EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the use of voter electronic-mail addresses for communication about the voting process and military-overseas ballot delivery. It does not address public verification artifacts, downloadable packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures—all elements central to the citizen verifiability criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires voters to mark and prepare paper ballots and feed them into an electronic vote tabulator, establishing that a paper ballot record exists. The requirement that ballots not be shown before tabulation, combined with the mandatory use of paper ballots, creates a voter-verifiable paper trail, as voters mark their own ballots and can verify their contents before feeding them into the tabulator.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses board of registration meeting procedures, public records access rules, and privacy protections for personal information. It does not address citizen rights to re-tally election results from precinct data or any aspect of vote tallying verification.

The statute mandates tamper-evident seals (numbered metal seals) on voting machines that must be broken to operate the machine, satisfying the basic tamper-evident requirement. However, there is no requirement for logging or tamper-responsive features like auto-quarantine, so the score does not reach the higher levels.

The statute requires that ballot-printing systems retain functionality during network disconnection, which assumes they may be network-connected but must work offline. However, the section does not prohibit internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity on vote-casting equipment; it merely mandates resilience if connectivity is lost. The criterion asks whether connectivity is legally prohibited, and this section does not establish such a prohibition.

The statute requires documentation of notice and confirmation of receipt to political parties and judges, but does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody requirement for ballot boxes, voting machines, or other election materials during recount proceedings. While the section requires certification that the recount occurred and specifies procedural safeguards (presence of county clerk and district judge), it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or require such documentation to be publicly available.

“The county clerk shall keep a log of how each person was notified and confirmation that the notice was received.”

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized access to voting machines, including opening, unlocking, inspecting, tampering, resetting, or adjusting county-owned voting machines without lawful authority. The penalty is designation as a fourth degree felony, which satisfies the criterion for explicit criminal penalties on unauthorized device access.

“Whoever commits unlawful opening of a voting machine is guilty of a fourth degree felony.”

The section establishes a post-election audit mechanism (voting system check), but it is not mandatory for every election. The audit is waived entirely if all winning margins exceed 15 percent, meaning some elections may have no audit requirement at all. This fails to satisfy the criterion of a mandatory audit for every election.

New Mexico's voting system check mandates a risk-limiting audit (RLA) mechanism. The statute explicitly requires a statistical process designed to detect faulty tabulators with at least 90% probability if they would alter the election outcome, and includes cascading sample expansion with error-rate thresholds (90% of winning margin) that trigger full recounts. This matches the risk-limiting audit standard for score 4.

While the statute does trigger additional audits (a second sample, and potentially a full hand recount) based on error rate thresholds, this is not a trigger based on close margins per se—rather, it is based on discovered discrepancies during the initial audit. The statute requires mandatory audits for all federal offices and certain statewide offices regardless of margin (subject to a 15% threshold exemption), but the escalation to additional audits is reactive to audit findings, not proactive to close margins or sworn challenges.

The statute grants observation rights only to persons designated as county canvass observers for the hand recount portion of the audit, not to parties, media, and citizens generally. The section does not explicitly provide public observation access to the broader voting system check process or establish observer access for media and citizens without designation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot ordering requirements for elections and contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit results, or the legal binding force of audit findings on certified election results.

The statute mandates that voting system source code be placed in escrow and made accessible to the state (the certifying authority), which corresponds to the '2=certifying authority only' level on the ordinal scale. Access is explicitly limited to the state of New Mexico rather than being fully public or available to academics.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses driver's license voter registration procedures, including application processes, employee conduct, and transmission of registration data. It does not address election software, binary code, cryptographic commits, or any pre-election technical security measures related to voting systems.

The section requires that tally sheets and statements of canvass be prepared before election day with candidate names, which addresses ballot contests. However, it does not explicitly require that ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules be signed and published before polls open—it only mandates printing and preparation of tally sheets. The signature and publication requirements central to the criterion are not addressed.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires voter registration system software to be verified, identified, and approved by the secretary of state, but it does not address post-election integrity checks or grant a right to verify that the running binary matches a committed one. The statute concerns approval and safeguarding of software, not post-election verification or binary matching procedures.

This section provides comprehensive procedural access rights to watchers and election observers, including continuous presence throughout polling operations, observation of conduct, access to voter lists and voting machines, and the ability to document actions. These provisions clearly establish full procedural access to election observation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines 'election observer' to include persons registered with the U.S. Department of State as international election observers, but it does not establish a default admission policy for OSCE, EU, or IFES observers. The statute merely permits certain internationally-registered observers to be classified as 'election observers' under the Election Code; it does not guarantee or mandate their access to elections. The criterion asks whether such observers are 'admitted by default,' which requires an affirmative permission or access provision that this definitional statute does not provide.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses post-election duties of the secretary of state regarding the state canvass and issuance of certificates of election or nomination. It specifies timelines for state canvassing and certification (not sooner than 31 days for primary/general elections, 24 days for local elections, etc.), but does not address precinct-level results publication or any requirement to publish results within 24 hours of poll closing.

The statute requires voting systems to maintain an internal audit trail of election events in printed form, satisfying the requirement for an event log. However, the statute does not explicitly require that this log be public or signed, nor does it mandate that it be append-only. These are key components of the criterion that are not addressed in the text.

“have internal audit trail capability such that all pre-election, election day and post-election events shall be stored, recorded and recovered in an easy-to-read printed form”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a voting system certification committee and outlines its composition, membership qualifications, and procedural requirements. It does not address whether multiple certified vendors may operate simultaneously in the same election; it only creates the institutional framework for reviewing and certifying voting systems.

The section requires voting systems to meet UACEC standards and state law, which establishes reference to external standards, but does not explicitly require that vote-format or device-protocol standards themselves be open and publicly documented. The statute mandates compliance with standards rather than mandating open protocol standards.

The statute explicitly caps the duration of vendor contracts at ten years, preventing perpetual lock-in to a single vendor. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement that vendor contracts be capped in duration.

“the term of the lease-purchase contract shall not exceed ten years”

The statute explicitly requires source-code escrow with the state as a condition of both initial and continued certification of voting systems. This directly satisfies the criterion by mandating that source code be placed in escrow and made accessible to New Mexico.

The section declares that securing ballot secrecy is a purpose of the Election Code, but a statement of purpose does not establish a legally enforceable guarantee or mechanism. The criterion requires that voter–ballot unlinkability be legally guaranteed and enforceable; this section only identifies an aspirational goal without providing substantive legal protections, procedures, or enforcement mechanisms.

“It is the purpose of the Election Code [Chapter 1 NMSA 1978] to secure the secrecy of the ballot”

The section mandates accessibility features at voter convenience centers, specifically requiring voting systems for disabled voters and ADA compliance. However, it addresses only motor/disability access through voting systems and physical accessibility (wheelchair-accessible spaces, ADA compliance), without explicit requirements for vision assistance or language accessibility supports.

The section establishes a floor of at least one polling place per precinct, but this is a precinct-based requirement rather than a floor based on voter density or geographic area. The criterion specifically asks for a legal floor per N voters or per geographic area, neither of which is articulated in this statute. Without knowing precinct size standards, this requirement does not guarantee minimum density based on population or area.