EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the disposition and recording of notices of candidacy, qualifying fees, and nomination petitions—matters of candidate registration and filing. It contains no provisions regarding downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, result signatures, or any election verification artifacts related to vote tabulation or ballot security. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section La. R.S. 18:1312 addresses the retention, storage, and handling of physical ballots and voting records but does not address cryptographic receipts, end-to-end verifiability mechanisms, or any form of voter-verified cryptographic proof of vote inclusion. The section is entirely focused on ballot custody and preservation procedures, not on technological voting verification systems. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | Louisiana R.S. 18:1366(1) explicitly mandates that any new voting system procured by the secretary of state must produce an auditable voter-verified paper record. This directly satisfies the criterion requiring a legally mandated voter-verifiable paper trail. “The voting system shall produce an auditable voter-verified paper record.” | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 18:403 addresses the retention and preservation of election records and their status as public records open to inspection, but it does not establish or guarantee a citizen's legal right to re-tally or recount votes from published precinct data. The statute merely requires that records be kept and made available for inspection; it does not address the substantive right to conduct an independent re-tally or recount. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
Custody Hardware
50.0% · 4/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The statute mandates tamper-evident seals on voting machine ports as a required component of voting system security. This directly satisfies the baseline requirement for tamper-evident hardware standards, corresponding to score level 2. The statute does not require logging of seal status or tamper-responsive auto-quarantine functionality, so a higher score is not warranted. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly mandates that voting system equipment shall not connect to the internet, which directly satisfies the criterion requiring legal prohibition of internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity on vote-casting equipment. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: La. R.S. 18:1316 addresses rejection of ballots with distinguishing marks. It contains no provisions regarding chain-of-custody documentation, public availability of custody records, or documentation requirements for ballot handling and storage. This section is about ballot acceptance criteria, not custody procedures. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties (fine up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment up to 5 years) for tampering with voting equipment, which directly satisfies the criterion for criminal penalties on unauthorized device access. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
Post Election Audit
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires the secretary of state to adopt and implement uniform policies and procedures for post-election audits, but it does not explicitly mandate that such audits be conducted for every election. The language authorizes the establishment of audit procedures and policies rather than requiring their mandatory execution in all elections. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the recount procedure following a judicial order in a contested election, not a post-election audit method. It does not mandate any audit method (fixed-%, comparison, risk-limiting, or otherwise) as part of a systematic post-election auditing process. The recount procedure here is reactive and discretionary, triggered by litigation, not a proactive audit requirement. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-08 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses qualifying fees for candidates in primary elections, payment methods, and additional fees imposed by political party committees. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, observer access to audits, or public observation of audit processes. The section is entirely focused on candidate qualification procedures and fee collection, which is unrelated to the criterion being evaluated. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 18:59.4 establishes a voter registration administrator certification program and specifies educational requirements, professional standards, and compensation incentives for registrars of voters and related personnel. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit results, or the legal binding force of any audit findings on certified election results. The section addresses personnel certification, not audit procedures or their enforceability. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs financial disclosure statements for political candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is unrelated to the criterion regarding whether voting system source code is legally accessible to the public, certifying authorities, academics, or other parties. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses election fraud offenses and penalties related to voter registration and voting procedures. It has no bearing on software reproducibility, binary builds, or any technical infrastructure requirements. The criterion concerns whether production binaries can be reproducibly built from public source code—a topic completely outside the scope of this criminal law provision. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-08 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section grants the Secretary of State general administrative powers over voting machines, voter registration, and uniform rules for voting systems, but does not address the publication or signing of ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules before polls open. The section covers procedural administration and governance structure, not the specific requirement for pre-election publication of ballot definitions. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses public access to voter registration records and restrictions on disclosure of personal voter information. It contains no provisions regarding software verification, binary matching, post-election integrity checks, or any technical controls over voting system software. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
Transparency Observation
25.0% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the challenge and registration status of voters in the U.S. military or temporarily abroad. It contains no provisions regarding observer access, observer rights, or procedures for party or civil-society observers to monitor election processes. The criterion concerns transparency and observation procedures, which is a different topic from voter registration challenges. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-08 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 2/540.0% | The statute requires parish boards to compile election returns showing machine votes broken down by precinct and file them with the clerk of court by the fifth day after the election. However, this is a filing requirement, not a publication requirement, and the fifth-day deadline exceeds the 24-hour standard. The tentative results announced by the secretary of state by the seventh day are at the parish level, not precinct level. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-08 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the Voting System Proposal Evaluation Committee and its review process for voting system proposals, but it does not address whether multiple certified vendors may operate simultaneously in the same election. The statute focuses on the committee's composition and procurement procedures, not on multi-vendor capability or system architecture. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure and advertising payment requirements, including prohibitions on subterfuge and mandates for transparency in political advertisements. It has no connection to voting equipment, device protocols, vote formats, or technical standards for election systems. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines the crime of bribery of a candidate and establishes penalties. It does not address vendor contracts, contract duration, or any mechanism to cap contract periods. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion regarding vendor contract duration caps. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-08 |
Voter Access
42.9% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires confidentiality efforts but does not guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability. The phrase 'as confidential as practicable' is a permissive standard that allows exceptions and does not legally guarantee that ballots cannot be linked to voters, particularly in electronic transmission and facsimile scenarios where a voter's name and contact information are used to deliver materials. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | The statute mandates accessibility for visually impaired voters and those unable to read through audio ballot options, and permits assistance for those with physical disabilities. However, it conditions the availability of audio ballots on whether a precinct is 'equipped' with such machines, meaning accessibility is not guaranteed at every polling place. The law addresses some accessibility standards but does not require comprehensive accessibility standards universally. | § view source 2026-06-08 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the inspection, preparation, and operation of voting machines at polling places on election day. It does not contain any provisions establishing a legal floor on the number or density of polling places per voter population or geographic area. The criterion requires a legal minimum standard for polling-place availability, which is not addressed in this statute section. | § view source 2026-06-08 |