EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 2-6-202 addresses absentee ballot procedures, including application requirements, signature verification, and ballot mailing. It contains no provisions regarding downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures. This section is entirely focused on voter application and ballot processing workflows, not on public verification artifacts or cryptographic records.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires and mandates the use of voter-verified paper ballots in the context of automatic audits. By requiring mandatory audits of voter-verified paper ballots and specifying procedures for handling and verifying them, the law establishes that voter-verifiable paper records are legally required as part of Tennessee's election system.

“conduct automatic mandatory audits of the voter-verified paper ballots cast for the president of the United States in a presidential election and the governor in a gubernatorial election”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the handling and redaction of social security numbers in voter registration records and their availability for public inspection. It does not address citizen re-tally rights or access to published precinct-level election data needed for independent verification of results.

The statute mandates that voting machines be sealed with pre-numbered seals before an election, which is a tamper-evident mechanism. However, there is no requirement for logging or monitoring of seal integrity during voting, and no tamper-responsive or auto-quarantine system. The provision requires documentation of seal numbers but does not establish ongoing tamper detection or automated response protocols.

“each machine sealed with a pre-numbered seal”

The statute explicitly prohibits any wireless communication capability on precinct-based optical scanners used in elections, which directly satisfies the criterion requiring internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity to be legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment. The prohibition covers both enabled and disabled capabilities, providing comprehensive network isolation.

“No precinct-based optical scanners used in an election in this state shall have any capability, enabled or disabled, for wireless communication of any sort.”

The section establishes custody responsibilities and security measures for voting machines and keys, but does not mandate that full chain-of-custody documentation be created, maintained, or made publicly available. It addresses physical custody and security but not documentation requirements.

“The local authority adopting voting machines shall have custody of them when they are not in use at an election and shall preserve and keep them in repair. All keys for voting machines shall be securely locked between elections by the voting machine technician.”

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized tampering, interference, and damage to voting devices and systems. The section concludes by specifying that violations constitute a Class D felony, providing an explicit criminal penalty for unauthorized device access and tampering.

“A person commits an offense who, before, during, or after an election: Intentionally tampers, interferes, or attempts to interfere with the correct operation of, or damages in order to prevent the use of, a voting machine, electronic poll book, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes”

The statute explicitly requires that county election commissions 'shall conduct automatic mandatory audits' following each November general election, using mandatory language that creates a binding legal obligation. This clearly mandates post-election audits for every general election.

“Following each November general election any county election commission utilizing a precinct-based optical scanner shall, in accordance with this section, conduct automatic mandatory audits of the voter-verified paper ballots cast for the president of the United States in a presidential election and the governor in a gubernatorial election”

The statute mandates a complete recount of all ballots in contested elections, which constitutes a fixed-percentage (100%) hand recount option. However, it does not mandate hand recounts universally—it only requires them in specific dispute circumstances, and even then permits the discretion to use automated tabulators instead. The statute does not establish a comprehensive post-election audit method, risk-limiting audit, or comparison audit framework.

“Any recount ordered by this section shall be a complete recount of all ballots cast in such election.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires that the audit be conducted 'at a time and place open to the public,' which grants parties, media, and citizens observer access to the audit process. This language directly satisfies the criterion for public observation.

“At a time and place open to the public, the county election commission shall identify those ballot boxes containing the absentee by-mail ballots cast in the randomly selected voting precinct or precincts”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes procedures for conducting audits of campaign finance reports and statements filed with the registry of election finance. It does not address whether audit results are binding on final certified election results; rather, it concerns compliance audits of candidate financial disclosures. The section discusses audit procedures, penalties for non-compliance, and posting of findings, but contains no language making audit results legally binding on the certification of election outcomes.

The statute mandates that vendors provide access to information and place it in escrow with a state-designated agent, indicating the secretary of state (a certifying authority) can access vendor information. However, the section does not specify whether source code is included, what scope of access applies, or whether independent experts or academics can access it, limiting it to likely certifying-authority-level access.

“vendors shall provide access to all information required by law, rule or regulation, which shall be placed in escrow with an agent designated by the secretary of state”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses online voter registration procedures and system architecture but contains no reference to cryptographic commitment, hash publication, binary code verification, or any pre-election security measures involving software binaries. The criterion concerns technical election security practices unrelated to voter registration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses absentee ballot procedures for address confidentiality program participants, including application submission, signature verification, and ballot mailing. It does not address ballot contest definition, ballot layout, tabulation rules, or any requirement for signing and publishing such materials before polls open.

No matching sections in corpus.

Tennessee law grants poll watchers (appointed by political parties, candidates, and citizen organizations) broad procedural access to observe election proceedings at polling places, including the ability to inspect ballots, tally sheets, and poll lists during preparation and certification. The statute explicitly authorizes their presence during all proceedings and provides specific mechanisms for challenging voters and protesting election conduct.

“Poll watchers may be present during all proceedings at the polling place governed by this chapter. They may watch and inspect the performance in and around the polling place of all duties under this title.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses audits and investigations of campaign finance reports and candidate disclosures filed with the registry of election finance. It does not address election results publication, precinct-level reporting, or any timeline for publishing election night data. The section is entirely focused on post-election financial compliance auditing.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses testing, certification, and security requirements for precinct-based optical scanners, but does not address whether multiple certified vendors are permitted to operate in the same election. The section focuses on equipment functionality and compliance standards rather than vendor selection or multi-vendor capability policies.

The statute explicitly mandates that voter registration data provided on computer media must use open, publicly documented data standards (EBCDIC, ASCII, or BCD) and prohibits proprietary or encrypted formats. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for open protocol standards.

“If the information is provided on computer generated media such as disk, diskette, tape, telecommunications or any other form of magnetic media, then the information shall be provided in non-proprietary and non-encrypted form. Minimum data standards shall be EBCDIC (Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code), ASCII (American Standard Code Information Interchange) or BCD (Binary Coded Decimal).”

The statute explicitly caps the total lease period for voting machine contracts at twenty years, preventing perpetual lock-in with vendors. This directly satisfies the criterion of capping vendor contract duration.

“The total lease period shall in no case exceed twenty (20) years.”

The statute requires vendors to place information in escrow with a state-designated agent, but it does not specifically mandate source-code escrow as a condition of certification. The text refers to 'all information required by law, rule or regulation' rather than explicitly requiring source code, and the escrow requirement appears to be a general vendor obligation rather than a specific certification prerequisite.

“vendors shall provide access to all information required by law, rule or regulation, which shall be placed in escrow with an agent designated by the secretary of state”

While the statute guarantees that voters may mark their ballots in 'complete secrecy and privacy,' it does not ensure voter-ballot unlinkability. The statute explicitly requires judges to compare ballot numbers on stubs with ballot applications and to file applications and stubs in order received, creating a linkage between voter identity and ballot number that undermines unlinkability. The secrecy protects the voting location and marking process but not the anonymity of the completed ballot.

“The voter shall then go to a place where the voter may mark the ballot in complete secrecy and privacy”

The statute provides accessibility accommodations for voters with disabilities (physical disability, blindness, illiteracy) and allows marked ballot assistance at every polling place. However, it does not mandate comprehensive accessibility standards across vision, motor, and language accessibility, nor does it require specific technical standards or equipment to be present at every polling place. The law is permissive regarding assistance rather than mandating comprehensive accessibility infrastructure.

“A voter who claims, by reason of illiteracy or physical disability other than blindness, to be unable to mark the ballot to vote as the voter wishes and who, in the judgment of the officer of elections, is so disabled or illiterate, may: Where voting machines are used, have the ballot marked on a voting machine or on a paper ballot subject to the provisions of § 2-7-117 by any person of the voter's selection, or by one of the judges of the voter's choice in the presence of either a judge of a different political party or, if such judge is not available, an election official of a different political party”

The section establishes a clear legal floor on polling place density: at least one voting center per 10,000 registered voters. This directly satisfies the criterion by mandating a minimum ratio of voting centers to voters, ensuring voter access is not left to discretion.

“For every ten thousand (10,000) registered voters, the county election commission shall locate at least one (1) convenient voting center”