EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced postal-envelope vote-counting provisions; Latvia produces paper vote-counting reports and election procedure logs but codifies no downloadable public verification package of certificates, device records and result signatures.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Latvia votes exclusively on paper — the voter marks a paper ballot paper and seals it in a ballot envelope, and the count opens each envelope and examines the ballot papers by hand (§ 32 of the Saeima Election Law). The hand-marked paper ballot is the voter-verifiable record.

“the envelope contains one ballot paper of the relevant”

§ 49 of the Saeima Election Law requires the complete election results — including the votes received by each candidate in each list in each polling station — to be published in a separate publication freely available to anyone in State libraries; § 48 of the EP Election Law publishes the equivalent per-polling-station data on the CEC website. Any citizen can re-tally from this published precinct-level data.

“freely available in State libraries.”

§ 36 of the Saeima Election Law requires all ballot papers and ballot envelopes plus the vote-counting report to be packaged and sealed after the count, with a reference in the election procedure log; § 18 has ballot boxes sealed before voting. Tamper-evident sealing is mandated, but without logged tamper-response or auto-quarantine.

“shall be packaged and sealed.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced pre-election-campaign-on-the-Internet provisions; Latvia votes on paper with no networked vote-casting equipment, so network isolation is moot and uncodified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced campaign-finance and signature-collection sections ('custody' matched the Orphan's and Custody Court). Latvia seals and packages election materials with election-procedure-log references (§ 36), but a comprehensive, publicly available chain-of-custody documentation regime is not codified.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced the financial audit of political parties (§ 11) and the constitutional State Audit Office. Latvia codifies no mandatory post-election audit of the vote count itself — higher election commissions consolidate and may re-examine polling stations only on complaint or own initiative.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The only audits surfaced are the financial audit of party accounts (§ 11) and general State Audit Office activity; no vote-tally audit method (fixed-percentage recount, comparison or risk-limiting audit) is codified for the count.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced the campaign-finance election-declaration audit (§ 8²); Latvia codifies no post-election vote audit, so there is no audit-observation provision for the count. (The count itself is observable — see 6.1.)

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 18 of the Saeima Election Law (and parallel § 20 EP, § 35 Local Govt, § 15 Referendum) lets up to two authorised observers from each political party or alliance, plus mass-media representatives and Central / local election commission members, observe the election procedure at every polling station.

“election procedure may be concurrently observed by not more than two authorised observers from each political party or alliance of”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 48 of the EP Election Law and § 49 of the Saeima Election Law require the full per-polling-station results to be compiled and published (on the CEC website / freely in State libraries), and § 25 of the Election Commissions Law makes results publication a commission duty; the detailed precinct publication is codified at three to six months, with no fast 24–48-hour statutory deadline.

“published on the website of the Central Election Commission.”

§ 35 of the Local Government Council Election Law requires the polling-station commission secretary to keep an election procedure report from the opening of the station, recording voter complaints; § 28 of the Saeima Election Law keeps the parallel log. It is a contemporaneous log open to observers, but not a public, signed, append-only published event log.

“shall write up the election procedure report in accordance with the procedures specified by the Central Electoral Commission.”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced pre-election-campaign advertising-contract provisions; Latvia runs paper elections with no voting-technology vendor, so no vendor contract-duration cap exists.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Ballot secrecy is constitutionally guaranteed — Article 6 of the Satversme requires the Saeima to be elected 'by secret ballot' — and § 28 of the Election Commissions Law requires polling premises to be equipped for a secret ballot; the voter seals the ballot envelope alone in a booth (§ 24 EP).

“and by secret ballot based on proportional”

§ 25 of the Saeima Election Law (and § 33 Local Govt) codifies assisted voting — a voter who cannot mark the ballot or sign due to physical disability may be assisted by a family member or other trusted person of their choice. This is partial accessibility ('some'); Latvia codifies no comprehensive polling-place accessibility-standards regime.

“marks on the ballot paper shall be made or the list”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.