EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

W. Va. Code § 3-5-20 enumerates standing for PRIMARY election contests explicitly: (1) candidates for nomination or election to office, (2) candidates for party executive committee membership, (3) candidates, committeemen, or delegates adversely affected by actions of party committees, election boards, or canvassers. However, the statute explicitly states 'The procedure in such case shall be the same as that governing the contest of a general election by candidates for county offices or offices in magisterial districts,' creating a cross-reference to general election contest rules that are not provided here. This section partially satisfies the criterion because it enumerates standing for primary contests with specificity, but delegates general election standing rules to another provision not presented. The enumeration is clear for primary contests (candidate-centered, narrowly defined) but incomplete for general elections, which represent a substantial portion of election dispute scenarios. A jurisdiction score cannot be complete without knowing whether general election standing is similarly codified.

Section 3-7-7(a) explicitly designates circuit court as the court of original jurisdiction for election contests and specifies the jurisdictional basis: the circuit court in the county or district where the election took place. This is a clear, statutory specification of both the court level and the geographic jurisdiction rule. The provision satisfies the criterion by codifying venue and jurisdiction for contest proceedings without discretion or ambiguity.

“The circuit court with jurisdiction over the county or district where the election took place shall hear and decide election contests initiated pursuant to §3-7-6 of this code.”

W. Va. Code § 3-7-6(b) explicitly specifies a filing deadline for election contests: 10 days after the election result is certified. This is a clear, numerically defined temporal trigger tied to a defined event (certification of election results). The statute applies to all county, district, and municipal offices. The deadline is codified in statute and leaves no discretion regarding when the contest window opens and closes. This satisfies the procedural clarity requirement for contest filing deadlines under EDRI criterion CONT.EDRI.3.

“An election contest challenging the election of any person to any county, district, or municipal office, including the office of magistrate, must be brought within 10 days after the election result is certified.”

W. Va. Code § 3-7-8 establishes a standard of proof by requiring that claims be 'shown, by proper evidence' before the competent tribunal. This codifies a requirement that evidence be presented and that corrections follow only to the extent proven. However, the statute does not define what constitutes 'proper evidence,' does not specify the quantum of proof (clear and convincing, preponderance, etc.), and does not articulate admissibility rules for specific categories of evidence (e.g., affidavits, documents, testimony). The provision thus sets a procedural standard—evidence must be presented to the tribunal—but leaves the substantive definition of 'proper evidence' and the burden of proof to common law, case law, or tribunal discretion. This satisfies the 'standard set' criterion (score 1) but falls short of the fuller codification of evidentiary rules (score 2).

“it may be shown, by proper evidence before the tribunal authorized by law to hear and determine contested elections, for whom such illegal votes or any of them were cast, or for whom the legal votes which were rejected would have been given, and the returns shall be corrected only to the extent that it is so shown.”

The statute establishes WHO performs the recount (board of canvassers) and addresses recount procedures in contexts of mechanical error (recount ballots affected by device malfunction). However, the section is narrowly focused on recounts triggered by vote recording device errors, not general recount procedures. It does not codify: (1) the procedures for initiating a recount (e.g., threshold margins, petition requirements); (2) how counting is conducted in ordinary recounts; (3) evidentiary standards for initiating recounts; (4) cost allocation; or (5) the effect of recount findings on certification. The procedures defined here are limited to testing equipment accuracy and correcting device-caused errors. The statute specifies that the clerk of the county court shall conduct tests 'in the presence of the board of canvassers and of any candidate or his party representative,' which provides some procedural clarity for the testing phase. But this does not constitute a comprehensive recount procedure codification as would be required for full satisfaction of RECT.1.

“the board of canvassers shall proceed to determine whether an error has occurred in the vote recorded or counted on such device or equipment. If an error is found, the board of canvassers shall have the cause of the error corrected and the ballots affected recounted”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly references recount procedures as applicable to primary elections and indicates they are governed by Article One of Chapter 3. However, this section is itself a reference provision that does not codify the actual cost allocation rules; it merely directs that other provisions shall apply. To satisfy RECT.3, the statute must allocate recount costs by statute (specifying who pays and under what circumstances or outcomes). This section acknowledges recount procedures exist elsewhere in the code but does not state the cost allocation itself. The statutory mechanism exists but is not transparent in this particular section—a reader would need to consult Article One to determine whether costs are actually allocated. For purposes of procedural clarity, this creates an indirect requirement rather than direct codification of cost allocation in an accessible location.

“Provisions of article one of this chapter relating to ballot commissioners, election commissioners and clerks, procedures for obtaining election supplies and conducting elections, loss and replacement of election supplies, challenge of voters, leaves of absence for voting, election expenses and recount procedures shall control and govern primary elections wherever applicable.”

W. Va. Code § 3-6-9 establishes clear recount procedures, including who may demand a recount (candidates, within 48 hours), timing (set for no sooner than 3 days after notice), and procedural safeguards (notice to candidates, opportunity to preserve rights to additional precinct recounts, single recount per precinct). However, the statute does not explicitly codify the legal effect of a recount finding—i.e., whether the recount result is binding and automatically amends the certified election results, whether it is merely advisory, or what happens if a recount confirms or contradicts the original count. The provision requires the board to 'seal the ballots again' after a recount but contains no language stating that recount findings mandate recertification, override prior declarations, or are conclusive. The statute thus satisfies the procedural clarity requirement for recount mechanics but fails to codify the binding legal effect of recount outcomes, which is essential to full satisfaction of RECT.4.

This section establishes a statutory tie-breaking procedure with a 30-day deadline for board of canvassers action before gubernatorial intervention, and requires the Governor to certify the result. However, it addresses only the narrow circumstance of tied votes at the canvassing stage, not the general certification deadline for all election results. The section does not establish when the overall election result becomes official or when results must be certified to state authorities—it only specifies what happens if a tie remains unbroken after 30 days. A complete answer to TIME.1 would require a statute setting the statewide certification deadline (e.g., 'the Governor shall certify election results within X days of the election'). This section satisfies the timing component only for the specific tie-breaking procedure, not for the broader certification deadline criterion.

“in the event the board of canvassers shall have failed to decide the tie within thirty days after such tie shall have been found by them to exist, upon application to the Governor by any one of such persons so voted for, he shall break the tie by the selection of one of such persons and shall certify his choice to such board of canvassers and declare such person duly elected”

West Virginia Code § 3-7-3(a)(4) explicitly provides a statutory stay mechanism for pending election disputes. The statute codifies that upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals, the court or justice may 'suspend the final decision' of the special court. While this addresses suspension of the special court's decision rather than pre-certification in the strictest sense, the statutory framework contemplates that contests proceed through a special court with the ability to stay the effects of that court's determination pending appellate review. The provision for suspension of the final decision operates as a mechanism to prevent finalization of disputed election results during the pendency of appellate proceedings, thereby satisfying the criterion's requirement for a statutory stay mechanism.