does not mandate or describe any post-election audit procedure, whether hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or reconciliation.

§ view source
2026-06-12
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the timing and location for receiving candidacy declarations for National Assembly elections. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, close margin triggers, or sworn challenges. The content is entirely procedural regarding candidate filing and is unrelated to the criterion.

§ view source
2026-06-12
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

The statute grants candidates and lists the right to designate observers (scrutateurs) at the counting tables, but does not explicitly extend observer access to media or citizens generally. The provision addresses access for party representatives only, not the broader public observation required by the criterion.

Si plusieurs candidats ou plusieurs listes sont en présence, il leur est permis de désigner respectivement les scrutateurs
§ view source
2026-06-12
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses incompatibility rules for elected deputies who hold multiple mandates simultaneously — it requires them to resign from one mandate within 30 days of election proclamation. It has no relevance to post-election audits or the binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes.

§ view source
2026-06-12

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9

Transparency Observation

37.5% · 3/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?0/10.0%

The section grants delegates of candidates and lists priority access to consult voter registration lists (listes d'émargement) after electoral operations end. However, this addresses only post-election access to specific documents and does not establish comprehensive procedural access for observers during voting or counting operations, which is the essence of 'full procedural access' in observer rights.

les délégués des candidats, des binômes de candidats ou des listes en présence ont priorité pour consulter les listes d'émargement
§ view source
2026-06-12
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-12
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?3/560.0%

The statute requires precinct-level (commune-level) results to be made public immediately upon completion of the vote count, which is stronger than a one-week requirement but does not specify an explicit 24-hour timeline. The phrase 'dès l'achèvement' (as soon as counting is finished) suggests rapid publication but the actual time frame depends on when counting ends, which could vary by location.

les résultats du scrutin sont rendus publics dès l'achèvement du dépouillement
§ view source
2026-06-12
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-12

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the French Electoral Code (L195) establishes eligibility restrictions for candidates to departmental councils, listing specific public officials and functionaries who are ineligible based on their roles and tenure. It has no relevance to vendor independence, certified vendors, or multi-vendor capability in elections. The criterion concerns election administration technology and vendor diversity, which is outside the scope of this candidate eligibility provision.

§ view source
2026-06-12
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the French Electoral Code addresses campaign account reporting requirements and financial disclosure procedures for candidates. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, or open technical standards for voting systems. The criterion concerns election technology standards, while this section concerns campaign finance transparency.

§ view source
2026-06-12
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-12
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-12

Voter Access

57.1% · 4/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The statute mandates that voters must vote in isolation within a designated booth specifically designed to shield their ballot from public view, and that voters themselves place their ballot in the envelope without external handling. This architecture legally guarantees the unlinkability between voter identity and ballot choice, as the physical isolation and process prevent anyone from observing which ballot an individual voter selects.

Sans quitter la salle du scrutin, il doit se rendre isolément dans la partie de la salle aménagée pour le soustraire aux regards pendant qu'il met son bulletin dans l'enveloppe
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2026-06-12
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?3/560.0%

The statute requires voting machines to enable disabled voters to vote autonomously regardless of disability type, which addresses accessibility in principle. However, this requirement applies only where voting machines are used (communes over 3,500 inhabitants on a prefectural list), not universally at every polling place. Thus it is not a comprehensive accessibility mandate covering all polling locations and all aspects (vision, motor, language).

permettre aux électeurs handicapés de voter de façon autonome, quel que soit leur handicap
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2026-06-12
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the French Electoral Code (art. R84) addresses procedures for handling voting materials and ballots from incarcerated voters in penal institutions on election day. It does not establish or address any legal floor or minimum requirement for polling-place density per voter or per geographic area. The criterion requires a legal floor on polling places, which this section does not mention or regulate.

§ view source
2026-06-12

Other methodologies for France