EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs campaign fund investment rules for candidates and political committees, not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff. It imposes penalties on candidates for improper fund investments but contains no provisions addressing whether commissioners or election administrators must disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections.

This section provides a narrow right to judicial review (mandamus) but only in one specific context: county election commissions challenging county legislative bodies' failure to maintain comparable appropriations. The section does not codify a general right to seek judicial review of election-authority decisions more broadly, does not clearly define standing, timeline, or venue for judicial challenge of administrative decisions by election officials or the state election coordinator, and the judicial review mechanism contemplated (administrative law judge hearing before the secretary of state) is internal administrative process, not independent court review. The criterion requires codified judicial review of election-authority decisions with defined procedural safeguards.

“the county election commission of any county receiving state payments under this section which so reduces election appropriations shall also be authorized to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the county legislative body to comply with the provisions of this subsection (c).”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses conflict-of-interest prohibitions and vendor conduct restrictions regarding election officials, but contains no language establishing or grounding the existence, structure, or mandate of any election commission. It presupposes commissions exist but does not satisfy COMM.1, which requires constitutional grounding of the commission itself. The section is regulatory in nature (prohibiting conduct), not structural.

The statute distributes appointment authority across three branches: the governor appoints two members (with constraining nominations from majority and minority parties), the state senate appoints two members with partisan balance (one Democrat, one Republican), and the state house appoints two members with partisan balance (one Democrat, one Republican). No single branch controls the composition; all six seats are allocated by statute to different appointers, with fixed terms (five years, staggered) and explicit partisan balance requirements preventing unilateral capture.

“The governor shall appoint two (2) members. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of three (3) nominees submitted by the state executive committee of the majority party. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of three (3) nominees submitted by the state executive committee of the minority party. The governor's solicitations and the replies shall be public records. The governor shall give due consideration to such nominations. The governor may request a second list of nominees; provided, however, no nominees from the original list of nominees may appear on the second list of nominees. The senate shall appoint two (2) members, with one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the senate democratic caucus and one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the senate republican caucus; and The house of representatives shall appoint two (2) members, with one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the house of representatives democratic caucus and one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the house of representatives republican caucus.”

The section establishes fixed two-year terms for county primary board members, satisfying the fixed-length requirement. However, it lacks staggered cycles (all terms run concurrently) and provides no statutory grounds for removal, only provisions for successor appointment. These omissions mean the institutional protection against mid-term removal and coordinated turnover is incomplete.

“for terms of two (2) years from the date of their appointment and until their successors are appointed and qualified”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot design and layout requirements (arrangement of offices, candidate names, question formatting). It contains no provisions regarding election commission composition, appointment procedures, political balance, term protection, or institutional structure. The section is purely procedural and does not engage with the criterion COMM.4, which measures whether an election commission's composition is statutorily required to be politically balanced.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 2-10-102 is a definitional section that establishes terminology for campaign finance law (e.g., 'contribution,' 'expenditure,' 'candidate'). It contains no provisions regarding election authority budgets, funding mechanisms, statutory line items, or protection from mid-cycle reallocation. The section does not address institutional funding structure for any election administration entity.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration purge procedures and address verification protocols. It contains no language pertaining to election infrastructure budgeting, multi-year funding cycles, or fiscal appropriations. The section is purely procedural and administrative in nature, dealing with when and how registrations are removed or placed in inactive status.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates that training for election officials be conducted in each county with defined content (duties during elections, state election laws) and frequency (at least one instructional meeting after appointment of officials). It delegates creation of minimum standards to the coordinator of elections but anchors the requirement in statute, satisfying the criterion's demand for statutory grounding of mandatory training.

“The coordinator of elections shall create minimum standards for educating election officials throughout the state for use by the county election commissions. The standards shall include instructing election officials as to their duties during an election and educating the officials about the election laws of this state. After the appointment of the election officials pursuant to § 2-4-102, there shall be held in each county, under the direction of the county election commission, at least one (1) instructional meeting for the purpose of training election officials as to their duties during an election.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute establishes that scanners must be certified by the federal Election Assistance Commission and meet voluntary voting systems guidelines, and requires independent expert review. However, the section delegates the detailed mechanics—criteria specificity, evaluator selection process, testing timeline, and public-comment procedures—to rulemaking by the state coordinator of elections ('shall enact necessary rules and regulations'). The codified layer confirms certification and testing requirements exist, but the statutory text does not itself codify evaluator credentials, timeline deadlines, or public-comment periods.

“Shall be certified pursuant to § 2-9-110 and shall have been certified by the election assistance commission as having met the applicable voluntary voting systems guidelines. In addition, the precinct-based optical scanners shall be tested to ensure the scanners operate in accordance with the guidelines; and Shall, with all relevant documentation, be made available by their vendors, at the request of the state election commission or the secretary of state for review by an independent expert, selected by the state election commission or the secretary of state, to ensure the functionality and security of its systems.”

The section codifies a fixed recertification schedule (at least every 8 years) as a mandatory duty of state officials ('shall reexamine'). This establishes a clear, statutory recertification trigger that does not depend on administrative discretion or reactive discovery alone. The 8-year cycle is specific and enforceable.

“Before the 2002 election cycle and at least every eight (8) years thereafter, the state coordinator of elections and the state election commission shall reexamine all voting machines to ensure such machines still meet the minimum criteria for certification.”

The statute identifies non-authorized use of voter registration data as a ground for vendor decertification and assigns this authority to the state election commission. However, the statute provides no procedural safeguards: it does not define notice, hearing, appeal, or due process requirements before decertification, nor does it specify timelines or standards of review. The grounds are stated but the procedure is absent.

“Non-authorized use by the vendor of the data shall constitute a Class B misdemeanor and grounds for decertification by the state election commission.”