EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs inaugural event fundraising, contribution limits, and financial reporting for candidates elected to statewide office. It does not address election verification artifacts, device records, result signatures, or any downloadable public packages related to election integrity or vote verification. The criterion concerns post-election verification infrastructure, which is entirely outside the scope of this inauguration finance statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires voter-verified paper ballots to be used in elections, mandating manual counting of these ballots in at least 3% of precincts during the canvass and allowing them to be used for recounts. This establishes a legal requirement for a voter-verifiable paper trail as part of the election process.

“the voter-verified paper ballots are to be counted manually”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses what financial statement information may not be made publicly available—specifically contributor addresses, business affiliations, and treasurer addresses. It concerns campaign finance disclosure restrictions, not precinct-level election data publication or citizen re-tally rights. The section has no bearing on whether citizens can access and re-tally published precinct data.

The statute mandates sealing of vote-recording devices, electronic poll books, and ballot packages to prevent tampering and unauthorized use prior to polls opening. This reflects a tamper-evident seal requirement. However, the statute does not require logging of seal breaks or tamper-responsive auto-quarantine mechanisms, limiting the score to 2 on the ordinal scale.

“At the time of the delivery the device and electronic poll books are to be sealed to prevent any use prior to the opening of the polls and the ballots are to be packaged and sealed to prevent any tampering with the ballots.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the office location and meeting procedures of an election commission, covering where meetings are held and how they may be conducted (via video, telephone, or internet conferencing). It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or isolation requirements for voting machines.

The statute requires written certification by precinct election commissioners documenting delivery, sealing, and opening of devices and ballots. However, it does not explicitly mandate a complete chain-of-custody documentation system covering all transfers or handlers throughout the entire election process, nor does it require public availability of these records.

“who shall certify in writing signed by them to the clerk of the county commission that the devices, where applicable, and the ballots have been delivered in their presence, that the devices and packages of ballots were found to be sealed upon delivery and that the seals have been broken and the devices opened in their presence”

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties for tampering with election devices, including imprisonment for one to ten years and fines of at least $5,000. This directly satisfies the criterion by providing explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Any person not an election officer or other public official who shall tamper or attempt to tamper with any vote-recording device, electronic poll book, ballot label, ballot or ballot card, program deck, standard validation test deck or automatic tabulating equipment or in any way intentionally impair or attempt to impair their use and any person who shall be guilty of or shall attempt any dishonest practice upon any such devices or equipment, or with or by their use, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in a correctional facility for not less than one year nor more than ten years or fined not less than $5,000, or both.”

The section mandates a risk-limiting audit process during canvass (manual count of at least 3% of precincts with potential expansion if discrepancies are found), but this is limited to precincts with voter-verified paper ballots and only occurs when certain triggering conditions apply (discrepancies exceeding 1% or different outcomes). This does not constitute a comprehensive post-election audit of every election or all ballots, so while an audit mechanism exists, it does not fully satisfy a requirement for mandatory audits of every election.

“During the canvass, at least three percent of the precincts are to be chosen at random and the voter-verified paper ballots are to be counted manually.”

The statute mandates a fixed-percentage hand recount audit: at least 3% of precincts must have their voter-verified paper ballots manually counted during the canvass. This satisfies the fixed-% hand recount category (score 2), but does not meet the higher standards of comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or RLA with reconciliation. The audit is limited to a predetermined percentage rather than risk-based.

“During the canvass, at least three percent of the precincts are to be chosen at random and the voter-verified paper ballots are to be counted manually.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses certification of candidates for public campaign financing in nonpartisan judicial elections. It does not establish or describe any post-election audit procedures or grant observer access to audits. The section concerns campaign finance eligibility and fund distribution, not election auditing or audit observation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate certification and public campaign financing eligibility procedures for West Virginia judicial elections. It does not discuss post-election audits, audit results, or their binding force on certified election results. The section is entirely focused on certifying candidates as eligible for public financing, not on auditing election outcomes.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate financial disclosure requirements and has no connection to voting system source code accessibility. It does not discuss voting systems, source code, or public access to technical materials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes training program requirements for election officials in West Virginia. It does not address software, binary buildability, reproducibility of builds, or source code transparency. The criterion concerns technical reproducibility of production binaries, which is entirely outside the scope of this election official training statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 3-3B-4 establishes minimum requirements for online voting systems in a pilot program, but does not mandate or address cryptographic commitment of the running binary before polls open. While subsection (7)(E) mentions 'cryptographic protocols' as one possible mechanism for verifying ballot tampering, it does not require pre-election binary commitment or hash publication.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the special absentee voting list and the administration of absentee ballots to disabled voters and Address Confidentiality Program participants. It does not address the publication, signing, or pre-election disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules. The criterion concerns election definition transparency and software verifiability of the ballot design process, which is entirely absent from this section.

The statute requires vendors to enable verification that software 'performs according to specification,' which addresses functional behavior but does not explicitly grant a right to verify that the actual running binary matches a cryptographically committed binary (e.g., source code hash verification or reproducible builds). The requirement is about specification compliance rather than binary integrity verification.

“System and vendor make it possible to verify that the software performs according to specification.”

The statute explicitly mandates that all proceedings at the central counting center allow observation by authorized persons, including candidates, political party representatives chosen by county executive committees, and members of the general public. The statute establishes comprehensive procedural access rights for domestic observers across multiple categories.

“All proceedings at the central counting center are to be under the supervision of the clerk of the county commission and are to be conducted under circumstances which allow observation from a designated area by all persons entitled to be present.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses post-election identity verification procedures for voters who executed identity affidavits and investigative protocols for suspected fraud. It contains no provisions regarding the timing or speed of precinct-level election results publication, which is the subject matter of the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides only definitional language for various voting equipment and systems terms used in West Virginia's election code. It does not address election event logs, public logging requirements, signed or append-only data structures, or transparency mechanisms for recording election activities. The definitions are technical in nature and do not impose any requirement for a public event log.

The statute permits multiple vendors to obtain authorization certificates to print ballots, using the phrase 'Any vendor' without limiting the number of certified vendors that may operate. Section (d) requires the Secretary of State to maintain and distribute a list of 'all vendors authorized to print ballots,' further indicating the system contemplates multiple certified vendors.

“Any vendor authorized to do business in West Virginia and in good standing may apply for a certificate of authorization to print ballots for elections in this state”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses fair campaign practices and ethical conduct by candidates for public office. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, open standards, or any technical specifications related to voting systems or election technology.

The statute explicitly caps the duration of ballot-printing vendor certificates at two years, with renewal requiring reapplication. This prevents perpetual lock-in by forcing periodic re-certification and evaluation of vendor eligibility and compliance.

“which shall remain in effect for two years from the date of issuance and may be renewed upon application therefor”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute guarantees the right to a private voting booth where the voter marks the ballot alone, which is a core mechanism for ensuring voter-ballot unlinkability. The statute further requires removal of ballot stubs and use of secrecy envelopes/sleeves, preventing identification of ballots with voters. These provisions together create a legal framework that guarantees and enforces ballot secrecy.

“The voter shall enter the voting booth alone and there mark the ballot”

The section establishes comprehensive accessibility requirements for ballot-marking devices including vision (visual display, audio), motor (keypad, sip/puff), and language capabilities. However, it only mandates accessibility for counties that choose to employ these systems, not at every polling place—accessibility is contingent on a county's voluntary adoption of the approved device.

“Allow voters with disabilities to mark their ballots, in complete independence, and in conformity with both federal and state law concerning mandatory accessibility for disabled persons”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedures for documenting and sealing election results at polling places, including the creation of certificates and handling of ballots and materials. It contains no provisions establishing a legal floor or minimum requirement for polling-place density, either per number of voters or per geographic area.