EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 5953 addresses the Court's procedural powers during an election contest trial (specifically, examination of ballots and evidentiary rules regarding ballot materials), but does not specify which court has original jurisdiction over election contests or establish venue rules. The section presupposes that a contest has already been brought ('In the trial of any contested election') and describes the Court's authority to examine ballots and obtain possession of records, but it does not codify the court of original jurisdiction or venue requirements. To satisfy CONT.EDRI.2, the statute must explicitly designate which court (e.g., Court of Chancery, Superior Court, or another tribunal) and which venue rules govern the filing of election contest actions. This section does not provide that specification.

Section 7558(g) establishes that election contest procedures are governed by cross-reference to §§ 5941–5955 of the Delaware Code. The statute itself does not codify the filing deadline directly in § 7558. To fully satisfy CONT.EDRI.3, the filing deadline must be 'specified by statute'—either in this section or clearly incorporated by reference. The cross-reference suggests that deadlines exist in §§ 5941–5955, but this section does not reproduce or clearly state what deadline applies to municipal election contests. A reader of § 7558 alone cannot determine the deadline without consulting those other sections. This partial satisfaction reflects that a filing deadline is addressed somewhere in the statutory framework, but not with the procedural clarity required by the EDRI standard for this section alone to be self-contained or clearly incorporate the rule.

“Sections 5941 through 5955 of this title apply to election contests within municipalities.”

This section codifies one specific admissibility rule—exclusion of ballots and records that came into possession of a candidate/party member—and grants the court general examination authority over ballots. However, it does not establish an affirmative standard of proof (e.g., preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence) required to overturn an election. The section addresses evidentiary exclusions but lacks comprehensive codification of the burden and standard applicable to the contestant's affirmative case. The scoring rule requires both standard of proof AND evidentiary rules; this section provides partial evidentiary rules (one exclusionary rule) but no articulated standard of proof, yielding a score of 1 rather than 2.

The section provides detailed statutory procedures for the initial counting and tallying of absentee ballots, including team composition (odd number of electors, with one reader and two talliers), venue (municipality offices or election place), evidence requirements (matching serial numbers, verification against absentee voter list, rejection standards), and documentation (tally sheets, log sheets, carrier envelopes). However, this statute governs the initial count procedure on election day, not the recount procedure triggered after election results are contested or when a margin is close. The section does not address post-election recount triggers, cost allocation, or the effect of recount findings on certification. It therefore partially satisfies the criterion by establishing clear statutory procedures for the initial absentee ballot count process, but does not address statutory recount procedures for disputed elections.

No matching sections in corpus.

Section § 5702(c) explicitly allocates the cost of petition-based recounts for statewide office to the state ("at state expense"). Section § 5702(e) similarly provides that "the Court shall recount the ballots cast in that election at state expense" for state senator, state representative, or county office when margin thresholds are met. The statute does not condition cost allocation on recount outcome or require petitioner payment regardless of result. Cost allocation is codified as a flat rule: the state bears the expense. This satisfies the criterion's requirement for statutory allocation of recount costs.

No matching sections in corpus.

§ 7106(a) is a cross-reference provision that incorporates by reference the certification procedures applicable to general elections. It does not itself set a certification deadline. To evaluate whether this section satisfies TIME.1, one must examine the general election laws of Delaware (likely § 7101 et seq. or other provisions of Title 15). The statute delegates certification to 'the same manner...as prescribed for the general election,' but this section does not codify a specific deadline. The criterion requires the deadline to be set by statute (not administrative discretion), but this provision only cross-references—without embedding—the deadline. A full analysis would require review of the general election statute to determine whether it sets a firm deadline or grants discretion. As currently isolated, § 7106(a) does not independently satisfy the criterion, though it may point to a satisfying provision elsewhere.

“Every special election in a representative or senatorial district shall be provided for, opened, held, conducted and closed and the result thereof ascertained and certified in the same manner, at the same places and subject to the same laws, so far as the same may be applicable, as prescribed for the general election”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Del. Code tit. 15, § 8044 addresses tardy campaign finance reporting penalties and appeals procedures. It contains no provisions regarding certification of election results, recounts, contests, or any stay mechanism for pending disputes over election outcomes. The statute governs administrative penalties for late filing of campaign finance reports by political committees and reporting parties, not the procedural framework for resolving election disputes or staying certification. This section is entirely outside the scope of pre-certification stay mechanisms required by TIME.2.