EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute specifies that the district court of the county is the court of original jurisdiction for precinct boundary and polling place protests ('petition the district court of that county'). However, this section addresses only precinct boundary and polling place disputes under mandamus, not election contests broadly. Election contests typically involve challenges to election results, candidate qualification, or vote counting—matters distinct from precinct administration. The statute clearly establishes venue for this narrow category of dispute but does not address jurisdiction for general election contests (result challenges, certification disputes, recount contests). A complete satisfaction of the criterion would require codification of venue for the full range of election contest types. The statutory specification for this particular dispute category is clear and meets the criterion partially but incompletely.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section quoted addresses the procedural characterization of election contests and the disqualification of trial judges, but does not specify any deadline for filing an election contest. The statute cross-references Section 38-3-9 NMSA 1978 (relating to civil procedure) without providing the substantive deadline rule itself in the election code. To determine whether this criterion is satisfied, one would need to examine the cross-referenced provision or other parts of the election code. As presented, this isolated section fails to codify the filing deadline (measured in days after certification or after a defined triggering event) that CONT.EDRI.3 requires. The criterion demands clarity about when a contest must be filed relative to certification or another defined electoral event.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-3-6 addresses precinct boundary and polling place disputes through mandamus petition to district court, but contains no codified standard of proof or evidentiary rules. The statute requires petitioners to set forth 'facts and reasons for their dissatisfaction' and directs the court to 'hear the evidence, decide the issues involved and issue its order as the law and facts require,' but does not establish: (1) a specific standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance); (2) rules governing admissibility of evidence; (3) burden of proof allocation; or (4) evidentiary procedures. The framework delegates these determinations entirely to court discretion under general law principles ('as the law and facts require'). This is a procedural clarity deficiency—no statutory codification of evidence standards for this category of election dispute.

NMSA 1978 § 1-14-23 comprehensively codifies recount procedures in statute. The section defines (1) who counts (county clerks, representatives of candidates, precinct boards), (2) how (hand tally of randomly selected ballots compared against electronic tabulation, with specific percentage thresholds: 2% for statewide/federal offices and 5% for other offices, minimum 100 ballots), and (3) with what evidence (comparison of hand tally results against electronic system results, with fallback procedures if discrepancies are discovered). The statute also specifies the mechanism for determining which electronic system to use based on accuracy validation. This is statutory law, not delegated to regulation or administrative discretion, satisfying the criterion's requirement that procedures be defined in statute rather than subordinate authority.

NMSA 1978, § 1-14-24(A) clearly enumerates automatic recount triggers based on specified margin thresholds differentiated by office type and ballot question category. The statute establishes precise percentage-based thresholds (one-fourth percent, one-half percent, and one percent) and applies them to distinct categories of elections (federal/statewide offices, county offices, judicial retention elections, local ballot questions, and other offices). The triggering mechanism is objective and mathematically defined. Section 1-14-24(B) further specifies procedural initiation by the secretary of state and state canvassing board. This satisfies the criterion because recount triggers are explicitly enumerated in statute with clear margin thresholds rather than left to discretionary determination.

NMSA 1978, § 1-14-15 clearly codifies cost allocation for petition-based recounts. Subsection C specifies that if error or fraud sufficient to change the election winner is found, the state or county bears the cost. Subsection D specifies that if no such error or fraud appears, the applicant bears the cost. The statute also defines what costs include (docket fees, mileage, witness fees), provides an exception for precinct board member fees when board error occurs, and requires an upfront deposit or surety bond (subsection A). This allocation mechanism is explicit and mandatory, leaving no discretionary gaps in the procedural rule.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute sets mandatory, specific certification deadlines that are not subject to administrative discretion. NMSA 1978, § 1-13-13(A) establishes a six-to-ten-day window (or six-to-thirteen-day window for counties exceeding 150,000 voters) for county canvassing board certification, and § 1-13-13(C) establishes a thirty-first-day deadline for the secretary of state's issuance of election certificates. These are binding statutory provisions that define when results become official, removing discretionary authority. The language 'shall meet' and 'shall issue' creates mandatory obligations with fixed temporal parameters.

No matching sections in corpus.