EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the duties of territorial and municipal election commissions, including managing ballot printing, registering candidates, and announcing results. However, it does not address the creation, publication, or availability of downloadable public packages containing certificates, device records, or result signatures. The section is about commission responsibilities for election administration, not public verification artifacts.

No matching sections in corpus.

Article 40 § 1 establishes that voting must be conducted using official paper ballots (kart do głosowania), which are hand-marked paper ballots that serve as a voter-verifiable paper trail. This requirement directly satisfies the criterion for a voter-verifiable paper record.

“Głosowanie odbywa się przy pomocy urzędowych kart do głosowania.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 51 concerns personal data protection, confidentiality, and access to personal information held by public authorities. It does not address election procedures, precinct-level vote tallies, or citizen rights to independently verify election results. The criterion asks about citizens' legal right to re-tally from published precinct data, which is an election integrity matter entirely outside the scope of this constitutional provision on data privacy.

Article 47§2 mandates that the electoral commission seal (zapieczętowuje) the ballot box opening when voting is interrupted or postponed. This requirement for sealing constitutes a tamper-evident standard, as the seal would provide visible evidence of any unauthorized access to the urn.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 447 addresses the transmission and custody of election protocols and documents after voting has concluded. It does not concern the technical specifications or connectivity requirements of vote-casting equipment used during the voting process itself. The section is about post-election document handling, not network isolation mandates for voting machines.

The section requires that election documents be transferred to state archives and may be made available, establishing a custody framework and potential public access. However, it does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or specify that such documentation must be publicly available—it only authorizes the minister to determine procedures for transfer, storage, and disclosure through regulation, leaving the specifics undefined in statute.

“Dokumenty z wyborów są przekazywane do archiwów państwowych i mogą być udostępniane.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 248 addresses the transmission of personal data about elected members of parliament to the Minister of Justice and the Marshall of the Sejm, and disclosure of criminal records. It has no connection to custody of hardware, tamper protections, or criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

This section requires district electoral commissions to check the correctness of vote counting results in each precinct immediately upon receipt of voting protocols. However, it describes verification of results already submitted rather than a mandatory post-election audit of every election. The provision addresses procedural verification but does not establish a comprehensive mandatory audit of every election as a system-wide requirement.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Polish Electoral Code governs the filing of election validity protests (protests against election validity) based on crimes or procedural violations, and establishes who may file such protests. It does not address audit triggers, close margin thresholds, or the conditions under which additional audits beyond mandatory procedures are activated.

The statute permits party representatives (mężowie zaufania—'men of trust') to observe the tabulation process and submit objections, and grants them the right to participate in data transmission. However, it does not explicitly extend observer access to media or the general public, limiting transparency to designated party representatives only. This partial form of observation falls short of the criterion's requirement for broader public observation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 56 of the Polish Constitution addresses asylum rights and refugee status for foreigners. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit results, or their binding force on certified election results. This section is entirely unrelated to election integrity or audit procedures.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses transparency of electoral campaign financing, not voting system source code accessibility. It is unrelated to the criterion regarding whether voting system source code is legally accessible to the public, certifying authorities, academics, or vendors.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 476 addresses campaign spending limits, financial reporting requirements for electoral committees, and the publication of municipal population figures for expense calculation purposes. It does not concern the publication of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules, nor does it address any requirement for digital signatures on such materials before polling opens.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 203 of the Polish Constitution establishes the powers of the Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) to conduct audits of government bodies, state legal persons, and local government units on grounds of legality, economy, and reliability. It does not address election integrity, software verification, or the verification of election-related binary code or systems. The criterion concerns post-election verification of software running in election systems, which is entirely outside the scope of this constitutional provision about general auditing authority.

The section grants observers (mężowie zaufania/trustees) the right to be present during vote counting and result compilation, and permits them to submit remarks. However, the provision uses permissive language ('mogą być' - 'may be present') rather than mandatory language, and limits their rights to observation and commentary without guaranteeing full procedural access or decision-making participation. The right is established but appears constrained rather than comprehensive.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 133 addresses the President's powers in foreign relations, international treaty ratification, and diplomatic representation. It contains no provisions regarding admission of international observers to elections or any access rights for OSCE, EU, or IFES observers. The section is entirely unrelated to election observation or observer access.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 364 addresses the loss of mandate for Members of the European Parliament under various circumstances. It contains no provisions regarding precinct-level election results publication requirements or timelines for result disclosure.

The statute requires that a district electoral commission prepare a voting protocol (protokół głosowania) after establishing election results. While this establishes a record-keeping requirement, the text does not explicitly mandate that the log be public, signed, or append-only—the core technical and transparency requirements of the criterion.

“Obwodowa komisja wyborcza po ustaleniu wyników wyborów sporządza protokół głosowania”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 10 of the Polish Constitution establishes the basic structure of the state's division of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It contains no provisions regarding election vendors, election technology, or vendor certification. The section is entirely structural and does not address election administration or vendor management.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 117 of the Polish Electoral Code addresses free airtime for electoral broadcasts by radio and television stations. It concerns media campaign rules and broadcasting procedures, not vote-format or device-protocol standards for voting systems. The section has no relevance to technical standards for voting devices or open protocol documentation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 241 of the Polish Constitution contains transitional and miscellaneous provisions regarding international treaties, parliamentary procedures, parliamentary mandates, and administrative acts following the Constitution's entry into force. It does not address vendor contracts, contract duration limits, or any mechanism to prevent lock-in to service providers.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 79 of the Polish Electoral Code addresses the deposit and handling of voting documents and election commission seals by district election commission chairs. It contains no provisions regarding source-code escrow, software certification requirements, or vendor independence in election systems. This section deals with physical document management, not technological or vendor-related safeguards.

The section explicitly states that Senate elections are conducted in secret voting (głosowaniu tajnym), which legally guarantees voter-ballot unlinkability by requiring that the voting process itself be secret. This is a direct statutory mandate of ballot secrecy.

“odbywają się w głosowaniu tajnym”

The statute mandates that polling place facilities be adapted for disabled voters and requires technical standards to be established. However, it does not mandate accessibility at every polling place—only that a minimum of one accessible facility per municipality be provided, and the regulation allows for proportional reduction based on the disabled population. This falls short of comprehensive accessibility at all locations.

The section establishes a ceiling (maximum population per polling place) of 3,000 voters and a floor of 500 voters. However, the criterion asks for a 'floor on polling places per N voters'—meaning a minimum density requirement (e.g., at least one polling place per X voters). The text specifies maximum size of polling districts but does not mandate a minimum number of polling places relative to population or geographic area; it only allows exceptions to reduce size below 500 based on local conditions. This addresses voter access through population caps but not through minimum polling place density requirements.

“Stały obwód głosowania powinien obejmować od 500 do 3 000 mieszkańców.”