Vermontv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity28.3%15/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability18.8%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware37.5%
3/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit50.0%
5/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation50.0%
4/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access28.6%
2/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

18.8% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2154 codifies the statewide voter checklist but no public, downloadable verification package of certificates, device records, and result signatures.

§ view source
2026-05-21
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

§ 2481 ('Printed ballots required') codifies that, except for floor voice votes, 'no voting shall occur in any local, primary, or general election that does not use printed ballots.' Vermont votes on hand-marked printed paper ballots — hand-counted or scanned by a vote tabulator that retains the paper ballot (§ 2499). A voter-verifiable paper ballot is mandated.

no voting shall occur in any local, primary, or general election that does not use printed ballots
§ view source
2026-05-21
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0.5/150.0%

§ 2603 codifies that the result of an election for any office (other than the General Assembly) or public question 'may be contested by any legal voter entitled to vote' on it, by filing a complaint alleging count or return errors. § 2688 lets a registered voter demand a recount on a public question decided by under a 5% margin. A citizen route to re-examination of the count is codified, though a general candidate-race re-tally runs through the contest/recount process.

§ view source
2026-05-21

Custody Hardware

37.5% · 3/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

§ 2590 codifies a tamper-evident ballot-custody regime: after the count, ballots, tally sheets, and checklists are placed in sealed containers delivered to the town clerk. § 2602h requires recording the seal number on the summary sheet, and § 2493(a)(2) requires vote tabulators to be 'locked in a vault or a secure location at all times when not in use.' Mandatory tamper-evident sealing codified (ordinal 2/5 — tamper-evident ballot custody, not a voting-equipment hardware tamper standard).

§ view source
2026-05-21
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2493 requires the Secretary of State to provide for tabulator security and to keep tabulators locked in a vault when not in use, but it does not codify an explicit prohibition on connecting vote-casting or tabulating equipment to the internet or a network.

§ view source
2026-05-21
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?1/1100.0%

§ 2590 codifies chain-of-custody documentation: the presiding officer collects and delivers to the town clerk, in securely sealed containers, the ballots, tally sheets, and checklists. § 2506 places ballot boxes in the town clerk's custody when not in use, and § 2499 requires two election officials for any transfer of voted ballots from a tabulator. Custody documentation codified.

§ view source
2026-05-21
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2154 codifies access limits on the statewide voter checklist (a data-security measure), but no explicit criminal penalty for unauthorized access to voting equipment was surfaced for this datapoint.

§ view source
2026-05-21

Post Election Audit

50.0% · 5/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?1/1100.0%

§ 2493(a)(3)(A) codifies a mandatory post-election audit: 'the Secretary of State shall conduct a random postelection audit of any polling place election results for a general election within 30 days of the election.' A mandatory random post-election audit of general elections is codified.

The Secretary of State shall conduct a random postelection audit of any polling place election results for a general election within 30 days of the election.
§ view source
2026-05-21
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?3/560.0%

§ 2493(a)(3) codifies the audit method: the Secretary of State conducts a random post-election audit by opening the ballot bags and counting 'in the same manner as ballots are counted under sections 2581 through 2588' — a hand count — then publicly announcing the audit results alongside the original return, and referring possible fraud to the Attorney General. A mandatory random hand-count audit method codified (ordinal 3/5 — not a statistical risk-limiting audit).

§ view source
2026-05-21
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0.5/150.0%

§ 2493(a)(3)(C) requires the Secretary of State to 'publicly announce the results of the audit as well as the results from the original return of the vote.' Public disclosure of audit results is codified; the audit itself is conducted at the Secretary of State's office.

§ view source
2026-05-21
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2103 is the definitions section. The post-election audit (§ 2493) refers possible fraud to the Attorney General rather than directly amending the certified result; recount findings, by contrast, are binding under § 2686.

§ view source
2026-05-21

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2962 governs campaign-finance report certification — unrelated to voting-system source code. Vermont codifies no public source-code disclosure for vote tabulators.

§ view source
2026-05-21
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2103 is the definitions section. No provision requires ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation programming to be signed and published before polls open (ballot content is set by § 2471 and distributed under § 2479, but not as a signed public election-definition artifact).

§ view source
2026-05-21
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21

Transparency Observation

50.0% · 4/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

§ 2564 codifies domestic observer rights: each organized political party, each non-party candidate on the ballot, and each committee supporting or opposing a public question may have up to two representatives per voting district inside the polling place 'for the purpose of observing the voting process and challenging the right of any person to vote.' § 2602c grants public viewing of recounts. Observer rights codified.

for the purpose of observing the voting process and challenging the right of any person to vote
§ view source
2026-05-21
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?3/560.0%

§ 2588 codifies prompt precinct/town-level result publication: as the count is completed the presiding officer announces results publicly and posts the tabulator tape ('Unofficial incomplete results'), and 'the town clerk shall report as soon as practicable on the day of the election the unofficial vote counts of all candidates ... to the Secretary of State' via the online elections reporting system. Election-night result reporting codified (ordinal 3/5).

The town clerk shall report as soon as practicable on the day of the election the unofficial vote counts of all candidates whose names appeared on the ballot to the Secretary of State.
§ view source
2026-05-21
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2950 governs contractor campaign contributions. Vermont in fact requires the opposite of multi-vendor capability — § 2493(a)(1) mandates a single 'uniform vote tabulator approved by the Secretary of State' for all municipalities that use one.

§ view source
2026-05-21
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2950 restricts sole-source state contracts awarded to campaign contributors, but the Election Code codifies no duration cap on voting-system vendor contracts.

§ view source
2026-05-21
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

no FTS match
2026-05-21

Voter Access

28.6% · 2/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2587 ('Rules for counting votes') governs voter-intent determination, not ballot secrecy. Vermont guarantees ballot secrecy through the Australian-ballot system and § 2504 (voting booths that let a voter mark a ballot 'without having his or her choices observed by any other person'), but that provision was not surfaced for this datapoint.

§ view source
2026-05-21
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?2/540.0%

§ 2667 requires the municipality to 'take reasonable measures to ensure that voters who are elders or have a disability may conveniently attend' meetings (ground-floor location, ramps, access devices). § 2538 codifies justice-of-the-peace delivery of ballots to early/absentee voters who are ill, injured, or disabled, and § 2502 governs accessible polling-place location. Accessibility accommodations codified (ordinal 2/5 — HAVA-equipment accessibility detail sits in Secretary-of-State rules).

§ view source
2026-05-21
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2504 requires 'a sufficient number' of voting booths 'as determined by the board of civil authority,' but no statutory floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area is codified — Vermont provides a polling place per town voting district.

§ view source
2026-05-21

Other methodologies for Vermont