EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29B.05.010 is a declaration of public policy on campaign finance disclosure and government transparency. It does not establish any statutory requirement for election commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section articulates aspirational goals regarding public confidence and disclosure of campaign financing and elected officials' financial affairs, but contains no operative language creating binding conflict-of-interest disclosure obligations for election administration personnel.

RCW 29A.04.550(3) codifies a statutory right to judicial review of election-authority certification decisions, with the scope and procedures grounded in the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 34.05 RCW). The section establishes standing (the petitioner/appealing party), timeline (within twenty days to appeal to the board; judicial review follows board denial), and venue (court review under the APA framework). This provides clear statutory accountability for election-authority decisions.

“Judicial review of certification decisions will be as prescribed under RCW 34.05.510 through 34.05.598, but is limited to the review of board decisions denying certification.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The commission's existence and mandate are grounded in statute (RCW 29B.20.010), not the Washington State Constitution. This satisfies the threshold of statutory grounding (score 1), but does not meet the constitutional requirement for score 2. The section establishes the commission by legislative enactment rather than constitutional provision.

The statute establishes a multi-branch appointment structure: the executive branch appoints the secretary of state and state director of elections; the legislature appoints four members (two from each chamber, one from each major party caucus); county auditors (a semi-independent body) appoint four members; and political party chairs designate representatives. No single branch controls composition. The prohibition on the secretary of state or state director serving as chair further prevents executive dominance.

The statute provides fixed five-year terms with statutory grounds for removal limited to neglect of duty or misconduct in office, protecting commissioners from arbitrary removal. However, the statute does not explicitly address staggered cycles (rotation of appointment dates to ensure continuity), which is a component of best-practice term protection though not strictly required by the criterion as written.

The statute explicitly requires political balance by capping commissioners of the same party at three of five, ensuring that no single party can control the commission. This structural requirement is set by statute, does not depend on executive discretion, and would be enforceable across administrations regardless of current political composition. The requirement directly addresses the core concern of preventing single-party capture.

“No more than three commissioners shall have an identification with the same political party.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29B.40.090 addresses disposal of surplus campaign funds by candidates and political committees—a campaign finance regulation—not the election authority's budget structure or funding mechanisms. It contains no provision regarding how the election authority itself is funded, whether it receives a separate statutory line item, or protections against mid-cycle reallocation. This section is entirely outside the scope of FUND.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute requires that primary costs be paid 'subject to available funds specifically appropriated for this purpose' and that 'reimbursements for primary costs must be from appropriations specifically provided by law.' This language grounds funding in annual or biennial appropriations cycles subject to legislative action, not in a multi-year dedicated funding mechanism that insulates election administration from annual political renegotiation. The secretary of state is directed to request funds in 'biennial budget requests,' but appropriation remains discretionary and subject to each session.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions to candidates and political committees and from financing political advertising and electioneering communications. It does not address foreign funding of the election authority itself or election administration vendors. FUND.3 asks whether foreign-source funding of the *election administration entity* is prohibited; this statute regulates campaign finance and political activity, not the institutional funding stream for election administration.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section establishes a statutory mandate for election official training with defined timing (18 months), scope (general and specific training), and authority for content specification (Secretary of State rules). This satisfies the structural requirement for mandatory, statutorily-grounded training covering both election administrators and other designated personnel.

“A person having responsibility for the administration or conduct of elections shall, within eighteen months of undertaking those responsibilities, receive general training regarding the conduct of elections and specific training regarding their responsibilities and duties as prescribed by this title or by rules adopted by the secretary of state under this title.”

RCW 29A.04.611 expressly grants the Secretary of State authority to promulgate rules governing voting-system testing, independent evaluations, and certification (subsections 4, 5, and 31). This provides a clear statutory mandate for codification of the certification process, including evaluator standards and procedures. The statute establishes that certification criteria and procedures must be set by rule under chapter 34.05 RCW (the State Administrative Procedure Act), which requires public notice and comment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses suspension or modification of financial disclosure reporting requirements for elected officials and state officers—a procedural exception mechanism for hardship cases. It contains no codified triggers for recertification of election systems, voting equipment, software, or other vendor products after material updates, defect discovery, or on fixed schedules. CERT.2 requires statutory triggers for recertification of election administration infrastructure; this section governs conflict-of-interest reporting waivers and is entirely outside that domain.

RCW 29A.12.190 establishes statutory grounds for decertification (failure to meet federal guidelines, material misrepresentation, unauthorized modifications, and rule-authorized reasons) and explicitly empowers the secretary of state to revoke certification and withdraw authority for future use. The grounds are enumerated in statute rather than left to administrative discretion, and the mechanism (secretary of state action) is clearly specified.