EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses replacement ballot procedures for voters whose ballots are destroyed, spoiled, or lost. It does not address public verification artifacts, downloadable packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures. The section is about ballot replacement administration, not election verification or public transparency of election records.

No matching sections in corpus.

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 16-42(a) explicitly requires that electronic voting systems generate a paper ballot or voter-verifiable paper audit trail that voters can inspect and correct before casting their vote, and mandates retention of these records as the definitive vote record. This directly satisfies the criterion for a legally required voter-verifiable paper trail.

“No electronic voting system shall be used in any election unless it generates a paper ballot or voter verifiable paper audit trail that may be inspected and corrected by the voter before the vote is cast, and unless every paper ballot or voter verifiable paper audit trail is retained as the definitive record of the vote cast.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 11-158 governs mandatory recounts initiated by election officials when vote margins fall below specified thresholds. It establishes procedures for official recounts, allows affected candidates and their representatives to witness recounts, but does not grant any citizen the right to independently re-tally votes from published precinct data. The section addresses official recount procedures, not citizen verification rights.

The statute mandates that ballots be sealed in containers and that unsealing/resealing occur only as prescribed by rules, which implies tamper-evident controls. However, the section does not explicitly specify tamper-evident seals, tamper-responsive systems, or logging requirements—it delegates these details to administrative rules rather than mandating specific hardware standards in statute.

“After all the ballots have been tabulated they shall be sealed in containers. Thereafter, these containers shall be unsealed and resealed only as prescribed by rules governing elections.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a definitions section that provides statutory terminology for Hawaii's campaign spending laws. It contains definitions of terms like 'advertisement,' 'candidate,' 'contribution,' and 'electioneering communication,' but does not address vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or election security measures. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion regarding network isolation on voting equipment.

The statute requires secure handling and supervision of ballots but does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such records. It delegates specific procedures to administrative rules rather than statutory requirement.

“The voted ballots shall be kept secure and handled only in the presence of representatives not of the same political party or official observers in accordance with rules adopted for the various voting systems.”

The section explicitly establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized access to electronic voting systems. Subsection (10) specifically criminalizes wilful access to any electronic voting system with intent to cause inaccurate recording, tallying, or reporting of votes, which directly satisfies the criterion for explicit criminal penalties regarding unauthorized device access.

“Every person who, directly or indirectly, personally or through another, wilfully designs, alters, accesses, or programs any electronic voting system to cause the system to inaccurately record, tally, or report votes cast on the electronic voting system”

The statute requires a post-election audit, but only of a random sample of 10% of precincts and only when electronic voting systems are used. This does not constitute a mandatory audit of every election in full, as it covers only a portion of precincts and is conditional on using electronic voting systems. The criterion asks if audits are required for every election.

“The chief election officer conducts a post-election, pre-certification audit of a random sample of not less than ten per cent of the precincts employing the electronic voting system”

Hawaii mandates a recount of all votes when the margin between candidates or on ballot questions is equal to or less than 100 votes or 0.5% of total votes cast, whichever is lesser. This is a fixed-percentage threshold-based hand recount triggered by close margins, fitting the ordinal level 2 (fixed-% hand recount) on the scoring scale.

“The chief election officer, or the clerk in the case of a county election, shall conduct a recount of all votes cast for any office or ballot question in any election if the official tabulation of all of the returns for that office or question reveals that the difference in: (1) The number of votes cast for a candidate apparently qualified for the general election ballot or elected to office and the number of votes cast for the closest apparently defeated opponent; or (2) The number of votes cast in the affirmative for the ballot question and the number of votes cast in the negative for the ballot question, including when applicable, the tabulation of blank votes, is equal to or less than one hundred votes or one-half of one per cent of the total number of votes cast for the contest, whichever is lesser.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the certification process and requires comparison of canvass results, audit records, and manual audit results, but does not establish triggers for additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. It references existing audit procedures and mandatory recounts under section 11-158, but does not itself create additional audit triggers beyond those already mandated.

The statute requires that electronic voting systems be subject to inspection, audit, and experimental testing by 'qualified observers' before and after elections. However, the term 'qualified observers' is undefined in the statute and delegated to administrative rules, leaving unclear whether this includes parties, media, and citizens or only designated officials. The statute does not explicitly grant access to parties, media, and citizens.

“The electronic voting system is subject to inspection, audit, and experimental testing, by qualified observers, before and after the election, pursuant to administrative rules adopted by the chief election officer under chapter 91”

The statute requires that certification be based on a comparison and reconciliation that includes audit results, but does not explicitly state that audit results are legally binding on or must override the final certified result. The language indicates audits are part of the reconciliation process for certification, but stops short of making audit results independently binding or capable of superseding other tabulation methods.

“The certification shall be based on a comparison and reconciliation of the following: (1) The results of the canvass of ballots conducted pursuant to chapter 16; (2) The audit of records and resultant overage and underage report; (3) The audit results of the manual audit team; (4) The results of any mandatory recount of votes conducted pursuant to section 11-158; and (5) All logs, tally sheets, and other documents generated during the election and in the canvass of the election results.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosures relating to disaster relief solicitations and is unrelated to voting system source code accessibility. It does not address voting system transparency, vendor disclosure requirements, or source code review mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires ballot layout facsimiles to be made available to candidates and parties, demonstrating transparency in ballot preparation. However, it does not explicitly address publication to the general public, does not mention digital signatures, does not require tabulation rules to be published, and does not specify publication timing relative to polls opening.

“Facsimiles of all ballot layouts prior to printing shall be available for viewing by the candidates and the parties at the office of the chief election officer and the county clerk as soon after the close of filing as they are available.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates the presence of party observers and media observers at counting centers, which partially addresses observer access. However, the provision does not explicitly grant 'full procedural access'—it only requires their presence at counting and does not specify what activities observers may conduct, what information they may access, or what procedural steps they may observe beyond ballot counting. The vague language about 'reasonable notice' and space-dependent access further limits the strength of the guarantee.

“No less than one official observer designated by each political party; (2) No less than one official observer from the news media”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedures for conducting a special election to fill a U.S. House vacancy, including proclamation timing and election conduct. It contains no requirements regarding the publication speed of precinct-level election results.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions for election-related terms such as 'counting center,' 'defective ballot,' 'electronic voting system,' and 'voter verifiable paper audit trail.' It does not address or require a public, signed, append-only election event log. The definitions provided are terminological in nature and do not establish logging, transparency, or audit requirements for election events.

While the statute permits different voting systems in different precincts, it does not explicitly address whether multiple certified vendors can operate in the same election. The discretion to use different system types does not directly establish vendor independence or multi-vendor capability within a single election context.

“Voting systems of different kinds may, at the discretion of the chief election officer, be adopted for different precincts within the same district.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs the petition process for political parties to qualify for ballot access in Hawaii. It addresses requirements such as voter signatures, filing deadlines, and committee structure. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, or technical documentation standards for voting systems.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines election fraud offenses and related criminal prohibitions in Hawaii. It does not address vendor contracts, contract duration, or any aspects of vendor independence or lock-in prevention. The section is entirely focused on criminalizing fraudulent conduct at elections, not on procurement or vendor management.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section mandates that voters must place their marked ballot in a secrecy envelope or sleeve before placing it in the return identification envelope, which is a structural mechanism that ensures the ballot itself is separated from the voter's identification information. This physical separation is legally required and enforceable through the instruction that ballots must comply with these procedures to be valid.

“Inserting the marked ballot in the secrecy envelope or secrecy sleeve; (3) Inserting the secrecy envelope or secrecy sleeve with the marked ballot in the return identification envelope”

The statute establishes an advisory committee focused on accessibility needs for voters with disabilities and requires annual review and recommendations to election officials. However, it does not legally mandate specific accessibility standards (e.g., visual, motor, or language accommodations) at polling places themselves—it only requires advisory input and recommendations. The law creates a consultative mechanism rather than binding accessibility requirements.

“Each advisory committee shall meet at least annually to review election procedures, services, and technology and access to information, and shall make recommendations to the office of elections on at least an annual basis.”

The statute establishes a minimum number of precincts per district but does not set a floor based on voter density (voters per precinct) or geographic area (precinct size). The criterion asks for a density or area-based floor, which this section does not provide.

“there shall be a minimum of four precincts in each district”