EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses prosecution procedures and criminal trial dispositions for violations of election law chapters, not the creation or publication of downloadable public verification packages for election results, device records, or certificates. It is procedurally focused on court handling of cases rather than election integrity verification artifacts.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute authorizes paper ballots in certain circumstances but does not mandate a voter-verifiable paper trail as a general requirement. It permissively allows paper ballots only when a political party has fewer than 5% enrolled voters, rather than requiring them universally or establishing a clear audit trail requirement.

“the state secretary may provide only paper ballots for a state or presidential primary”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute establishes a formal recount procedure initiated by petition from registered voters and conducted by registrars of voters. It does not authorize ordinary citizens to independently re-tally votes from published precinct data; recounts are official government processes requiring petition, notarization, and specific procedural requirements. The statute does not grant citizens a general right to re-tally from published precinct information.

The statute mandates tamper-evident sealing of ballot containers using durable material seals and election officer seals, which satisfies the basic requirement for tamper-evident standards. However, the statute does not require logging of seal integrity or tamper-responsive auto-quarantine procedures, falling short of the higher ordinal levels.

“cause all ballots cast to be publicly enclosed in an envelope or container and sealed up with a seal of durable material provided therefor and also with the private seal of any election officer who may desire to affix the same”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 18G addresses disclosure requirements for independent expenditures and electioneering communications in paid advertising (radio, television, internet, print, direct mail, and billboards). It has no bearing on vote-casting equipment, network isolation, or connectivity mandates for voting systems.

The statute requires sealing and securing of ballots and election materials, demonstrating basic custody procedures. However, it does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation (recording transfers, handlers, times, and conditions) nor does it require such documentation to be publicly available. The section addresses physical custody and sealing but falls short of comprehensive documentation and transparency requirements.

“Upon the completion of the canvass and the counting, the warden shall place all ballots including absentee ballots, and all lists into a container and place a seal upon all such containers. The clerk shall receive from all the polling places such sealed containers and shall place all election material, so far as practical, in a locked facility.”

The section explicitly establishes criminal penalties—both fines and imprisonment—for unauthorized tampering with election apparatus including ballot boxes and related equipment. This directly satisfies the requirement for explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Whoever wilfully or maliciously injures, tampers with or destroys a ballot box or any of the blank forms or apparatus furnished to a city or town under this section or section twenty-six shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year.”

The section mandates audits following presidential general elections, but the criterion asks whether audits are required for 'every election.' This statute covers only presidential general elections, not all elections (e.g., primary elections, local elections, or non-presidential general elections). Thus it partially addresses the audit requirement but does not satisfy the criterion's broader scope.

“An audit shall be conducted pursuant to this section following any presidential general election.”

Massachusetts mandates a hand-counted audit of votes in a fixed percentage of precincts (3% rounded up) following presidential general elections. This is a fixed-percentage hand recount method, which corresponds to ordinal level 2 on the scoring scale.

“Each precinct selected pursuant to subsection (c) shall conduct a hand-counted audit of votes cast on the day of election”

No matching sections in corpus.

Section 109A(d)(1) explicitly requires audits to be performed in full public view and mandates that the time and place be publicly announced in advance. Additionally, subsection (c) specifies that the precinct selection drawing shall be 'fully observable to the public and representatives of each political party,' establishing clear observer access for citizens and party representatives.

“The audits shall be performed in full public view”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses nomination paper filing deadlines, political party membership requirements, and term limits for candidates. It contains no provisions related to post-election audits, audit results, or the binding force of audit findings on election certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses media organizations' disclosure obligations regarding political advertising offers to candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is completely unrelated to the criterion concerning voting system software verifiability and source code disclosure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires that counting software be prepared and ready by the fourth day prior to an election, but does not explicitly mandate publication of ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules to the public before polls open. The requirement addresses program readiness but not public transparency or signed certification of election definitions.

“Said clerk shall also require that a program for the counting of the votes, prepared by a suitably skilled technician, be in readiness for use in said computer or counting unit, no later than the fourth day prior to the primary, preliminary election or election.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute provides specific positioning rights for party challengers to observe voting and grants them access to polling places, but it does not comprehensively establish observer rights for civil-society organizations or guarantee full procedural transparency requirements. The provision is limited to political party-appointed challengers and does not address independent observer access or comprehensive observation procedures.

“He shall be assigned by the election officer presiding at the polling place to such position within the polling place as will enable him to see and hear each voter as he offers to vote.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 109A addresses post-election audits of votes in selected precincts following presidential elections, not the publication timeline for precinct-level results on election night or shortly thereafter. The section requires audit reports to be submitted within 14 days and findings published within 180 days, neither of which constitutes a 24-hour publication requirement for precinct-level results.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs bonds and indemnification requirements for manufacturers or distributors of marking and tabulating units leased or purchased by municipalities. It does not address whether multiple certified vendors are permitted to operate in the same election or contain any provisions relating to vendor certification, vendor competition, or multi-vendor capability.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the administration of automatic voter registration, including registrar duties, notification requirements, and reporting obligations. It does not address vote-format or device-protocol standards, which are the subject matter of the criterion. The section is entirely outside the scope of vendor independence and open protocol standards for voting systems.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires disclosure and reporting of electioneering communication expenditures, including vendor names and payment details. It does not address or regulate the duration of vendor contracts, nor does it establish any cap on contract length or prohibit perpetual lock-in arrangements. The criterion concerns contract duration restrictions, which is outside the scope of this disclosure and reporting provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance regulations, specifically restrictions on contributions and expenditures through various payment methods. It contains no provisions relating to source-code escrow, state certification of voting systems, or vendor independence requirements. The criterion concerns technical safeguards for election infrastructure; this statute concerns political committee financial disclosures.

While the statute requires provisional ballots to be grouped in a manner that 'allows for the secrecy of the ballot to the greatest extent possible,' this falls short of a strict guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. The language is aspirational rather than mandatory, and the statute permits identification of provisional voters by name, address, date of birth, and provisional voter number for status-checking purposes. Additionally, subsection (j) explicitly allows the state secretary to discuss ballot disposition with the provisional voter themselves, which implies the system maintains some form of linkage between voter identity and ballot for administrative purposes. A true guarantee of unlinkability would prohibit any such linkage.

“grouped with other ballots in a manner that allows for the secrecy of the ballot to the greatest extent possible”

The statute mandates assistance for voters with vision, motor, and language disabilities, addressing multiple accessibility dimensions. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards or require specific equipment/infrastructure at polling places—it only requires that voter-designated assistance be provided upon request. The requirement is conditional on voter disclosure and relies on designated assistants rather than mandating standardized accessible voting methods.

“A voter who states to the presiding officer that from blindness or other physical disability or inability to read or to read in the English language he is unable to prepare his ballot or register his vote upon a voting machine shall be assisted in such marking or registering by any person whom he may designate.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes procedures for counting votes and announcing results at the close of polls, including how ballots are handled, counted, and recorded. It does not address polling-place density, the number of polling places per voters, or geographic distribution of polling locations, which is what criterion 7.3 requires.