EIIElection Integrity Index

§ 129.023 codifies a public logic-and-accuracy test producing signed written statements by the testing board, with public notice and online publication of any unsuccessful-test explanation; § 66.005 requires posting a post-election reconciliation on the county website; § 127.304 requires publishing risk-limiting-audit results online. Multiple public verification artifacts codified, though not consolidated into a single downloadable verification package.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 129.003 (Paper Audit Trail Required) defines an 'auditable voting system' as one that 'uses, creates, or displays a paper record that may be read by the voter' and bars DRE-based voting systems unless they are auditable; the paper record is the official record for any recount or contest. Voter-verifiable paper trail codified.

“uses, creates, or displays a paper record that may be read by the voter”

§ 66.057 codifies that precinct election returns become public information once the general custodian completes the unofficial tabulation for that precinct, and the records in envelope no. 3 become public when delivery of precinct records is complete — enabling re-tally from published precinct data. Formal recount standing, however, is limited to candidates and parties under Title 13, so a general citizen re-tally right is only partial.

§ 127.065 requires ballot boxes to be locked and sealed 'so that the box cannot be opened without breaking the seal,' with § 127.064 mandating serially numbered seals and a preserved seal-number record. § 127.066 requires sealing the deposit slot with signatures of the judge, a clerk and watchers; § 127.068 requires inspecting the box and both seals and matching the seal serial number on receipt at the counting station. § 127.123 protects the tabulation program from tampering in a sealed container. Mandatory tamper-evident sealing codified (ordinal 2/5 — tamper-evident ballot custody, not a voting-equipment hardware tamper standard).

“seal it so that the box cannot be opened without breaking the seal”

§ 129.054 codifies a hard network-isolation mandate: 'a voting system may not be connected to any external communications network, including the Internet,' and beginning September 1, 2026, may not even be capable of such a connection; wireless capability is likewise prohibited. § 129.054(c) bars the secretary of state from waiving any requirement of the section.

“A voting system may not be connected to any external communications network, including the Internet.”

§ 129.052 requires the general custodian to adopt secure storage and transport procedures whose chain-of-custody provisions 'must require two or more individuals to perform a check and verification check whenever a transfer of custody occurs.' § 129.051(b) codifies tracking custody of each storage medium from storage through the election to post-election disposition. Comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation codified.

“Procedures relating to the chain of custody must require two or more individuals to perform a check and verification check whenever a transfer of custody occurs.”

§ 276.013 (Election Fraud) criminalizes knowingly altering a ballot, causing a ballot not to reflect voter intent, counting votes known to be invalid, or altering a report — a second-degree felony (first-degree if committed by an elected official). § 276.012 escalates organized election-fraud activity. § 129.051(i) requires documenting unauthorized seal removal. Explicit criminal penalties for tampering codified.

“An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree”

§ 66.005 codifies a mandatory post-election integrity check for every election: not later than the 30th day after election day the general custodian 'shall prepare a reconciliation of the total number of votes cast and the total number of voters accepted to vote' at each polling place, and post the results online. This is reinforced by the separate mandatory § 127.201 1% hand-count audit and the § 127.302 risk-limiting audit. A post-election audit is legally required for every election.

“the general custodian of election records shall prepare a reconciliation of the total number of votes cast and the total number of voters accepted to vote”

§ 127.302 codifies a genuine statutory risk-limiting audit: the general custodian must participate in an RLA of selected statewide races, and § 127.303(b) requires rules that, 'using widely accepted statistical methods,' set the number or percentage of paper records counted. § 129.003(c) makes the RLA determinative of the official record. Plus the universal § 127.201 1% hand-count audit. A true RLA codified (ordinal 4/5 — RLA covers selected statewide races rather than the entire ballot).

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 127.302(e) codifies that a watcher may be present for the risk-limiting audit if appointed by a candidate, and § 127.302(d) requires posting notice of the audit's date, hour and place on the county website. § 127.201(d) grants each person entitled to appoint watchers the right to be present at the hand-count audit. Public/party observation of audits codified.

“A watcher may be present for the audit if appointed by a candidate in the election.”

§ 127.302 codifies the risk-limiting audit, and § 129.003(c)-(d) (cross-referenced) makes its findings determinative of the official record: the electronic vote is the official record only if the RLA produces strong evidence that the reported outcome matches a full count of the paper records, and the paper record becomes the official record if the RLA fails. The surfaced section codifies the audit itself; binding force on certification is established by the cross-referenced § 129.003.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 129.021 codifies hash validation to confirm voting-system source code has not been altered, but the Texas Election Code does not make voting-system source code publicly accessible or subject to open disclosure. Code is examined confidentially by appointed examiners under Ch. 122.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 18.010 governs fees for reproducing voter-registration lists — unrelated to reproducible software builds. No reproducible-build requirement is codified.

§ 129.021 codifies a pre-election binary commitment: immediately on receiving a voting system, and again at the public logic-and-accuracy test under § 129.023, the general custodian must 'perform a hash validation on each ballot marking device, each unit of automatic tabulating equipment, and each tabulation computer to verify that the source code of the equipment has not been altered.' § 129.023(c-1) repeats the source-code-integrity demonstration before each election. Pre-election cryptographic integrity check codified.

§ 127.122 requires the tabulation program (the election definition / ballot programming) to be submitted to the tabulation supervisor for approval no later than the 10th day before the equipment is first used. § 127.123 secures the approved program. § 52.007 makes a specimen ballot available for public inspection. The election definition is committed and approved before polls open, though not published as a signed public artifact.

§ 129.023 codifies a public logic-and-accuracy test that includes a § 129.023(c-1) demonstration, using a representative sample, that the source code of the equipment has not been altered; § 129.023(f)(2) requires preserving a copy of the system's software at a secure location outside the administrator's control for 22 months after election day, enabling later verification. Post-election binary verification is supported but not framed as an enforceable citizen right.

§ 213.013 grants each candidate, party, and specific-purpose committee watchers at a recount, entitled to 'observe any activity conducted in connection with the recount' and to 'sit or stand conveniently near the officers.' Chapter 33 codifies the precinct poll-watcher regime, and § 32.075(g) bars a presiding judge from removing an accepted watcher except for an observed Penal Code violation. Comprehensive domestic observer rights codified.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 66.005 requires the general custodian to post a post-election reconciliation of votes cast and voters accepted on the county website; § 66.057 makes precinct returns public information once unofficially tabulated; § 127.201(e)(2) references 'the location that the county provides information on election returns and election results,' confirming county-website results posting. Results are published online, but no statutory 24-hour precinct-level publication deadline is codified (ordinal 2/5).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 129.003 codifies a paper audit trail but no public, signed, append-only electronic election event log is required.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 122.032 sets approval requirements for voting systems (including US-manufacture requirements) and § 122.035 governs examiner appointment, but the Election Code codifies no explicit multi-vendor capability or open-competition mandate for concurrent certified vendors.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 32.111 codifies published training standards for election judges and § 122.001 references the Election Assistance Commission voting-system standards, but no open, publicly documented vote-format or device-protocol specification is codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 31.092-31.093 govern election-services contracts between county election officers and political subdivisions, but the Election Code codifies no duration cap on voting-system vendor contracts.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 122.001(a)(1) bars use of any voting system that does not 'preserve the secrecy of the ballot,' and § 1.0015 declares the legislative intent to 'protect the secrecy of the ballot.' § 61.012 requires accessible voting stations that provide a practical means to cast a secret ballot; § 31.014(a-1) references the secret-ballot right under Art. VI § 4 of the Texas Constitution. Ballot secrecy guaranteed.

“preserves the secrecy of the ballot”

§ 61.012 mandates that each polling place must provide at least one voting station complying with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, and the HAVA accessibility requirements (42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)), providing a practical and effective means for voters with physical disabilities to cast a secret ballot. § 43.034 requires every polling place to be physically accessible to the elderly and disabled with detailed structural standards. § 63.0015 grants voting-order priority to mobility-impaired voters. Comprehensive accessibility mandate at every polling place.

“each polling place must provide at least one voting station”

§ 43.007(f) codifies a polling-place density floor for the countywide-polling-place program: the total number of countywide polling places 'may not be less than 50 percent' (65 percent in the first year) of the precinct polling places that would otherwise be located in the county, and § 43.007(m) requires at least one countywide polling place per commissioners precinct with a 2:1 cap on disparity between precincts. Polling-place density floor codified.