EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns unaffiliated candidate ballot access requirements, including registration timelines, nominating petitions, and background checks. It contains no provisions related to election verification artifacts, downloadable packages, device records, result signatures, or any post-election verification materials.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires removal and delivery of 'ballot container' and 'media containing election results' but does not explicitly mandate that these constitute voter-verifiable paper records or establish verification procedures. The statute describes procedural steps without defining or requiring VVPAT or hand-marked ballots as a legal requirement.

“the election officers shall remove the ballot container and the media containing the election results from each voting device and deliver them to the Department”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses confidentiality of voter addresses and protection of personal information in voter records. It does not address citizen re-tally rights, published precinct data, or the ability to conduct independent vote verification. The criterion concerns transparency and auditing of election results, which is entirely outside the scope of this section.

The statute mandates security mailing envelopes designed to protect against tampering and ensure detection if tampering occurs, which aligns with a tamper-evident standard. However, the law does not specify particular technical standards, does not require logging or documentation of seal integrity checks, and does not mandate tamper-responsive measures such as automatic quarantine.

“security mailing envelopes, designed to securely protect the contents thereof from tampering, removal, or substitution without detection”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses deep fake technology and election-related misinformation, not the technical specifications or network connectivity requirements of vote-casting equipment. The criterion concerns whether vote-casting equipment is legally required to be isolated from internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity, which is entirely outside the scope of this statute's subject matter.

The section requires completion of documentation when securing voting devices and when handling ballot containers and election media, but does not explicitly state that this documentation is publicly available or that it constitutes a full chain-of-custody requirement. The statute references "required documentation" and "as instructed" without specifying the scope or public accessibility of such records.

“the inspector shall close and secure each voting device as instructed and complete the required documentation”

The statute explicitly criminalizes tampering with and unauthorized access/manipulation of voting machines, imposing both fines and imprisonment. This directly satisfies the criterion for explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Whoever before the opening of the election registers any vote on a voting machine or at any time tampers with, disarranges, defaces, impairs in any manner or destroys a voting machine or any part thereof, including the ballots on its face, shall be fined not less than $300 nor more than $500 and may be imprisoned not less than 1 nor more than 2 years.”

This section mandates that the municipal Board of Elections shall conduct an audit following certification of every election to reconcile voter counts across different voting methods. The use of 'shall' establishes a mandatory requirement for post-election audits.

“The municipal Board of Elections, following certification of the election and the resolution of any contest, shall audit the election records in order to reconcile the number of voters who cast ballots as compared to the number of voters who returned absentee ballots and voted on voting machines.”

The statute mandates hand counting of paper ballots and comparison to electronic totals, which constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount method. The section requires audits of randomly selected voting devices and election districts rather than a more sophisticated risk-limiting approach.

“counting by hand the votes on each paper ballot from a voting device and comparing the paper ballot totals to the totals kept by the voting device electronically”

The statute requires the Department to promulgate regulations that may include thresholds triggering additional actions based on audit discrepancies, but it does not itself establish or mandate additional audits triggered by close margins or sworn challenges. The law mandates only fixed, routine audits of randomly selected districts/devices and delegates the design of any discrepancy-triggered procedures to future regulations, leaving the actual trigger mechanisms undefined in the statutory text.

“The Department shall promulgate regulations to govern the procedure to be used if an audit reveals a discrepancy, including all of the following: (1) The thresholds that trigger the Department or others to take a specific action.”

The statute explicitly mandates that audits be conducted in public, which grants parties, media, and citizens the opportunity to observe the audit process. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for observer access.

“The Department shall conduct an audit under this section in public.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the Governor's certification and proclamation of election results based on county returns, but it does not discuss post-election audits or their binding force on certified results. The statute concerns the initial certification process, not audit procedures or audit bindingness.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure requirements for prerecorded and automated voice messages in political campaigns. It has no connection to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1 on software verifiability. The statute concerns robo-call transparency, not voting system transparency or code disclosure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns voter registration applications and procedures, including citizenship verification, record-keeping, and digitized signatures. It contains no reference to software, cryptographic commitments, binary hashes, or any election-day technology systems relevant to the pre-election binary commitment criterion.

The section requires that election definitions be correctly programmed and tested on voting machines before use, and that testing records be kept and made available for public inspection. However, it does not explicitly mandate that ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules be signed and published before polls open—only that they be properly defined and tested on the machines themselves.

“The election is correctly defined on the voting system.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly grants party-appointed challengers the right to be present inside the polling place and observe the conduct of the election and all election records. This provides full procedural access to observe election processes, which directly satisfies the criterion for domestic observer rights.

“One challenger from any political party which is represented by a candidate in that district may be present inside the polling place and shall be permitted to observe the conduct of the election and all the election records.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses notice requirements for municipal elections, including posting notices of election, solicitation of candidates, and absentee ballot information. It contains no provisions regarding the publication timeline for precinct-level election results, which is the subject matter of criterion 6.3.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the preparation, inspection, testing, and certification of voting devices before elections, but does not address vendor certification, multi-vendor capability, or whether multiple vendors may operate in the same election. The statute is about procedural requirements for device preparation, not vendor independence or selection policies.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the duties and powers of the Commissioner relating to campaign finance reporting, disclosure forms, and administrative procedures. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, voting technology, or vendor independence. The section is entirely about political committee reporting requirements and is unrelated to the criterion concerning open protocol standards for voting systems.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the unlawful distribution of deep fake media in elections and does not govern vendor contracts, service agreements, or procurement terms. The statute contains no provisions regarding contract duration caps or vendor lock-in prevention.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires that electronic voting systems must secure voter secrecy in the act of voting, which is the core requirement for ballot secrecy and voter-ballot unlinkability. Additionally, subsection (b) mandates side curtains and front shields to prevent any person from seeing how a voter votes, providing enforceable mechanisms to implement this guarantee.

“Secure to the voter secrecy in the act of voting for or against as many questions as may be submitted.”

The statute mandates that all polling places be accessible to persons with disabilities and comply with the ADA, establishing a strong accessibility requirement. However, it does not explicitly enumerate specific accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) and contains exceptions in subsection (b) that allow inaccessible polling places under limited circumstances if an alternative means of voting is provided, which falls slightly short of a comprehensive "every polling place" mandate.

“The Department shall ensure that all polling places for any election conducted in this State have adequate and accessible parking spaces, that all polling places for any election conducted in this State are accessible to persons with disabilities, and that the accessibility features of such places are available to voters for any election, in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 2033 addresses identification requirements for mail registrants and voting procedures. It contains no provisions regarding polling-place density, minimum numbers of polling places per population, geographic distribution of polling places, or any similar floor requirement. The section is entirely focused on ID verification, not polling-place accessibility standards.