EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29A.60.235 requires publication of election reconciliation reports (ballot counts and auditor data) on the county auditor's website and secretary of state's website, but does not mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, or result signatures. The statute addresses transparency of vote counts, not cryptographic verification artifacts or machine records needed for independent verification. | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-26 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly requires all direct recording electronic voting devices to produce a paper record that voters may accept or reject, and mandates that this record be human-readable without an interface. This directly satisfies the requirement for a voter-verifiable paper trail. “all direct recording electronic voting devices must produce a paper record of each vote that may be accepted or rejected by the voter before finalizing his or her vote” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | The statute permits certain citizens (candidates and groups of registered voters) to request recounts, but it governs official recounts conducted by election officials—not independent citizen re-tallying from published precinct data. The criterion asks whether citizens can independently re-tally from published data; this statute addresses only formal recount applications filed with officials, which is a different mechanism that does not satisfy the criterion of direct citizen access to independently verify tallies. “An officer of a political party or any person for whom votes were cast at any election may file a written application for a recount of the votes or a portion of the votes cast at that election for all candidates for election to that office. Any group of five or more registered voters may file a written application for a recount of the votes or a portion of the votes cast upon any question or issue.” | § view source 2026-05-27 |
Custody Hardware
50.0% · 4/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The statute mandates tamper-evident seals (uniquely numbered seals) on voting devices and requires a record of programming, which addresses the basic tamper-evident requirement. However, the statute does not require logging of seal integrity checks or tamper-responsive automatic quarantine mechanisms, falling short of the higher ordinal levels. “after being prepared for a primary or election, each device shall be sealed with a uniquely numbered seal” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly mandates isolation of ballot counting equipment and voting system components from any external network, specifically including the internet, Wi-Fi, and radio connectivity. This legal requirement effectively prohibits internet, Wi-Fi, and cellular connectivity on vote-casting equipment. | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The section requires documentation when the canvassing board opens sealed ballot containers, but it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation for all handling and custody of ballots, nor does it explicitly require such records to be publicly available. The requirement is limited to recording what happens during specific openings, not comprehensive custody tracking. “If the canvassing board opens a ballot container, it shall make a full record of the additional tabulation or examination made of the ballots. This record must be added to any other record of the canvassing process in that county.” | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly criminalizes unauthorized access to voting machines and election systems as a class C felony, establishing a direct criminal penalty for the conduct described in the criterion. “any unauthorized person who accesses or assists another person or entity with unauthorized access to a voting center, election office, ballot counting area, ballot storage area, or election system, voting machine, or device to be used or being used in a primary or special or general election, is guilty of a class C felony” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
Post Election Audit
77.8% · 7/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | The statute mandates that county auditors 'shall conduct' both a duplicated ballot audit and at least one of four additional audit methods prior to election certification. The use of 'shall' creates a legally binding requirement applicable to every election. This requirement is unconditional and does not contain carve-outs for specific election types. “Prior to certification of the election as required by RCW 29A.60.190, the county auditor shall conduct an audit of duplicated ballots in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, and an audit using at minimum one of the following methods:” | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 4/580.0% | Washington mandates post-election audits using at minimum one of four specified methods, including risk-limiting audits (score 4), comparison audits (score 3), and other approaches. However, the statute does not mandate risk-limiting audit + reconciliation together; it permits counties to choose among alternative methods. The risk-limiting audit option represents the highest audit standard available, but the law's flexibility to select from multiple methods prevents a score of 5 (which would require RLA + reconciliation as a unified mandate). “the county auditor shall conduct an audit of duplicated ballots in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, and an audit using at minimum one of the following methods” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | The statute mandates recounts based on close vote margins (a form of audit trigger), but the criterion asks about audits 'beyond mandatory' triggers—implying discretionary or additional audits triggered by circumstances like sworn challenges. This section establishes mandatory recounts by margin thresholds alone, with no provision for audits triggered by sworn challenges or other non-margin-based mechanisms. The statute does not address audit triggers beyond the automatic margin-based recount requirement. “If the official canvass of all of the returns for any office at any primary or election reveals that the difference in the number of votes cast for a candidate apparently qualified for the general election ballot or elected to any office, and the number of votes cast for the closest apparently defeated opponent is less than two thousand votes and also less than one-half of one percent of the total number of votes cast for both candidates, the county canvassing board shall conduct a recount of all votes cast on that position.” | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly requires canvassing board meetings to be public meetings with times and locations accessible to the public and specifically grants parties, media, and citizens the right to 'attend or observe.' This directly satisfies the criterion for observer access to the audit process. “Meetings of the county canvassing board are public meetings under chapter 42.30 RCW. Meetings must be conducted at times and locations that are accessible to the public to ensure that the public is informed and able to attend or observe.” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly states that amended abstracts resulting from a recount canvass supersede prior abstracts, making the recount audit results legally binding on the final certified result. This language directly establishes that audit results have binding legal force over the original election results. “An amended abstract certified under this section supersedes any prior abstract of the results for the same offices or issues at the same primary or election.” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines 'benefit' in commercial and financial terms for what appears to be a campaign finance or lobbying disclosure statute (RCW ch. 29B.10). It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility, disclosure requirements, or any related transparency measures. The section is entirely irrelevant to the criterion. | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29A.04.260 addresses voter information privacy and disclosure exemptions for ballot return envelopes and signature forms. It contains no provisions regarding software, binary builds, source code, or reproducibility requirements. This section is entirely unrelated to the software verifiability criterion. | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-26 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs the format, layout, and contents of the voters' pamphlet—the printed material sent to voters—but does not address whether ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules are signed and published before polls open. The section specifies what information must appear in the pamphlet and who determines its format, but contains no provisions regarding pre-election publication of signed ballot definitions or tabulation rules. | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides a definition of 'voting system' that includes software, firmware, and audit trail components, but does not grant any right to verify that the running binary matches a committed one. The section describes what a voting system comprises and what practices and documentation are used, but contains no provision establishing a right to post-election verification of binary code integrity. | § view source 2026-05-26 |
Transparency Observation
25.0% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | The statute grants major political parties the right to appoint one observer each at the counting center, but the language 'if representatives have been appointed' and 'if...present while the counting center is operating' makes observation conditional rather than automatic. More significantly, no procedural access rights are specified—the statute does not define what observers may examine, ask, or challenge, nor does it guarantee their access to specific phases of counting or documentation. Civil-society observers beyond campaigns/organizations are not mentioned. “The counting center is under the direction of the county auditor and must be open to observation by one representative from each major political party, if representatives have been appointed by the respective major political parties and these representatives are present while the counting center is operating.” | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-26 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 2/540.0% | The section establishes that precinct returns are public records, which supports transparency and access, but it does not specify a timeline for publication. The requirement to deliver returns to the canvassing board for verification suggests they will eventually be made public, but no 24-hour, 48-hour, or other specific timeframe is mandated in this statute. The public records designation likely subjects them to chapter 42.56's disclosure requirements, which typically allow a reasonable time frame but do not guarantee same-day or next-day publication. “The precinct and cumulative returns of any primary or election are public records under chapter 42.56 RCW.” | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires a log of ballot duplication activities with specific information including control numbers and initials of participants, which provides some record-keeping and auditability. However, the criterion requires a 'public, signed, append-only election event log,' and this section does not explicitly require the log to be public, does not mandate digital signatures or append-only structure, and does not specify that it must cover all election events beyond ballot duplication. The log requirement is also limited to a specific procedural step rather than comprehensive election events. | § view source 2026-05-26 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses decertification procedures for voting systems and components that fail to meet standards or comply with requirements. It does not address whether multiple certified vendors are permitted to operate in the same election or establish any multi-vendor capability framework. | § view source 2026-05-27 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses statewide surveys of ballot rejection rates and canvassing practices, not vote-format or device-protocol standards. It contains no discussion of open standards for voting devices, protocols, or technical specifications. | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact agreement, which concerns how member states appoint presidential electors based on the national popular vote total. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or any restrictions on vendor lock-in. The section is entirely focused on electoral procedures and interstate agreement terms, not procurement or vendor management. | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-26 |
Voter Access
57.1% · 4/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly guarantees 'absolute secrecy of the vote' and prohibits requiring voters to disclose their political choices. This establishes a legal protection for voter-ballot unlinkability by ensuring votes cannot be traced to individual voters and voters cannot be compelled to reveal how they voted. “The right of absolute secrecy of the vote. No voter may be required to disclose political faith or adherence in order to vote” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | The statute requires at least one accessible voting unit at each voting center specifically for blind and visually impaired voters, establishing a mandate for vision accessibility. However, it does not address motor accessibility, language accessibility, or comprehensive accessibility standards across all polling place functions, making this a partial rather than comprehensive requirement. “At each voting center, at least one voting unit certified by the secretary of state shall provide access to individuals who are blind or visually impaired.” | § view source 2026-05-26 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires counties to maintain voting centers and explain their determination, but does not establish a specific legal floor—such as a minimum number of voting centers per population or geographic area. It only requires 'reasonable access' without quantifying that standard, making it discretionary rather than a binding minimum requirement. “The number of voting centers that will be maintained in order to ensure that people with disabilities have reasonable access to accessible voting devices, and a written explanation for how the determination was made” | § view source 2026-05-27 |