EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 197 regulates the procedural rights of electoral committees representing national minorities—specifically exemptions from voter thresholds and filing deadlines with the State Electoral Commission (PKW). It contains no statutory requirements for conflict-of-interest disclosure by commissioners or senior election staff, nor does it establish any accountability mechanism for financial interest reporting. The section addresses candidate committee registration, not institutional governance or ethics safeguards.

Article 394 § 4 codifies the right to seek judicial review by explicitly granting standing (to the person filing a protest, the election commissioner, and the chair or deputy chair of the relevant election commission), defining the timeline (7 days from delivery), and specifying venue (appellate court). This creates a clear, statutorily-grounded accountability mechanism for election authority decisions.

The section establishes the Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza's (State Electoral Commission's) mandate and role in statutory law (the Electoral Code), satisfying the requirement that the commission's existence and core mandate be set in law rather than by executive order. However, COMM.1 specifically asks whether this is grounded in the constitution rather than statute alone. This section is statute-only; constitutional grounding would be required to score 2.

The statute mandates that all nine commission members are judges from three independent judiciary institutions (Constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Court, and National Administrative Court), nominated by the heads of those courts and formally appointed by the President. This represents a multi-branch structure: the judiciary branches dominate nomination through their respective court leadership, and the executive (Presidency) has only formal appointment power. No single branch unilaterally controls composition—the judiciary nominations are binding, and the President cannot refuse appointment or appoint non-judges. This satisfies the structural requirement for institutional independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 358 concerns the technical procedure for allocating parliamentary seats and dividing mandates among electoral lists. It contains no provisions regarding commissioner terms, fixed lengths, staggered cycles, or grounds for removal. The section addresses vote tabulation and mandate distribution algorithms, not institutional structure or personnel governance.

The statute mandates multi-branch judicial appointment (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and National Administrative Court), which provides structural insulation from executive capture and reflects judicial independence as the source of commissioners. However, the text contains no explicit political-balance requirement, party-balance mandate, or supermajority-confirmation procedure. The reliance on judicial selection mitigates (but does not eliminate) single-party dominance risk, but the criterion specifically requires statutory language demanding balance or independent judicial appointment—both of which are present in principle but the latter is implicit rather than explicitly framed as a balance safeguard.

The section establishes a separate statutory line item (wyodrębnionymi — 'separated' or 'carved out') for the National Electoral Office within the state budget, satisfying the independence-of-allocation requirement. However, it does not explicitly restrict mid-cycle reallocation by the executive branch; the Head of the National Electoral Office 'disposes of' (dysponuje) these funds, suggesting administrative discretion within that line rather than protective earmarking or legislative requirement for non-reallocation. The provision lacks statutory language prohibiting executive in-cycle modification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 38 addresses political party campaign finance disclosure and reporting to the State Election Commission (PKW), not election administration infrastructure funding. It does not establish any multi-year budgeting framework for election administration itself, nor does it protect election-administration funding from annual political negotiation. The article concerns party fund reporting requirements and enforcement mechanisms, which is orthogonal to the institutional funding structure for election offices and staff.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 146 defines the Council of Ministers' general powers and responsibilities within the Polish state system. It contains no provision concerning foreign-source funding of election authorities, election administration, or any prohibition on foreign funding of state institutions. The section addresses executive power, budget authority, and administrative coordination but does not establish statutory rules governing the sources of election administration funding.

The section establishes that the head of the Central Electoral Office and staff are civil servants governed by the 1982 civil service statute, which provides merit-based employment protections. However, this excerpt does not explicitly detail the protections themselves (recruitment, tenure, removal safeguards, political insulation), and the section also grants the Head broad discretionary authority to determine internal organization, leaving ambiguity about whether subordinate staff inherit full civil-service protections or operate under administrative discretion.

“Szef Krajowego Biura Wyborczego jest kierownikiem urzędu w rozumieniu przepisów ustawy z dnia 16 września 1982 r. o pracownikach urzędów państwowych”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 13 addresses judicial review of political party registration applications and procedural defects in party registration filings. It contains no provisions establishing whistleblower protections for election staff or personnel reporting irregularities. This section governs party registration procedures, not employment protections or internal accountability mechanisms for election administrators.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section grants the State Electoral Commission (PKW) authority to set technical conditions for postal voting through resolution, but it does not codify a voting-equipment certification process. The provision addresses procedural rules for handling mail ballots and ballot security, not equipment certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment procedures. No statutory framework for equipment testing, approval, or oversight is present in this text.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.