EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
31.3% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0.5/150.0% | § 21-2-379.25 codifies ballot-design programming verification by superintendent. § 21-2-379.11 codifies tabulation procedure. § 21-2-379.6 codifies maintenance. § 21-2-72 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies that primary and election records are open to public. Building blocks of public verification, though not a single signed downloadable package. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-334 codifies paper-ballot fallback when voting machines are impracticable. § 21-2-281 codifies parallel. Georgia's statewide regime since 2020 uses Dominion ICX BMDs that produce printed paper ballots scanned by optical scanners — voter-verifiable paper trail exists per § 21-2-300 ('uniform system') in conjunction with § 21-2-379.1 (DRE secrecy + paper-record requirements). “paper ballots shall be printed for such candidates, offices, or questions, and the primary or election shall be conducted by the poll officers, and the ballots shall be counted and return thereof made in the manner required by law” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-72 codifies that primary and election records of each superintendent, registrar, and political-party committee 'shall be open to public'. § 21-2-51 codifies parallel for Secretary of State records. § 21-2-586 codifies criminal penalty for refusing public inspection. § 21-2-73 codifies preservation of election records. Citizen re-tally is enabled through open-records access. “Except when otherwise provided by law or court order, the primary and election records of each superintendent, registrar, municipal governing authority, and committee of a politica” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Custody Hardware
50.0% · 4/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | § 21-2-328 codifies delivery, set up, and sealing of voting machines. § 21-2-454 codifies that after polls close 'the poll officers shall immediately lock and seal the operating lever or mechanism of the machine so that the voting' results are preserved. § 21-2-450 codifies that 'the seals of the package furnished by the superintendent shall be publicly broken at the opening of the polls.' § 21-2-329 codifies key delivery to chief manager. Tamper-evident sealing required throughout. “The superintendent shall deliver the proper voting machine or voting machines, properly furnished with ballot labels, to the polling places of the respective precincts at least one” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 21-2-379.11 codifies DRE tabulation procedure (votes counted at precinct or tabulating center) but does not codify network-isolation/air-gap requirement for vote-casting equipment. § 21-2-211 (statewide list maintenance) is unrelated to tabulation isolation. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-377 codifies custody and storage of ballot scanners: 'The superintendent shall designate a person or persons who shall have custody of the ballot scanners of the county or municipality when they are not in use at a primary or election'. § 21-2-331 codifies parallel for voting-machine custody. § 21-2-405 codifies poll-officer custody at polling places. § 21-2-51 codifies public-record access to chain-of-custody documentation. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-580 makes unlawful tampering with voting machines/BMDs/tabulating machines a felony. § 21-2-582 specifically covers DRE/BMD tampering. § 21-2-566 makes broader election-interference (including ballot box / voting-machine tampering) a felony punishable by 1-10 years imprisonment + $100,000 fine. § 21-2-582.1 (penalty for voting-equipment modification) provides additional sanctions. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Post Election Audit
66.7% · 6/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-498 codifies mandatory precertification tabulation audits 'for any federal or state general election' beginning November 2020. Audits performed by manual inspection of random samples of paper official ballots, completed before final certification. “the local election superintendents shall conduct precertification tabulation audits for any federal or state general election in accordance with requirements set forth by rule or regulation of the State Election Board.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 3/560.0% | § 21-2-498 codifies risk-limiting audits (RLA) with statutory definitions of 'risk limit' and 'incorrect outcome'. Ordinal level 3: risk-limiting audit codified by name with statistical-methods requirement — among the strongest audit-method codifications in the US. ““Risk-limiting audit” means an audit protocol that makes use of statistical methods and is designed to limit to acceptable levels the risk of certifying a preliminary election outcome that constitutes an incorrect outcome.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-498 codifies that the audit must be completed 'in public view' with details provided to the public within 48 hours of completion, plus public posting of unofficial final tabulated results before the audit begins. Comprehensive public-observation mandate. “Complete the audit in public view; and Provide details of the audit to the public within 48 hours of completion.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-498 codifies that the precertification audit is 'completed prior to final certification of the contest' — making the audit findings necessarily binding on the certified outcome via the State Election Board's implementing rules. “Complete the audit prior to final certification of the contest;” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Software Verifiability
5.6% · 1/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 21-2-379.26 codifies storage/security of BMD equipment but not source-code disclosure. § 21-2-225 covers voter registration confidentiality. Georgia does not codify voting-system source-code disclosure (Dominion ICX source is proprietary, with limited escrow access via court order). | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0.5/150.0% | § 21-2-294 codifies superintendent's record of ballots printed and furnished per precinct. § 21-2-292 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies that ballot forms be on file open to public inspection at least 5 days before each primary/election. § 21-2-500 codifies post-election delivery of voting materials. Public commitment of ballot definitions exists, though without cryptographic signature. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
Transparency Observation
62.5% · 5/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-408 codifies poll-watcher regime: each candidate submits names through party executive committee 21 days before primary / 14 days before run-off, party designates up to 2 per precinct, with training and conduct provisions. § 21-2-413 codifies voter/campaigner/poll-watcher conduct at polling places. § 21-2-230 codifies elector-by-elector challenge rights. Comprehensive observer regime. “each candidate entitled to have his or her name placed on the primary or run-off primary ballot may submit the name of one poll watcher for each precinct in which he or she wishes to have an observer” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 4/580.0% | § 21-2-421 codifies posting of preliminary results 'not later than 10:00 P.M. following the close of the polls' (Election Integrity Act of 2021, SB 202). § 21-2-456 codifies posting on polling-place door immediately after vote ascertained. § 21-2-440 codifies poll-officer general-returns posting. Ordinal level 4: precinct-level results within ~3 hours of poll close — fastest in the corpus. “As soon as possible but not later than 10:00 P.M. following the close of the polls on the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the election superintendent shall report to the Secretary of State and post in a prominent public place” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
Vendor Independence
25.0% · 1/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-379.24 codifies BMD examination + approval process — any person/organization may request Secretary of State examination, with approval/revocation procedure. § 21-2-379.2 codifies parallel for DRE voting systems. § 21-2-368 codifies optical-scan systems. § 21-2-324 codifies general voting machine examination. Multiple vendors may seek certification. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 21-2-300 codifies state provision of new voting equipment + uniform system requirement. § 21-2-8 (eligibility), § 21-2-71 (county/municipal funding), § 21-2-225 (confidentiality) are unrelated. No statutory contract-duration cap codified. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
Voter Access
35.7% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-2-379.1(6) codifies that DRE voting systems must 'permit voting in absolute secrecy so that no person can see or know for whom any other elector has voted or is voting'. § 21-2-365 codifies parallel for optical scan. § 21-2-322 codifies general voting machine secrecy. § 21-2-373 codifies write-in vote secrecy. § 21-2-579 makes ballot-disclosure intent a misdemeanor. Comprehensive secret-ballot mandate. “It shall permit voting in absolute secrecy so that no person can see or know for whom any other elector has voted or is voting” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 1/520.0% | § 21-2-579 codifies penalty for fraudulent allowing of ballot to be seen. § 21-2-379.1(13) (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies BMD accessibility requirements (audio ballot, large-print, etc. — required by HAVA). Accessibility is partially codified through the BMD-requirements framework but not as a comprehensive standalone accessibility chapter. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0.5/150.0% | § 21-2-265 codifies that the superintendent of a county or governing authority of a municipality 'shall select and fix the polling place within each precinct'. § 21-2-403 codifies polling hours 7:00 AM. § 21-2-235 codifies inactive-elector list maintenance. Polling-place provision is codified per precinct; a strict voters-per-place statutory floor is not specified. | § view source 2026-05-19 |