EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

Virginia Code § 24.2-803 explicitly enumerates the class of parties with standing to contest a General Assembly election. The statute clearly states that only an 'unsuccessful candidate in the election' may initiate a contest. This is unambiguous statutory enumeration of standing eligibility, establishing a narrow and well-defined category of contestants rather than leaving standing determination to judicial discretion. The statute does not delegate standing questions to case-by-case judicial determination; it codifies the eligible party category directly in the text.

“A contest of the election of any member to the General Assembly may be initiated by an unsuccessful candidate in the election, referred to hereafter as the contestant.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Virginia Code § 24.2-803 establishes that election contests to the General Assembly are resolved by the Committee on Privileges and Elections of the appropriate house, not by a court of original jurisdiction. The statute specifies a legislative committee as the forum, not a judicial court. The criterion asks whether 'the court of original jurisdiction' is specified by statute. Since the statute lodges jurisdiction in a legislative committee rather than a court, this section does not satisfy the criterion as framed. The statute is procedurally clear about where disputes are heard, but it does not designate a court—it designates an internal legislative body.

Va. Code § 24.2-803 explicitly specifies a filing deadline of 'no later than thirty days following the date of the election or three days after the conclusion of a recount, whichever is later.' This is a clear, codified deadline tied to defined events (the election date or conclusion of a recount). The statute also specifies subsequent filing deadlines: notice must be filed, the contestee has ten days to answer, the contestant must file a petition within specified timeframes depending on whether the election was held at a November general election (within ten days following notice) or another date (within ten days or two days after commencement of next session, whichever is later). These deadlines are all specified by statute, satisfying the criterion for procedural clarity regarding contest filing deadlines.

“A contest of the election of any member to the General Assembly may be initiated by an unsuccessful candidate in the election, referred to hereafter as the contestant.To initiate a contest, the contestant shall give written notice, in the manner provided in subsection D, of his intent to contest the election to the person or persons apparently elected, referred to hereafter as the contestee, and to the Clerk of the House of Delegates if he is contesting a House election or of the Senate if he is contesting a Senate election, no later than thirty days following the date of the election or three days after the conclusion of a recount, whichever is later.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 24.2-669 addresses ballot custody, inspection, and destruction procedures. While it references Chapter 8 (§ 24.2-800 et seq.) as the governing framework for contests and recounts, it does not itself codify standards of proof or evidentiary rules for election contests. The section merely permits ballot inspection 'on the order of a court' in pending contest proceedings but does not establish what standard of proof applies, what evidence is admissible, how evidence must be presented, or what burdens of persuasion contestants must meet. The criterion requires codification of 'standard of proof and admissibility rules'—substantive evidentiary standards—not procedural logistics for ballot access. This section provides only procedural mechanisms for ballot custody and access, not the evidentiary framework governing contest adjudication.

This statute codifies recount procedures in substantial detail within statutory text rather than delegating to regulation or administrative directive. The procedures specify: (1) who counts (recount officials selected equally by parties, teams for ballot scanners with one representative from each party, coordinators from electoral boards); (2) how counting proceeds (at least one team per locality for scanner machines, uniform procedures across the election district, observers with unobstructed view); and (3) evidence handling (individual ballots examined after preliminary hearing, security measures supervised by chief judge). The statute mandates the court "fix any additional procedures" and ensure "uniform" recount procedures, but the core mechanisms—team composition, party selection rights, observer access, and ballot handling—are statutorily defined rather than left to administrative discretion or regulation.

This section identifies one specific trigger for recount eligibility—a person who loses a tie-breaking determination by lot may petition for a recount. However, it does not enumerate the full range of recount triggers (e.g., margin thresholds, sworn challenge requirements, or other grounds for automatic/petition-based recounts). The section delegates the substantive recount framework to Article 1 (§ 24.2-800 et seq.), which this excerpt does not include. The statute codifies one narrow trigger but does not satisfy the criterion of enumerating recount triggers more broadly, as the section is limited to the tie-determination context and cross-references rather than enumerates triggers.

“Any person who loses the determination by lot may petition for a recount pursuant to Article 1 (§ 24.2-800 et seq.) of Chapter 8 of this title.”

Virginia Code § 24.2-802.3 provides explicit statutory allocation of recount costs based on clearly defined outcomes. The statute specifies three scenarios where costs are borne by counties and cities (petitioner wins, petitioners win referendum, or margin is ≤0.5%), and designates the petitioner as cost-bearer in all other cases. The statute further details cost calculation limitations, bonding requirements ($10 per precinct), and forfeiture provisions. This represents codified, outcome-dependent cost allocation with no discretionary gap. The framework is sufficiently clear and specific to enable prompt administrative implementation without requiring case-by-case judicial interpretation of cost responsibility.

“Costs of the recount shall be assessed against the counties and cities comprising the election district when (i) the candidate petitioning for the recount is declared the winner; (ii) the petitioners in a recount of a referendum win the recount; or (iii) there was between the candidate apparently nominated or elected and the candidate petitioning for the recount a difference of not more than one-half of one percent of the total vote cast for the two such candidates as determined by the State Board or electoral board prior to the recount. Otherwise the costs of the recount shall be assessed against the candidate petitioning for the recount or the petitioners in a recount of a referendum.”

The statute codifies the legal effect of a recount finding with substantial clarity. The court is required to declare the person who received the higher number of votes to be 'nominated or elected' (making the recount outcome binding and mandatory). The statute further mandates that the Department post changes to previously certified results, and explicitly provides that 'The recount proceeding shall be final and not subject to appeal.' This language establishes that recount findings are binding, not advisory, and must result in amendment of the original election certification. The procedural effect is codified in statute rather than left to judicial discretion or common law.

The statute requires the State Board to issue certificates 'without delay,' which establishes a deadline principle, but 'without delay' is not a specific temporal deadline fixed by statute. A true satisfaction of TIME.1 would require a definite date or number of days (e.g., 'within 10 days'). The phrase 'without delay' confers discretion on the State Board to interpret what constitutes prompt action, rather than codifying a clear, measurable deadline. This is superior to complete silence on certification timing, but inferior to a statutory deadline with a fixed calendar date or day count. The reference to § 24.2-948.2 suggests a possible carve-out for requirements elsewhere in statute, but this section itself does not establish a specific certification deadline.

“the State Board shall without delay complete and transmit to each of the persons declared to be elected a certificate of his election”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 24.2-953 addresses campaign finance disclosure violations and penalties. It contains no provisions regarding certification stays, recounts, or election contests. The section explicitly references § 24.2-946.3 for enforcement procedures, but those procedures concern financial reporting violations, not dispute-resolution timing or certification mechanics. To evaluate whether Virginia law satisfies TIME.2, one would need to examine statutes governing recount procedures and election contests (such as § 24.2-800 et seq. or § 24.2-952, which typically address certification timelines and stays). This section is categorically outside the scope of dispute-resolution procedure and does not codify or reference any stay mechanism for pending disputes.