EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-173.5 explicitly specifies the court of original jurisdiction for election contests in primary and special primary elections, as well as county elections held concurrently with regularly scheduled primary or special primary elections. The statute mandates that complaints 'shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme court,' establishing the Hawaii Supreme Court as the designated venue. This is codified with specificity regarding both the court and the procedural mechanism for filing. The statute also establishes a clear timeline (13 days after election) and procedural requirements (deposit for costs, summons issuance within 5 days), all of which reinforce that jurisdiction is statutorily determined rather than discretionary.

“the complaint shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme court no later than 4:30 p.m. on the thirteenth day after a primary or special primary election or a county election contest held concurrently with a regularly scheduled primary or special primary election”

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 11-173.5(a) explicitly specifies a filing deadline for election contests in primary, special primary, and concurrent county elections. The deadline is codified with precision: 13 days after the election, with a time-of-day specification (4:30 p.m.). The deadline is tied to a clearly defined event (the election itself), satisfying the statutory clarity requirement for contest filing procedures. This meets the criterion's requirement that the deadline be 'specified by statute' and defined relative to a clear temporal event.

“the complaint shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme court no later than 4:30 p.m. on the thirteenth day after a primary or special primary election or a county election contest held concurrently with a regularly scheduled primary or special primary election”

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 11-173.5(b) codifies procedural requirements for election contests, including mandatory summary hearing format and written evidence reduction. However, the statute does not codify a specific standard of proof (e.g., preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence) nor does it establish evidentiary rules governing admissibility, burdens, or types of evidence permissible in election contests. The phrase 'hear the contest in a summary manner' indicates procedure but not evidentiary standards. The requirement that the court state 'all findings of fact and of law' creates an obligation to articulate reasoning but does not itself establish what evidence is admissible or what quantum of proof is required. Under the dual-scholar test, one scholar would view this as codifying procedural clarity (hearing format, timeline, written record) without codifying substantive evidentiary rules, scoring it at 1. A second scholar might argue that 'summary manner' implies statutory reference to summary-proceeding rules elsewhere in Hawaii law, but the text here does not explicitly cross-reference those rules, leaving evidentiary standards ambiguous at the statutory level of this section.

“the court shall hear the contest in a summary manner and at the hearing the court shall cause the evidence to be reduced to writing and shall not later than 4:30 p.m. on the fourth day after the return give judgment fully stating all findings of fact and of law”

§ 11-108 addresses WHEN and WHAT ballots are recounted (initial recount includes only verified ballots; final tabulation recount 'as provided by law'), and establishes that the clerk validates ballots within five business days. However, the section does NOT define the substantive recount procedure—who physically conducts the recount, what method is used, what chain-of-custody or witnessing requirements apply, or what triggers a recount. The phrase 'as provided by law' is a delegation to other statutory provisions. While § 11-108(d) clarifies which ballots are included in a recount, it does not codify the procedural mechanics (counting method, observer roles, audit procedures, etc.). Standing alone, this section establishes only ballot eligibility and timing constraints, not the recount process itself. A complete recount procedure would specify counting method, observer access, and evidence standards in the same section or cross-reference a specific statute that does so.

No matching sections in corpus.

Section 11-158 clearly allocates cost for MANDATORY recounts: the state/county bears the cost, not candidates. This satisfies the criterion for mandatory recounts. However, the criterion asks about 'petition-based recount' cost allocation. While this statute addresses mandatory recounts triggered by vote margin thresholds, it does not explicitly address cost allocation for recounts initiated by candidate petition or other discretionary mechanisms. The statute does not clarify whether petition-based recount costs differ from mandatory recount costs, or whether candidates seeking discretionary recounts must pay. The scope is therefore incomplete—cost allocation is codified only for the automatic triggering mechanism, not for petition-based or discretionary recount requests that may exist elsewhere in chapter 11.

“No candidate shall be charged for the cost of a mandatory recount under this section.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 11-108(e) contains only a procedural reference to recount authority ('shall be as provided by law') but does not codify the legal effects of a recount finding. The statute specifies *when* recounts occur (after final tabulation) and *what* ballots are included, but does not address whether recount findings are binding on certification, whether they mandate amendment of results, or what their legal effect is. The criterion requires that recount-finding effects be codified in statute itself, not delegated to other unspecified legal provisions. To satisfy RECT.4, the statute would need to explicitly state the binding or advisory nature of recount outcomes and their relationship to certification.

This section establishes a CONDITION for certification (all valid ballots must be included) but does not itself set the certification deadline. It cross-references section 11-155, which governs the actual certification process and timing. The section codifies procedural requirements that must be satisfied BEFORE certification can occur (ballot verification within 5 business days, initial tabulation by 6 a.m. day after election), but the statutory deadline for when certification actually occurs is located in the referenced statute (11-155), not in this section. For the dual-scholar test: Scholar A would note this clearly ties certification to a defined procedural sequence (favorable for procedural clarity). Scholar B would observe that without seeing 11-155, one cannot assess whether the certification deadline itself is fixed by statute or subject to discretion. The section provides clarity on prerequisites to certification but incomplete clarity on the deadline itself as it appears in this extract.

“No election result shall be certified pursuant to section 11-155 unless all ballots verified as valid by the clerk within five business days following an election day have been added to the final tabulation.”

No matching sections in corpus.