EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

The section establishes that 'the superior court' has jurisdiction over contested elections and power to manage proceedings, including witness subpoenas and attachments. However, the statute does not explicitly specify which superior court (by county or venue rules) has original jurisdiction for election contests. The provision assumes superior court jurisdiction but does not codify venue—i.e., which superior court in a multi-county or statewide election contest, or whether contests must be brought in the county where the election occurred or where the candidate resides. A complete answer to the criterion would require explicit statutory venue allocation (e.g., 'the superior court of the county in which the election was held'). The text confirms court type but leaves venue rules potentially to be derived from other statutes or procedural rules rather than codified in this section.

“the superior court shall have full power to issue attachments to compel the attendance of witnesses”

No matching sections in corpus.

RCW 29A.68.090 establishes a procedural pleading standard—what a contestant must allege to state a sufficient cause regarding illegal votes. It specifies that general allegations of illegal votes are sufficient if they would, if credited, change the election outcome. This codifies a standard of proof (outcome-determinative margin) applicable to illegal-vote contests. However, the section does not codify evidentiary rules governing admissibility, burden of proof mechanics, witness qualification, or how to establish that votes were illegal. It addresses pleading sufficiency but not the evidentiary framework for proving allegations at hearing. Thus it satisfies the 'standard set' benchmark (score 1) but falls short of 'standard + evidentiary rules' (score 2).

“When the reception of illegal votes is alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that illegal votes were cast, that, if given to the person whose election is contested, or to the winning choice for a measure, in the specified precinct or precincts, will, if taken from that person, or winning choice for a measure, reduce the number of the person's legal votes below the number of legal votes given to some other person for the same office or reverse the outcome of the measure.”

RCW § 29A.64.041 codifies core procedural elements of recount administration directly in statute: (1) designation of who counts (canvassing board or duly authorized representatives), (2) procedural mechanism (opening sealed containers, tabulating votes in presence of witnesses), (3) scope limitation (only offices/issues for which recount was applied), (4) observer participation rights and restrictions (candidates may observe but not handle ballots or record voter information unless court-authorized), and (5) administrative discretion to limit observers to prevent undue delay. These substantive procedural rules are statutory, not delegated to regulation or administrative directive. The provision satisfies the criterion for procedurally clear recount mechanics codified in law.

No matching sections in corpus.

RCW 29A.64.081 explicitly codifies cost allocation for petition-based recounts. The statute clearly specifies: (1) the applicant deposits funds upfront; (2) costs are deducted from that deposit; (3) if costs exceed the deposit, the applicant pays the difference; and critically, (4) if the recount changes the election result, no charges may be deducted from the applicant's deposit. This creates a clear statutory allocation rule tied to outcome: petitioner pays unless the recount succeeds. The statute also addresses state/federal office recounts with specific reimbursement mechanisms through the secretary of state. The cost allocation framework is unambiguous and outcome-dependent as required by the criterion.

“For a recount conducted under RCW 29A.64.011, the cost of the recount shall be deducted from the amount deposited by the applicant for the recount at the time of filing the request for the recount, and the balance shall be returned to the applicant. If the costs of the recount exceed the deposit, the applicant shall pay the difference. No charges may be deducted by the canvassing board from the deposit for a recount if the recount changes the result of the nomination or election for which the recount was ordered.”

RCW 29A.64.061(4) explicitly codifies the legal effect of a recount finding: the amended abstract from the recount 'supersedes any prior abstract.' This establishes that recount findings are binding and mandatory—they replace prior results with no discretionary gap. The statute further specifies the procedural chain (29A.64.061(1)-(3)) requiring canvassing boards to prepare amended abstracts and transmit them through established channels, with the secretary of state filing amended abstracts for state-level offices. The binding effect is unambiguous and clearly stated in statutory language.

“An amended abstract certified under this section supersedes any prior abstract of the results for the same offices or issues at the same primary or election.”

RCW 29A.60.260 establishes a statutory certification deadline for statewide measures. The statute specifies that the secretary of state must canvass votes and certify results 'within thirty days after the election' and that the governor must 'forthwith issue a proclamation' declaring the result. This deadline is mandatory and codified in statute, not left to administrative discretion. The language 'shall' indicates a non-discretionary duty. The thirty-day deadline provides a fixed temporal boundary for the certification process, satisfying the requirement that certification deadlines be set by statute rather than discretionary determination.

“The secretary of state shall, in the presence of the governor, within thirty days after the election, canvass the votes upon each question and certify to the governor the result. The governor shall forthwith issue a proclamation giving the whole number of votes cast in the state for and against such measure and declaring the result.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29A.12.180 addresses security breach disclosure requirements for voting systems, manufacturers, counties, and voter registration systems. It establishes mandatory reporting timelines ('immediately following discovery') and defines malicious activity and security breaches. However, this section does not address certification timing, stay mechanisms, or procedures for staying certification while recounts or contests are pending. The criterion requires statutory language establishing a mechanism to delay or suspend certification pending dispute resolution. This section is entirely focused on cybersecurity incident notification and contains no provisions relating to election certification, recounts, contests, or judicial stays of certification. It therefore does not satisfy TIME.2.