EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses confiscation of goods and money used in violations related to contraventions or crimes (articles 55, 57-62), and marks a transition to final provisions. It does not address public verification artifacts, downloadable packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures related to election verification.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section mandates that voting ballots (buletine de vot) are physically printed with standardized specifications for all voters in an electoral district. This establishes a requirement for paper ballots, which constitute a voter-verifiable paper trail. The provision for ballot printing with specific formatting ensures that physical paper records exist for voter verification.

“buletinele de vot sunt imprimate cu litere de aceeaşi mărime, aceleaşi caractere şi aceeaşi cerneală, într-un număr egal cu al alegătorilor înscrişi în listele electorale, cu un plus de 10%”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section (§ 75) regulates exit polling by accredited opinion polling institutions and organizations. It does not address or establish any right for citizens to re-tally votes from published precinct data. The section is about media/polling access and restrictions on publishing exit polls, not about citizen verification rights or access to electoral tallying data.

The section mandates tamper-evident seals on ballot boxes and control stamps, with disappearance of stamps recorded in the official report. However, it provides only for detection and documentation of tampering (tamper-evident), not for automated response mechanisms or comprehensive logging beyond the report.

“sigileaza urna, introduce stampilele cu menţiunea «VOTAT» într-un plic care se sigileaza prin aplicarea ştampilei de control a secţiei de votare. Dispariţia uneia sau a mai multor ştampile se consemnează în procesul-verbal”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 27 of Law 370/2004 governs the procedures for submitting candidate nominations for Romanian presidential elections, including requirements for supporting documentation, voter lists, and declarations. It does not address the technical specifications or network isolation requirements for vote-casting equipment. The section is entirely focused on candidate nomination procedures and has no relevance to the criterion concerning network isolation mandates for voting machines.

The section requires documented chain-of-custody transfers (proces-verbal) for the stickers from prefects to mayors to polling station officials, and return of unused stickers. However, it does not explicitly require that this documentation be publicly available, only that it be documented. Public availability is a key component of the criterion.

“Prefecţii distribuie, pe bază de proces-verbal de predare-preluare, timbrele autocolante primarilor, care le predau preşedinţilor birourilor electorale ale secţiilor de votare, pe bază de proces-verbal de predare-preluare”

Section 62 establishes criminal penalties for falsifying electoral documents, manipulating voter lists, and introducing defective software or data that alter election results. However, it does not explicitly address criminal penalties for unauthorized physical access to or tampering with voting devices or hardware—it focuses on falsification, software manipulation, and data alteration rather than device custody or unauthorized hardware access itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 23 addresses voter registration procedures for EU citizens in local elections, specifically the documents required to be inscribed in the supplementary electoral list. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, mandatory or otherwise. This section is entirely focused on pre-election registration requirements and is irrelevant to the criterion of mandatory post-election audits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 21 governs the allocation of parliamentary mandates using the d'Hondt method and procedures for preparing electoral documents (process records and certificates). It does not address post-election audits or any audit methodology. The section is substantively about mandate distribution, not election verification or auditing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 37 addresses removal of deceased voters from electoral registers. It contains no provisions regarding audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges to election results. This section is entirely focused on voter registration procedures and is unrelated to post-election audits.

The section requires transparency in vote-counting operations but does not explicitly grant parties, media, or citizens observer access rights to audits. It mandates transparency as a principle for the counting process, which implies some form of observation is intended, but lacks specific provisions defining who can observe or how observation is organized.

“asigura desfăşurarea, în condiţii de transparenta şi în spiritul legii, a operaţiunilor de numărare a buletinelor de vot”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses military service obligations for Romanian citizens and has no connection to election audits or the binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes. The criterion concerns post-election audit procedures in an electoral context, which is entirely absent from this constitutional provision on national defense.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30 addresses freedom of expression, press freedom, and related communication rights in Romania. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code disclosure, access by certifying authorities, academics, or any technical specifications for election systems. This section is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning software verifiability in voting systems.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the administrative procedures for independent candidate registration, requiring submission of application documents and supporter lists. It does not address software, cryptographic commitments, binary verification, or any aspect of election technology or pre-election security measures relevant to the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 92 addresses post-election procedures for ballot counting, verification, and audit—specifically the handling of ballot seals, counting procedures, and result recording. It does not address pre-election publication of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules, nor does it address signing or publishing these materials before polls open.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 23 addresses voter registration for EU citizens in local elections, specifically the documentation requirements for supplementary electoral lists. It contains no provisions regarding software verification, binary code comparison, or post-election integrity checks of any voting systems or software.

The section grants accreditation to domestic observers from NGOs and media, permitting them to assist at electoral operations and file written complaints about irregularities. However, the statute notably restricts party observers entirely—it permits only NGO and media representatives as domestic observers, explicitly excluding political party representatives. This partial protection of civil-society observation combined with the complete absence of party observer rights prevents full satisfaction of the criterion.

“Persoanele acreditate pot asista la operaţiunile electorale în ziua votării, începând cu ora 6,00 şi terminând cu momentul încheierii şi semnării de către membrii biroului electoral al secţiei de votare a procesului-verbal de constatare a rezultatelor votării în secţia respectivă, numai dacă prezintă actul de acreditare”

The section permits international observers to be present at polling stations, but they must be accredited by the Permanent Electoral Authority—they are not admitted by default. The section establishes a discretionary accreditation process (subsection 6) rather than a presumption of automatic admission for OSCE/EU/IFES observers.

“observatori internaționali, desemnați de către organizații străine sau internaționale pentru observarea alegerilor ori invitați de către autoritățile române, acreditați de către Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 6 governs the formation and contestation of electoral alliances by political parties and minority organizations, not the publication of election results. This section contains no requirements regarding precinct-level result publication timelines.

The section requires that ballot distribution and handover be documented via process-verbal (official records), which provides some documentation mechanism. However, this does not establish a public, signed, append-only election event log as contemplated by the criterion. The records are administrative documents between officials, not necessarily public or designed with cryptographic append-only properties.

“pe bază de proces-verbal”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 28 concerns access control and authentication procedures for the electoral register, specifically addressing authorized personnel, authentication methods, and mandate suspension. It does not address vendor selection, certification, operation, or competition in elections, and therefore does not speak to whether multiple certified vendors are permitted to operate.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 22 addresses the delimitation of voting sections by mayors, specifying administrative and territorial nomenclature requirements. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, or technical specifications of voting equipment. The section is entirely unrelated to vendor independence or open protocol standards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 59 addresses the admission and rejection of candidacies by electoral bureaus and the procedures for contesting those decisions. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or any measures to prevent vendor lock-in. This section is about electoral candidate procedures, not vendor management.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly guarantees that votes cast in elections are secret (votul este secret). This legal guarantee of ballot secrecy establishes the fundamental legal protection for voter–ballot unlinkability, making it enforceable as a statutory requirement.

“Votul exercitat în cadrul alegerilor este secret.”

The section addresses mobility and health-related accessibility by permitting mobile voting teams to visit voters unable to travel to polling places due to illness or disability. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards (vision, motor, language accommodations) legally required at every polling place itself, nor does it mandate physical accessibility features or language services at voting facilities.

“Pentru alegătorii care nu se pot deplasa la sediul secţiei de votare din cauză de boală sau invaliditate, preşedintele biroului electoral al secţiei de votare poate aproba, la cererea scrisă a acestora, însoţită de copii ale actelor din care rezultă starea de sănătate sau de invaliditate, ca o echipă formată din cel puţin 2 membri ai biroului electoral să se deplaseze cu o urnă specială”

The section establishes a specific legal floor for polling-place density: in localities with over 1,000 inhabitants, one polling station must be established for every 1,000–2,000 voters. This directly mandates a minimum density threshold.

“în localităţile cu o populaţie de peste 1.000 de locuitori, câte o secţie de votare la 1.000-2.000 de alegători”