EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the mechanics of voter marking and ballot validity in a single transferable vote system, and the secrecy of the voting process. It contains no provisions relating to downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, result signatures, or any form of electronic verification artifacts or public audit materials.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires that ballot papers remain clearly visible to parties, candidates, and agents at all times, which establishes a requirement for voter-verifiable paper records (physical ballot papers) that can be observed and inspected by election observers. This visibility requirement is fundamental to creating a verifiable paper trail that enables independent verification of voting integrity.

“The pigeon hole and ballot papers must at all times be clearly visible by parties, candidates and agents.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses public availability and disclosure of audited party financial accounts, not the right of citizens to re-tally election results from precinct-level data. It concerns financial transparency for political parties, which is unrelated to election result verification or citizen re-tally rights.

The section requires seals on ballot boxes and allows objection if they appear tampered with, indicating a tamper-evident system is contemplated. However, it does not explicitly mandate tamper-evident standards, specify technical requirements, or establish logging or auto-quarantine procedures.

“Any party delegate, candidate or agent may, prior to the opening of the ballot box, make representations claiming that the seals of the box have been tampered with.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 37 of Cap. 544 addresses the registration and reporting of political party donations. It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network isolation, internet connectivity, or any technical requirements for voting systems. This section is entirely irrelevant to the criterion.

The section requires attestation and witness signatures for the sealing of ballot boxes, documenting that the boxes are empty before polling begins. However, it does not establish a full chain-of-custody documentation system covering the entire lifecycle of ballot boxes (storage, transport, opening, closing, counting, and storage after election), nor does it explicitly require such documentation to be publicly available.

“the Chairperson of the Assistant Commissioners shall so attest on the form provided by the Commission and shall ask all the persons present at the sealing to sign as witnesses”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 16 addresses voter registration and voting rights in electoral divisions, establishing penalties for voting in unauthorized divisions. It does not address device access, hardware custody, or tamper protection—topics that fall outside its scope and are not mentioned in this section.

The section requires audited accounts that include election campaign accounts to be delivered to the Commission, which addresses financial auditing related to elections. However, it does not explicitly mandate a distinct post-election audit for every election; rather, it requires audited accounts within four months of the financial year end that happen to include election-related accounts. The requirement is tied to financial year reporting cycles rather than to election cycles specifically, and does not clearly establish a mandatory audit requirement that applies to every election regardless of timing.

The section mandates reconciliation of ballot paper accounts with actual vote counts in each box, which constitutes a form of hand recount verification. However, it does not specify the scope (e.g., whether all boxes or only a percentage), the statistical methodology, or risk-limiting audit parameters. This is a basic reconciliation requirement rather than a systematic audit method as defined in the scoring scale.

“the Commission shall immediately proceed to reconcile the Ballot Paper Account of each box delivered by the Assistant Commissioners with the actual number of votes in that box”

The section provides for examination of objections regarding ballot box seals prior to opening, but this is a pre-audit integrity check rather than a post-election audit triggered by close margins or sworn challenges. It does not establish mechanisms for triggering additional audits based on close election results or sworn challenges after voting concludes.

“Any objection raised by the party delegates or their substitutes as to the integrity of such seals shall be examined by the Commission whose decision thereon shall be final and not subject to appeal.”

The section requires public disclosure and accessibility of audited accounts through copies available for inspection and posting on the Commission's website. However, it does not explicitly grant observer access to the audit process itself—it only mandates making the final audited statements publicly available after the fact. Public observation of the actual audit procedure (which the criterion asks about) is not addressed.

“it shall, within one month after receiving the statement, make a copy of the statement available for public inspection and it shall post the said statement on the website of the Commission and keep it available for public inspection and on the said website”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 52 of Malta's General Elections Act addresses candidate nomination deposits and vote forfeiture rules. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit procedures, audit results, or the binding force of any audit findings on certified election results. This section is entirely unrelated to the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 90 addresses physical security arrangements and access controls at the ballot counting facility, including room provisions, transparent barriers, and party delegate access. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code disclosure, legal accessibility of software, or any software-related matters.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of Malta's General Elections Act deals with repeal of prior electoral ordinances and saving provisions for political party rights. It contains no content related to software, binary reproducibility, or build processes. The criterion concerns technical software integrity requirements, which is entirely outside the scope of this statutory provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 86 addresses ballot box delivery, storage, inspection, and document preservation procedures. It contains no mention of software, binary code, cryptographic commitments, hashing, or any pre-election technical verification mechanisms. The criterion concerns digital election technology governance, which is not the subject of this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 2 is an interpretation/definitions section that establishes the meaning of terms used throughout the Act, such as 'ballot box,' 'polling booth,' and 'Electronic Counting System.' It does not address whether ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules are signed and published before polls open. The section provides no information about publication requirements, signing procedures, or timing of such disclosures.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration verification and enquiries by the Electoral Commission, not software integrity or verification of election system binaries. It is unrelated to post-election software verification or cryptographic integrity checks.

The section explicitly guarantees free access to counting facilities for party representatives (candidates, candidates' agents, and counting agents) at all times during the counting process. This provides full procedural access for party observers to monitor ballot counting, which directly satisfies the criterion of domestic observer rights.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires publication of detailed election results subdivided by polling booth within seven days of the end of counting. This satisfies a requirement for precinct-level results publication, but the seven-day timeline falls short of the 24-hour requirement specified in the criterion. The statute does not mandate publication within 24 hours or 48 hours.

“The Commission shall publish in the Gazette not later than seven days after the end of counting a declaration of the result of the election”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 46 addresses the printing, security, and distribution of voting documents, including party observation and audit provisions. However, it does not establish or require a public, signed, append-only election event log. The audit trail mentioned in sub-article (2) relates to verification of the printing process, not a comprehensive public election event log.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 68 concerns physical polling booth arrangements, ballot box construction, candidate photographs, and polling place security. It does not address vendor certification, vendor selection, or the use of multiple vendors in elections. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion of multi-vendor capability.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of Malta's Financing of Political Parties Act addresses accounting records and financial documentation requirements for political parties. It is entirely unrelated to vote-format standards, device protocols, or voting technology standards, which is what criterion 5.2 concerns. The statute deals with party finance transparency, not electoral device specifications.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the duty of government officers to provide voter registration information to the electoral commission. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration, or lock-in prevention. The criterion concerns vendor independence and contract terms, which is entirely outside the scope of this statutory section.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section imposes criminal penalties on Assistant Commissioners for revealing how a voter voted, which protects ballot secrecy against disclosure by officials. However, it does not affirmatively guarantee the structural mechanisms that ensure voter–ballot unlinkability (such as ballot design, separation of voter identity from ballots, or procedures preventing ballot traceability). It addresses only post-voting disclosure rather than the legal guarantee of the system itself.

“Every Assistant Commissioner who shall reveal the manner of voting of any voter when such manner of voting shall have come to his knowledge in the course of the exercise of his functions under this Act shall be guilty of an offence”

The section provides accessibility accommodations for voters with visual and literacy disabilities through multiple mechanisms (assistance with marking, Braille templates, playback devices), but it does not mandate these standards as requirements at every polling place. Rather, it grants voters the right to request accommodations, leaving implementation discretionary.

“a person who is unable to vote independently by reason of blindness may either request an Assistant Commissioner to mark the ballot paper on his behalf indicating for which candidate or candidates he wishes to vote and the order in which he wishes to record his vote, or request the provision of a Braille template as well as a playback listening device”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter intimidation and order maintenance outside polling places, but contains no provisions regarding the density, number, or geographic distribution of polling places relative to voter population or area. It does not establish any legal floor or minimum requirement for polling-place availability.