Turkeyv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity20.8%11/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware50.0%
4/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access71.4%
5/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 39 covers defamation defense — unrelated.

§ view source
2026-05-17
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 298 Article 47 governs voter-register handover to YSK Voter Register Directorate — not E2E verifiability.

§ view source
2026-05-17
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

Law 298 Article 78 mandates that watermarked-paper combined ballots are used in presidential, parliamentary, provincial council, municipal council, and mayoral elections. Turkey's primary voting method is hand-marked paper ballots cast into transparent sealable boxes — meeting the voter-verifiable-paper-record criterion. Reinforced by Article 26 of Law 2839 (party ballot preparation per Art 14 of Law 298), Article 18 of Law 2972 (local elections use combined ballots per Law 298), Article 102 (paper-ballot validity).

§ view source
2026-05-17
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 2972 Article 25 covers PARTY/CANDIDATE challenges to records leading to re-count — not general citizen re-tally right.

§ view source
2026-05-17

Custody Hardware

50.0% · 4/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

Law 298 Article 77 mandates that the ballot-box committee chair seals the empty ballot box with the committee seal in such a way that it cannot be opened without breaking the seal — a tamper-evident-seal requirement. Reinforced by Article 27 of Law 2839 (sealed/numbered paper packets), Article 68 (clear plastic sealable boxes), Article 46 of Law 2820 (sealed party ballots), Article 19 of Law 2972 (sealed EVET/TERCİH stamps).

§ view source
2026-05-17
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 174 protects secular-reform laws — unrelated.

§ view source
2026-05-17
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?1/1100.0%

Law 298 Article 107 codifies a full chain-of-custody handover: counted ballots, signed tally sheets, all rejected/contested ballots, and the record book go into separately sealed packets, placed in a sealed bag signed by chair and members, transported by the committee chair plus two lot-selected members to the district election board. Reinforced by Article 77 (ballot-box sealing) and Article 68 (sealed transport).

§ view source
2026-05-17
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?1/1100.0%

Law 298 Article 164 imposes 5–8 years' imprisonment for anyone who alters or causes alteration of election results, or forges/tampers election records — increased to 5–10 years if committed by board members/officials. Strong tamper-penalty regime. Reinforced by Article 148 (fake voter-register), Article 113 of Law 2820 (party-record tampering 1–3 years), Article 112 of Law 2820 (election manipulation), Article 111 of Law 2820 (refusal-to-provide-information sanctions).

§ view source
2026-05-17

Post Election Audit

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 298 Ek Madde 1 governs YSK voter-education broadcasts, not post-election audit.

§ view source
2026-05-17
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 298 Article 33 governs voter-register reconstruction — not audit method.

§ view source
2026-05-17
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 73 is tax law — unrelated.

§ view source
2026-05-17
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 298 Article 108 codifies open/continuous district counting with party-rep attendance — but this is routine counting, not a codified audit process.

§ view source
2026-05-17
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 2820 Article 74 governs Constitutional Court audit of PARTY FINANCES, not election-result audit binding.

§ view source
2026-05-17

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 168 governs natural resources, not voting-system source code.

§ view source
2026-05-17
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-17
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 2820 Article 69 governs party finances — printed receipts for income, not cryptographic binary commitment.

§ view source
2026-05-17
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 298 Article 77 governs ballot-box sealing procedure at poll opening, not pre-publication of ballot layouts.

§ view source
2026-05-17
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 2972 Article 2 declares local-election principles + judicial supervision in general — not a software-integrity verification.

§ view source
2026-05-17

Transparency Observation

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

Law 298 Article 72 grants party observers (müşahitler), candidates, and independent-candidate observers the right to be present at the ballot box and follow all ballot-box operations. Reinforced by Article 17 (party representation on provincial boards), Article 105 (party reps countersign result records), Article 108 (party-rep presence at district counting). Strong codified domestic-observer regime.

§ view source
2026-05-17
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-17
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?0/50.0%

Law 2839 Article 35 requires provincial board chair to determine + post results in the district AND keep posted for one week — fast but not a precinct-level 24h-deadline mandate.

§ view source
2026-05-17
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

Law 298 Article 105 ballot-box result record (tutanak) is signed and provided — but not a public signed append-only event log of the election overall.

§ view source
2026-05-17

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 45 governs agriculture — unrelated.

§ view source
2026-05-17
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

Law 298 Article 68 publicly specifies ballot-box physical dimensions/material — an open hardware standard for the box, but not for a vote-format/device-protocol (no devices used).

§ view source
2026-05-17
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 155 Danıştay (Council of State) jurisdiction — unrelated.

§ view source
2026-05-17
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 166 economic planning — unrelated.

§ view source
2026-05-17

Voter Access

71.4% · 5/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

Law 298 Article 2 declares 'Vote is given secretly' as a foundational principle. Reinforced by Anayasa Article 67 (constitutional principle of secret ballot + open count), Law 298 Article 76 (closed voting booth specifications: must not be visible from outside), Law 2820 Articles 21, 27, 37 (internal party elections also by secret ballot).

Oy gizli verilir.
§ view source
2026-05-17
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?3/560.0%

Law 298 Article 93 codifies an assistance-based accessibility provision: blind, paralyzed, or those with clearly-visible physical disabilities may vote with assistance from a relative who is a voter in that precinct (or any other voter if no relative is present). This is SOME accessibility (limited to assistance, not independent accessible voting). No comprehensive standards for vision-impaired independent voting, no codified motor/language accommodations, no mandate for accessible polling-place design.

§ view source
2026-05-17
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?1/1100.0%

Law 298 Article 10 mandates institutional structure: every district gets a board, every ballot-box-area a committee.

§ view source
2026-05-17

Other methodologies for Turkey