EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates paid political advertisements in newspapers and periodicals, requiring disclosure of advertisement sponsors and retention of identity proof. It does not address election auditing, device records, result signatures, or any downloadable public verification packages related to election integrity or vote counting.

No matching sections in corpus.

This section mandates the use of paper ballots that voters handle directly and mark, creating a voter-verifiable paper trail. The statute requires voters to fold paper ballots with candidate names and hand them to election officers for deposit, establishing a physical paper record that voters can verify before submission.

“The qualified voter shall fold each paper ballot with the names of the candidates and questions on the inside and hand the folded ballot to the appropriate officer of election. The officer shall place the ballot in the ballot container without any inspection except to assure himself that only a single ballot has been tendered and that the ballot is a genuine ballot.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the costs and procedures for recounts petitioned by candidates or referendum petitioners, but does not establish or recognize a right for any citizen to independently re-tally votes from published precinct data. The statute focuses on who bears the expense of official recounts conducted by courts, not on citizen access to raw data for independent verification.

The section requires that voting machines be sealed with numbered seals or locked with a key, which constitutes a tamper-evident mechanism. However, it does not require logged records of seal status or any tamper-responsive automated systems—only that representatives certify the seal/counter numbers. This satisfies the basic tamper-evident requirement but falls short of more robust standards.

“it shall be sealed with a numbered seal in their presence, or if the machine cannot be sealed with a numbered seal, it shall be locked with a key”

This section directly prohibits wireless communications on voting machines during polling hours, which mandates network isolation from internet, Wi-Fi, and cellular connectivity on vote-casting equipment. The prohibition is explicit and applies to all machines purchased after July 1, 2007.

“There shall be no wireless communications on election day, while the polls are open, between or among voting machines within the polling place or between any voting machine within the polling place and any equipment outside the polling place.”

The statute requires that inoperative machines be placed in custody of authorized personnel but does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such documentation. While custody transfer is specified, the section lacks explicit requirements for documentation of the chain of custody or its public disclosure.

“Any machine so removed shall be placed in the custody of an authorized custodian, technician, general registrar, or electoral board representative.”

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties (Class 5 felony) for tampering with voting and registration equipment, electronic devices, and software used in the election process. This directly addresses unauthorized access to election hardware and related devices.

The statute mandates risk-limiting audits but only for specific elections (federal House, General Assembly, local offices in non-statewide years) and only for randomly selected contested races, not every election or every race. It does not require audits for every election overall, failing to meet the criterion's requirement for mandatory audits of all elections.

“In the year of a general election for members of the United States House of Representatives, a risk-limiting audit of at least one randomly selected contested race for such office”

Virginia Code § 24.2-671.2 explicitly mandates risk-limiting audits (RLA) as the audit method. The statute defines RLA in detail, prescribes procedures for conducting them, and requires the State Board to conduct RLAs in specific election years and cycles. This directly satisfies the criterion for a risk-limiting audit audit method.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires procedures ensuring transparency and direct observation rights for members of the public, candidates' representatives, and political party representatives. Additionally, the statute mandates that all risk-limiting audits 'shall be conducted in a place and manner that is open to the public,' directly satisfying the criterion for observer access.

“Procedures for ensuring transparency and understanding of the process by participants and the public, including guidelines for direct observation by members of the public, representatives of the candidates involved in the risk-limiting audit, and representatives of the political parties.”

The statute describes the mechanics of risk-limiting audits and what happens if a full hand count is triggered (it 'determines the outcome'), but it does not explicitly state that audit results are legally binding on the final certified election result or that they override the initial reported outcome. The section prescribes the audit process and mentions that a full hand count 'determines' the outcome, but stops short of establishing a clear legal mandate that binds the certification to the audit result.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure requirements for political committee television advertisements under campaign finance law. It is entirely unrelated to voting system source code accessibility, which concerns the technical specifications and transparency of election machinery. The section does not address voting systems, source code, certification, or related technical transparency matters.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the criminal prohibition on counterfeiting ballots and ballot-related materials. It is entirely unrelated to software reproducibility, reproducible builds, or the verifiability of binary code in election systems. The criterion concerns technical software engineering practices; this statute concerns ballot fraud penalties.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electronic voter registration application procedures, including verification of applicant identity, signature handling, and transmission timelines. It does not address software binaries, cryptographic commitments, hashing, or pre-election commitments of any running code. The criterion concerns election system software integrity; this section concerns only registration data collection and verification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the election day page program for high school students, addressing their training, supervision, and permitted activities at polling places. It does not address ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or the requirement that such materials be signed and published before polls open.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 24.2-305 addresses the geographic composition and boundary definitions of election districts and precincts. It contains no provisions regarding observer rights, procedural access for party observers, or civil-society monitoring. The section is entirely concerned with cartographic and boundary requirements, not election observation policies.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes procedures for risk-limiting audits conducted after elections and prior to certification of results. It does not address precinct-level results publication timelines or speed of publishing election results after poll closure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 24.2-629 describes the State Board's approval process for electronic voting systems and the criteria for evaluating their technical and operational capabilities. It does not address public election event logs, append-only data structures, digital signatures, or any transparency requirements for recording election events during actual voting or tallying. The section focuses on equipment certification and testing rather than operational logging requirements.

The statute explicitly permits different kinds (vendors) of electronic voting systems to be used within the same county or city, including within the same precinct, subject to State Board approval. This directly enables multi-vendor capability in a single election.

“Systems of different kinds may be adopted for use and be used in different precincts of the same county or city, or within a precinct or precincts in a county or city, subject to the approval of the State Board.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses covered practices in elections (changes to election methods, district boundaries, polling places, and language access) and requires public notice and comment procedures or Attorney General certification. It does not address vote-format or device-protocol standards, open protocols, or vendor independence in voting systems. The statute is about procedural requirements for certain electoral changes, not technical standards for voting devices or formats.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure requirements for campaign telephone calls and caller identification, including vendor identification. It does not address contract duration, vendor lock-in, or any temporal limits on vendor agreements. The statute is focused on transparency in caller identification, not on contract management or duration restrictions.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly makes it unlawful to hinder, intimidate, or interfere with a voter in casting a secret ballot, and provides enforcement mechanisms through arrest and jail commitment. This directly guarantees the legal protection of ballot secrecy and voter–ballot unlinkability by establishing criminal penalties for violations.

“It shall be unlawful for any person to hinder, intimidate, or interfere with any qualified voter so as to prevent the voter from casting a secret ballot.”

The statute mandates that every polling place must have at least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities, explicitly requiring nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, and alternative language accessibility. This covers vision, motor accessibility (through the equipped voting system), and language accessibility comprehensively across all polling places.

“Provide for at least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters; and Provide alternative language accessibility when required by § 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses precinct establishment and polling-place flexibility (allowing polling places within one mile of precinct boundaries when unavailable within the precinct), but it does not establish a legal floor or minimum requirement for polling-place density per number of voters or per geographic area. It permits exceptions to normal requirements but does not mandate minimum ratios.