EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article L270 of the French Electoral Code addresses succession of municipal council seats and incompatibility rules but contains no statutory requirement for conflict-of-interest disclosure by commissioners or senior election staff. The section does not establish any accountability mechanism for disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections.

The section confirms that electoral disputes can be brought before administrative courts and the Conseil d'État, establishing venue and removing a procedural barrier (mandatory lawyer requirement). However, the text does not codify standing, timeline requirements, or substantive standards for judicial review. While it evidences a judicial-review mechanism, it lacks the full statutory framework needed to satisfy COI.2 completely.

“Les recours en matière électorale devant les tribunaux administratifs et le Conseil d'Etat sont jugés sans l'intervention obligatoire d'un avocat au Conseil d'Etat.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the election commission's existence and core mandate (oversight of each election, composition with judicial and administrative magistrates) by statute (Code électoral), not by constitutional provision. The statutory grounding satisfies a baseline institutional framework, but COMM.1 specifically asks whether grounding is constitutional rather than statutory alone, making this a score of 1 rather than 2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section merely specifies that the Martinique assembly comprises 51 members. It contains no provisions regarding appointment procedures, branch involvement, or structural safeguards for any election commission. The text does not address commission composition, appointment authority, or multi-branch oversight.

The section establishes all three core elements of term protection: fixed length (six years, non-renewable), staggered cycles (half renewed every three years), and statutory grounds for removal (enumerated in the second paragraph: incompatibility, incapacity, or breach of obligations, decided unanimously by other members). These provisions are codified in statute and shield commissioners from arbitrary removal.

“Les membres de la commission sont nommés pour une durée de six ans non renouvelable. Ils sont renouvelés par moitié tous les trois ans.”

The statute mandates a nine-member commission with three members each drawn from the Conseil d'État, Cour de cassation, and Cour des comptes—three co-equal senior courts—and designated by decree upon the proposal of the heads of each institution. This multi-branch, multi-court appointment structure (explicitly rooted in judicial institutions rather than political appointees) provides structural insulation from single-party capture. The requirement that proposals come from the vice-president and first presidents of these courts (with notice to their internal bodies) ensures independent selection by professional judicial bodies, satisfying the statutory political-balance criterion through institutional independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes criminal penalties for campaign finance violations by candidates and donors. It does not address election authority funding structure, budget lines, or protection against mid-cycle executive reallocation. It is a criminal law provision, not a funding statute for the election administration apparatus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs campaign finance and candidate spending authorization for overseas constituencies, not election-administration infrastructure budgets. It addresses procedural rules for campaign accounts and fund transfers in countries with currency or exchange-control restrictions. It contains no provisions regarding multi-year funding cycles for election administration or protecting election-administration budgets from annual political renegotiation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates foreign funding of ballot-initiative campaigns (Article 11 petitions), not funding of the election authority or election administration itself. FUND.3 requires statutory prohibition of foreign funding to the electoral administration agency; this text addresses campaign finance for citizens' legislative proposals, which is outside the scope of election administration institutional funding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the French Electoral Code describes procedural rules for vote counting and ballot handling at polling stations (scrutiny operations). It does not address the institutional structure, employment status, or civil-service protections of election authority career staff. It contains no reference to hiring, firing, merit-based employment, term protection, or any personnel governance framework.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article LO132 of the French Electoral Code addresses the ineligibility of high-ranking state officials and administrators for elected office within their territorial jurisdiction. It contains no provisions regarding mandatory training for election officials or poll workers, their content, or frequency of training requirements. This section concerns candidate eligibility constraints, not election staff competency or professional development.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article L238 of the French Electoral Code addresses municipal council membership restrictions and conflict-of-interest rules (prohibition of dual mandates, family relation limits). It contains no language addressing whistleblower protections for election staff reporting irregularities. The section is purely about candidate eligibility and council composition, not institutional safeguards for staff reporting.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the operational mechanics of electronic voting (opening times, key distribution, ballot-box verification) and contains no language regarding certification of voting equipment, evaluator credentials, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. It does not codify any certification process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate observer rights and notification procedures for electronic voting operations. It does not establish any recertification triggers, material-update protocols, defect-discovery mechanisms, or fixed-schedule recertification requirements for electronic voting systems. Vendor oversight and system recertification are absent from the text.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electoral propaganda restrictions on electronic communications and contains no statutory definition of decertification grounds, procedures, or any vendor oversight mechanism. The criterion requires codified grounds and procedure for revoking certification; this text is substantively unrelated to vendor certification or decertification.