EIIElection Integrity Index

§ 13-15-113 requires a precinct-level reconciliation spreadsheet (ballots issued, cast, accepted, rejected per precinct) to be posted publicly to the county election website, and a statewide comprehensive reconciliation report to be published; a public verification artifact, though without cryptographic certificates, device records or result signatures.

“The spreadsheet must be posted to the county election website in a place accessible by all members of the public”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Montana votes on hand-marked paper ballots — § 13-13-116 governs delivery and marking of the paper ballot, and § 13-17-103(1)(k) bars approval of any voting system that does not use a paper ballot allowing votes to be manually counted.

“Before delivering a paper ballot to an elector, the election judges shall”

§ 13-1-109 makes all election records public and open to inspection, and § 13-15-113 requires precinct-level ballot counts to be posted to the county election website — any citizen can obtain the precinct data needed to re-tally.

“all records pertaining to elector registration and elections are public records.”

Montana requires election materials and ballot containers to be sealed, with each election judge signing across all seals (§ 13-15-205) and sealed packages openable only by court order (§ 13-15-108); voting systems must be 'protected from tampering' (§ 13-17-103). Tamper-evident seals are mandated — no tamper-responsive auto-quarantine. Level 2.

“Each election judge shall sign the judge's name across all seals.”

Montana mandates network isolation — § 13-17-103(1)(m) bars approval of any voting system not certified free of modems or other unauthorized external communication devices, and § 13-35-205 makes installing or using such a device a crime.

“is certified by the manufacturer to be free of any modems or other unauthorized external communication devices”

Montana codifies sealed-package custody — ballots are sealed in the presence of the election administrator and the recount board and delivered to the administrator for custody (§ 13-16-417), judges sign across all seals (§ 13-15-205), and election records are public (§ 13-1-109); but a single comprehensive publicly-available chain-of-custody log is not mandated.

“must be delivered to the election administrator for custody.”

§ 13-35-205 makes it a crime (tampering with public records or information, punishable under 45-7-208) to install or use a modem or other unauthorized external communication device in a voting system; § 13-35-206 criminalizes physical tampering with voting equipment.

“installs a modem or other unauthorized external communication device in a voting system”

§ 13-17-503 mandates a random-sample audit by the county audit committee after every federal election; § 13-17-510 makes the audit only optional after nonfederal elections, so it is not required for every election.

“the county audit committee shall conduct a random-sample audit”

§ 13-17-503 sets a fixed-percentage hand audit — at least 10% of precincts per county — manually counted and compared to the vote-counting-machine totals under § 13-17-506, escalating to more precincts on a discrepancy (§ 13-17-507). A fixed-percentage hand recount, not a risk-limiting audit. Level 2.

“at least 10% of the precincts in each county or a minimum of two precincts in each county, whichever is greater”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Montana's random-sample audit is triggered by the federal-election calendar (mandatory) or a county board's request for nonfederal elections (§ 13-17-510); close margins trigger a recount rather than an additional audit, and there is no sworn-challenge audit trigger.

§ 13-17-506(3) requires the audit process to be public, § 13-17-505(2) opens the precinct-selection process to the public, and § 13-17-507(4) makes the audit results public.

“The audit process must be public.”

The audit feeds the official result — § 13-17-506 has the county audit committee certify the audit results to the election administrator and secretary of state, and § 13-17-507(1) makes it binding: where the audit and machine totals disagree, the random-sample audit results 'must serve as the definitive record for purposes of the canvass'.

“the county audit committee shall certify the results to the county election administrator and the secretary of state”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced campaign and petition disclosure provisions; the MCA does not grant access to voting-system source code — § 13-17-103(1)(l) lets auditors monitor software while it runs, but the source code itself stays with the vendor.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The 'digital signature' provisions concern overseas-voter authentication (a U.S. Department of Defense common access card), not a cryptographic commitment of the voting-system binary; Montana does not require pre-election publication of a software hash.

§ 13-17-203 requires the election administrator to publish a sample ballot layout, a voting-system diagram and voting instructions 2 to 12 days before an election; the ballot layout is published pre-election, but it is not cryptographically signed and tabulation rules are not included.

“a diagram showing the voting system to be used by voters and a sample of the ballot layout”

§ 13-17-103(1)(l) grants auditors the right to monitor voting-system software while it runs, and § 13-17-507 / § 13-17-509 require expert software examination of any machine that fails the random-sample audit; there is, however, no committed-binary hash to verify against.

“allows auditors to access and monitor any software program while it is running on the system to determine whether the software is running properly”

§ 13-13-120 entitles a poll watcher from each political party to observe voting and all vote-counting procedures, and § 13-13-121 lets any candidate or group with an interest in the election request additional poll watchers — broad domestic observer access.

“Poll watchers must also be permitted to observe all of the vote counting procedures of the judges after the closing of the polls”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 13-15-113 requires a precinct-level reconciliation spreadsheet to be posted to the county election website no later than the county canvass meeting, which occurs within roughly a week of election day; unofficial results are available election night. Level 2: within one week.

“The spreadsheet must be posted to the county election website in a place accessible by all members of the public no later than when the board of county canvassers meets”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Montana approves voting systems by type (§ 13-17-101, § 13-17-103) and each county independently acquires and pays for its own system; nothing restricts the state to a single vendor, so multiple certified vendors may operate across counties in the same election.

“A county that acquires the new voting system shall cover the cost of the third-party test.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 13-17-103 sets functional voting-system specifications and authorizes the secretary of state to adopt electronic security standards by rule, but Montana does not codify open, publicly-documented vote-format or device-protocol standards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced the commissioner's deputy-appointment contract provision; Montana does not cap the duration of voting-system vendor contracts.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 13-1-102 guarantees the secret ballot — 'All elections shall be by secret ballot' — reinforced by Article IV, section 1 of the Montana Constitution, and § 13-17-103(1)(a) requires every voting system to let an elector vote in secrecy.

“All elections shall be by secret ballot.”

Montana mandates comprehensive accessibility — § 13-3-205 requires polling-place standards complying with the ADA, § 13-3-208 requires at least one voter interface device at each polling place letting disabled electors vote independently and privately, and § 13-17-103(2)(b) requires accessible voting technology for hearing, vision, speech and ambulatory impairments. Level 5.

“the election administrator shall ensure that at least one voter interface device is available at each polling place”

§ 13-3-101 sets a statutory density floor — a precinct may not contain more than 2,500 registered voters, and a precinct that grows to 3,750 or more must be split to 2,500 or fewer.

“A precinct may not contain more than 2,500 registered voters.”