EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

Section 33 clearly specifies original jurisdiction for election contests alleging corrupt practices. The statute mandates that applications for leave to bring election petitions must be brought before 'a justice of the superior court, sitting in equity within and for Suffolk county' (subsection a), and the petition itself must be filed 'in the superior court within and for Suffolk county' (subsection b). The venue is fixed geographically (Suffolk County) and by court level (Superior Court). This satisfies the criterion because the statutory text unambiguously designates the court of original jurisdiction with specificity regarding both the court level and geographic venue. The procedural clarity is further enhanced by additional specificity about assignment to three justices and equity procedures.

M.G.L. c. 54, § 134 explicitly specifies a filing deadline for election contests: within thirty days after the election. The statute defines the triggering event (the election) and the timeframe (thirty days thereafter) with sufficient clarity. The deadline applies to both claims to office and declarations of intention to contest another person's election. This codified, time-specific deadline satisfies the requirement that a contest filing deadline be specified by statute.

“If a person who has received votes for any office at an election shall, within thirty days thereafter, himself or by his agent serve upon a city or town clerk a written claim to such office or a declaration of an intention to contest the election of any other person”

The statute codifies a clear standard of proof: 'reasonable cause to believe' at the petition-granting stage, and proof of 'violations' (implicitly a preponderance standard) at the hearing stage. It also establishes specific affirmative defenses that define what must be proven (section 32 violations) and what can defeat liability even if violations are shown (inadvertence, reasonable cause, triviality, immateriality). However, the statute does not codify evidentiary rules (admissibility, chain of custody, expert qualification, confrontation rights, etc.). It delegates procedural rules to the Superior Court justices (section (c): 'the justices of the superior court may from time to time make such rules... as they deem expedient'). The standard of proof is statutory; evidentiary rules are not. This satisfies the 'standard set' criterion (score 1) but falls short of 'standard + evidentiary rules' (score 2).

Section 109A defines a mandatory post-election audit procedure with substantial statutory clarity on mechanics: who conducts it (board of registrars or election commission), timing (within 2 business days), how (hand-counted, public, following sections 135 and 135A procedures), precinct selection (3% random draw), evidentiary standard (voter intent), and reporting (audit report forms within 14 days). However, this is framed as a mandatory post-election AUDIT, not a recount triggered by dispute or candidate request. The section does not address triggered recounts initiated by candidates or parties under section 135, which is the paradigm dispute-resolution recount. The statute cross-references sections 135 and 135A for hand-count procedures but does not themselves codify recount triggering conditions, cost allocation, or the effect of a recount finding on certification. The audit procedure is rigorous and statutory, but the criterion asks whether recount procedures (implicitly: triggered recounts in the context of election contests) are defined. This section provides procedural clarity for a compliance audit, not for the recount mechanism invoked to resolve disputed elections.

The statute clearly enumerates petition-based recount triggers: (1) a sworn petition signed by at least ten voters (or more in larger jurisdictions) filed within specified deadlines (6 days for primaries, 10 days for elections); (2) a written request signed by the candidate; (3) a statement that the petitioners have reason to believe election records are erroneous, specifying wherein they are in error, or that challenged votes were improperly cast; and (4) a belief that recount will affect the nomination or election. These are explicit, statutory enumerated conditions that must be satisfied to trigger a recount. The statute does not rely on judicial discretion or administrative interpretation—the triggers are codified with specificity regarding who may petition, when, how, and on what grounds.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 18E addresses how candidates may finance recount costs through dedicated recount funds, but does not allocate or assign recount costs by statute. It permits candidates to create separate accounts to pay for recount expenses, but contains no statutory rule governing who bears the cost of a recount petition, under what conditions costs are borne by the petitioner vs. the state vs. the election official, or how costs are allocated based on recount outcome (e.g., whether petitioner pays if margin is not changed, or state pays if fraud is found). The section is about campaign finance disclosure and account segregation, not about cost allocation for recount procedures themselves. Statutory cost allocation rules would typically appear in the recount procedure statute itself, not in the campaign finance chapter.

This section codifies the legal effect of a recount finding by establishing that recount results are binding and mandatory. The statute explicitly requires that 'records amended' follow from the recount, and the city clerk 'shall forthwith declare the result' based on the recounted ballots. This makes clear that recount findings have mandatory amendment effect — the clerk must update the official record and declaration based on the recount outcome. The binding nature is further reinforced by the provision that no person can act in office 'before his certificate of election has been issued,' which can only occur after recount completion and record amendment. The statute thus codifies that recounts produce binding, not advisory, determinations that must be reflected in official records and election certification.

“After the ballots have been recounted and the records amended, the city clerk shall forthwith declare the result of the election”

M.G.L. c. 54, § 132 establishes a specific, binding statutory deadline for certification: the city or town clerk 'shall, within fifteen days after an election' certify results to the state secretary. This is a clear, non-discretionary mandate. The deadline is set by statute rather than left to administrative discretion, and applies uniformly to elections of state, city, town officers and elections of presidential electors. The use of 'shall' imposes a mandatory duty with a fixed temporal boundary.

“The city or town clerk shall, within fifteen days after an election of state, city or town officers, certify to the state secretary the total number of voters checked on the voting list at such election in each voting precinct of the town.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 109A is a post-election audit provision triggered after presidential general elections. It does not address certification timing or mechanisms to stay certification while recounts or contests are pending. The statute describes the audit procedure (selection, conduct, reporting) but contains no language regarding certification deadlines, suspension of certification, or statutory stays applicable to pending disputes. The section references section 135 (recount procedures) but does not itself establish any stay mechanism. Section 109A operates as a parallel audit process independent of the dispute-resolution framework that would implicate TIME.2. To satisfy this criterion, the statute would need to codify when certification must occur and provide explicit authority to suspend or delay certification pending resolution of a recount petition or election contest—neither of which appears in this section.