EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses political party certification and decertification procedures, including petition requirements and organizational requirements. It contains no provisions regarding downloadable public packages, certificates related to election results, device records, or result signatures. The statute is entirely focused on party registration and organizational compliance, not election verification artifacts.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute permits the use of paper ballots as a fallback when electronic vote recorders malfunction, but it does not establish that voter-verifiable paper records are legally required as a standard voting method. The paper ballots are optional contingency measures, not a mandatory voter-verification mechanism tied to electronic voting systems.

“in case such repair or substitution cannot be made, paper ballots, printed or written and of any suitable form, may be used for the taking of votes”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the ethics committee process and House or Senate review of ethics committee actions. It does not concern election procedures, ballot counting, precinct data publication, or citizen rights to re-tally election results. The criterion asks about citizen re-tallying from published precinct data, which is entirely outside the scope of this ethics provision.

The statute mandates that voting machines be locked or sealed with numbered seals in the presence of party representatives, which establishes a tamper-evident mechanism. However, the section does not specify automated logging of seal integrity checks, chain-of-custody documentation requirements, or any tamper-responsive quarantine procedures—only the initial sealing and certification process.

“it must be locked or sealed with a numbered seal in their presence”

The statute explicitly requires that vote recorders or optical scan voting devices must disable all forms of internet, wireless, and external network connectivity at all times during a current election. This directly prohibits internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity on vote-casting equipment.

“disables, at all times while utilized in a current election, the following: (1) a connection to the Internet or an external network; (2) the capability to establish a wireless connection to an external network; (3) the establishment of a connection to an external network through a cable, a wireless modem or any other mechanism or process”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses contribution attribution rules for spouses and minor children in campaign finance contexts, not custody documentation or chain-of-custody procedures for election materials or equipment. It is entirely unrelated to the custody_hardware dimension.

The statute explicitly criminalizes tampering with or attempting to tamper with voting machines and establishes a specific criminal penalty of imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than three years. This directly satisfies the criterion by providing explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Any person who wilfully tampers with or attempts to tamper with, disarrange, deface or impair, in any manner whatsoever, or destroy any such voting machine while it is in use at any election or who shall, after such machine is locked in order to preserve the registration or record of any election made by it, tamper with or attempt to tamper with such machine or who instigates, aids or abets any other person in any case herein mentioned, with intent to destroy or change the record of votes on a voting machine, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than three months nor more than three years.”

The section mandates recounts but only when the margin between candidates is one percent or less, not for every election. It provides a threshold-based recount mechanism rather than a universal post-election audit requirement. This is a conditional audit triggered by close margins, not a comprehensive audit of all elections.

“Whenever the difference between the number of votes received by a candidate who has been declared nominated for an office in a primary election or who has been declared elected to an office in a general election and the number of votes received by any other candidate or candidate not declared so nominated or elected or whenever the difference between the number of votes received by a candidate who received the least number of votes to qualify for a runoff election and a candidate or candidates who did not so qualify shall be not more than one percent of the total votes which were cast for such office therein, the committee or board charged by law with canvassing such votes shall order a recount of such votes to be made forthwith”

This section mandates recounts, which is a form of hand recount, when vote margins fall within one percent. However, the recount is triggered only when margins are extremely close (≤1%), not applied as a fixed percentage of all elections. This is a narrow, margin-based recount requirement rather than a systematic audit method covering all elections.

“the committee or board charged by law with canvassing such votes shall order a recount of such votes to be made forthwith”

The statute mandates recounts when vote margins are within one percent, which triggers additional scrutiny on close margins. However, the criterion asks whether law triggers additional audits on close margins OR sworn challenges. This section addresses only close-margin triggers (recounts), not sworn-challenge triggers, and a recount is not necessarily an audit under standard election integrity terminology. The statute does not address audit triggers based on sworn challenges.

“Whenever the difference between the number of votes received by a candidate who has been declared nominated for an office in a primary election or who has been declared elected to an office in a general election and the number of votes received by any other candidate or candidate not declared so nominated or elected or whenever the difference between the number of votes received by a candidate who received the least number of votes to qualify for a runoff election and a candidate or candidates who did not so qualify shall be not more than one percent of the total votes which were cast for such office therein, the committee or board charged by law with canvassing such votes shall order a recount of such votes to be made forthwith”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the conduct of ethics complaints and investigations by the State Ethics Commission and legislative ethics committees. It addresses procedures for filing complaints, investigating violations of ethics laws, and conducting hearings—matters entirely unrelated to post-election audits or public observation of audits. The statute contains no provisions regarding election audits or observer access to any audit process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the role and responsibilities of the State Election Commission's executive director, including supervisory duties over county boards and voter registration processes. It does not address post-election audits or whether audit results are binding on certified election results. The section focuses on administrative organization and pre- and post-election voter file management, not audit authority or binding force.

The statute requires source code escrow and makes it available to the State Election Commission under limited circumstances (business closure, court order, or discretionary examination). This provides access to a certifying authority but does not provide public disclosure or access to academics under NDA, placing it at level 2 on the ordinal scale.

“Before a voting system may be used in elections in the State, all source codes for the system must be placed in escrow by the manufacturer at the manufacturer's expense with the authority approved by the Federal Election Assistance Commission. These source codes must be available to the State Election Commission in case the company goes out of business, pursuant to court order, or if the State Election Commission determines that an examination of these source codes is necessary.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires source code escrow (subsection I) and approval of optical scan voting systems, but it does not mandate or address reproducible builds—the requirement that production binaries be buildable from public source with identical outputs. The statute focuses on system approval, testing, certification compliance, and source code escrow for business continuity, not on the technical requirement for reproducible builds.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedures for requesting and returning absentee ballot applications, including record-keeping and verification requirements. It does not address ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or pre-election publication of such materials. The section is entirely about absentee ballot administration logistics and is unrelated to the criterion regarding signed and published election definitions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section defines voting systems and assigns the State Election Commission duties to approve and adopt systems, provide training, and create ballots, but does not grant any right to verify that the actual running binary matches a committed one. There is no mention of binary verification, source code transparency, or post-election integrity checks of software.

The section grants poll watchers a right to observe ballot processing and container sealing after polls close, which addresses transparency and observation rights. However, it does not clarify whether this access extends to all procedural steps throughout the entire election process (from opening through certification), does not specify the types of observers permitted (party vs. civil society), and does not address the scope of 'full procedural access' as required by the criterion.

“Poll watchers shall be allowed to remain in the polling place after the polls close and may observe the processing of the ballots and the sealing of the containers.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural handling and tabulation of absentee ballots, including examination of envelopes, opening procedures, and the role of candidates and watchers. It does not address international observer access or admission of OSCE/EU/IFES observers, which is a different topic entirely.

The statute requires county boards to canvass and transmit precinct-level vote statements by noon on the Saturday following the primary, which typically falls within 48 hours of poll closure (assuming polls close on Tuesday). However, this requirement applies only to primary elections, not general elections, and the exact timing can vary depending on when the primary falls relative to Saturday.

“The county board of canvassers for primaries shall make statements of the votes of the precincts of its county as the nature of the primary requires not later than twelve o'clock noon on the Saturday next following the primary and at that time transmit and certify to the Board of State Canvassers the results of its findings.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines voting systems and assigns duties to the State Election Commission regarding system approval, training, and procurement. It does not address or require a public, signed, append-only election event log, which is a specific technical transparency mechanism.

The statute explicitly authorizes the State Election Commission to approve and adopt multiple voting systems, which permits multiple certified vendors to operate within South Carolina elections. This directly satisfies the requirement for multi-vendor capability.

“approve and adopt multiple voting systems if the commission, in its discretion, determines not to adopt one voting system”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses remedies for breaches of ethical standards by public officials and employees, including warnings, reprimands, and recovery of improperly received benefits. It does not address vote-format standards, device protocols, or election technology specifications. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning open and publicly documented voting standards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 7-3-20 addresses the appointment, qualifications, duties, and removal of the State Election Commission's executive director. It does not contain any provisions regarding vendor contracts, their duration, or caps on contract terms. The criterion concerns whether vendor contracts are capped in duration to prevent perpetual lock-in, which is entirely outside the scope of this section.

The statute explicitly requires that all source codes for optical scan voting systems be placed in escrow by the manufacturer before the system can be used in elections. This is a mandatory condition of certification, as stated in subsection (I). The source codes must be made available to the State Election Commission under specified circumstances, and manufacturers must place all updates in escrow as well.

“Before an optical scan voting system may be used in elections in the State, all source codes for the system must be placed in escrow by the manufacturer, at the manufacturer's expense, with the authority approved by the Federal Election Assistance Commission.”

The section mandates folding and preservation of ballot secrecy during the curbside voting process, but it does not guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability. The process involves managers observing the voter outside the vehicle and handling the ballot afterward, which creates opportunities for the ballot to be linked to the voter. The statute protects the physical secrecy of the ballot (keeping its contents hidden) but does not enforce the separation between voter identity and ballot identity that would be required for true voter-ballot unlinkability.

“After the voter has voted his ballot, he must fold it so that the secrecy of the ballot is preserved and return it to the managers waiting outside the vehicle.”

The section establishes that voters with blindness, disability, or literacy challenges have a right to assistance in voting, and requires managers to appoint qualified assistants. However, it does not mandate specific accessibility standards or equipment at every polling place (such as accessible voting machines, Braille ballots, or language services), nor does it address physical accessibility requirements. The statute addresses procedural assistance rather than comprehensive accessibility infrastructure.

“A voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write shall make the fact known to the managers. The chairman of the managers shall appoint one of the managers and a person of the voter's choice, other than the voter's employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union to assist the voter in preparing his ballot.”

This section establishes a legal floor for voting machine density at polling places, requiring at least one machine per 250 registered voters (or portion thereof). Since voting machines are essential infrastructure for polling place functionality, this requirement effectively establishes a floor on polling place capacity and accessibility per voter.