EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires financial interest disclosure by elected officials generally (those elected to office), not specifically by election commissioners or senior election staff. It does not establish a statutory requirement for election administrators to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections as a condition of their role in administering elections.

The section explicitly codifies a right to judicial review of all director decisions under the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 30A), grants standing to 'any interested person,' and incorporates by reference a detailed statutory framework (chapter 30A) that defines procedures, timelines, and venue. This provides clear statutory grounding for judicial accountability of the election finance administrator.

“All acts, decisions and rulings of the director shall be subject to judicial review under the provisions of chapter thirty A upon the application of any interested person.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides only definitional language about election-related terms and organizational units (e.g., 'board of election commissioners or election commission'). It establishes no constitutional grounding for the commission itself—it merely references commissions that may exist under other law. The section assumes commissions exist but does not establish their existence, powers, or mandate. Constitutional grounding would require the commission to be established in the Massachusetts Constitution; this statute alone does not satisfy that criterion.

The commission includes the state chairman of each major party and the state secretary (both executive branch), plus a law school dean appointed by the governor—all appointments flow from the executive branch. The statute does not provide for legislative or judicial appointment of any commission member. Although the commission requires unanimous vote to select the director (a safeguard), the underlying commission structure itself lacks multi-branch appointment and is vulnerable to single-branch (executive) capture.

“The state chairman of each of the two leading political parties, the state secretary, and a dean of a law school located in the commonwealth, to be appointed by the governor as provided hereinafter, shall serve as a commission”

The statute provides fixed four-year terms for commissioners, with explicit language establishing term length and start date. While the statute does not enumerate statutory grounds for removal (a minor gap), the combination of defined fixed terms and staggered appointments (succession as terms expire) creates meaningful term protection against arbitrary removal. The requirement that successors be appointed from party-submitted lists or through mayoral/manager/selectmen approval further insulates commissioners from unilateral executive discretion.

“Such appointments shall be for terms of four years beginning April first, except that any appointment to fill a vacancy shall be for the unexpired term.”

The statute explicitly mandates political-balance requirements through two mechanisms: (1) a positive duty to appoint successors to represent the two leading political parties 'as nearly as possible,' and (2) a hard cap preventing any single party from holding more than two of the board's seats (plus the clerk, who need not be party-enrolled). This creates an enforceable structural constraint on composition rather than discretionary guidance.

“the selectmen or the appointing authority shall so appoint their successors that as nearly as possible the members of the board shall represent the two leading political parties, as defined in section one of chapter fifty; provided, that a city or town clerk need not be enrolled in a political party; and provided further, that in no case shall an appointment be made as to cause a board to have more than two members, including the city or town clerk, of the same political party.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns candidate contribution and expenditure disclosure and reporting requirements, not election authority funding or budget structure. It contains no provision establishing an independent funding line for an election administration agency, nor any statutory shield against mid-cycle executive reallocation. The criterion requires institutional structure for the election authority itself; this section addresses campaign finance recordkeeping by candidates.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 153 addresses only the timing and basic mechanics of congressional election voting (biennial state elections), not election administration funding, budgets, or multi-year appropriations cycles. It contains no language governing how election infrastructure is financed or whether budgets are set on a multi-year basis. The section is silent on all funding mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

This section mandates by statute that city/town clerks and registrars/election commissioners attend annual training on state and federal election laws. The statute specifies the content (applicable state and federal election laws and regulations), the frequency (annual), the provider (office of the state secretary), and removes cost barriers. The mandatory language ('shall attend') establishes a clear statutory requirement.

“In each municipality, the city or town clerk and a registrar or election commissioner, as designated by the board of registrars or the board of election commissioners, shall attend an annual training conducted by the office of the state secretary, and offered at no cost to the municipality or to the individual, on the applicable state and federal election laws and regulations.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute delegates the core certification process to regulatory promulgation by the state secretary, rather than codifying it directly in statute. While § 33I(a)–(c) establish that the secretary examines equipment and approves it, the actual criteria, evaluator qualifications, timeline, and public-comment procedures are explicitly deferred to future regulation. This creates structural dependence on administrative discretion rather than statutory codification of the certification framework.

“The state secretary shall promulgate regulations for the certification process, standards, including security, and use of electronic poll books at a polling place or early voting location.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedural notice requirements for revoking acceptance of special electoral provisions by political parties at the local level, not decertification of voting systems, election vendors, or equipment. CERT.3 requires statutory definition of grounds and procedures for revoking certification of vendors or voting systems; this text concerns intra-party adoption and revocation of electoral rules and imposes no decertification regime for vendors or equipment.