Icelandv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity11.3%6/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access28.6%
2/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs political organisations' access to electoral registers for monitoring elections and voter outreach. It does not address downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures—the technical artifacts required for public verification under criterion 4.1.

§ view source
2026-06-06
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

This section requires voters to use physical ballot papers that they mark themselves according to the Act's prescribed method, creating a hand-marked paper record. The requirement that voters handle, fold, and place the ballot paper themselves, combined with the prescribed marking procedures, establishes a voter-verifiable paper trail as the core voting mechanism.

§ view source
2026-06-06
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses notification and publication of election results by the National Electoral Commission, but does not establish any legal right for citizens to conduct independent re-tallies from precinct data. It describes administrative procedures for informing elected officials and publishing results in the Government Gazette, with no mention of public access to detailed precinct-level data or citizen verification rights.

§ view source
2026-06-06

Custody Hardware

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The section mandates tamper-evident seals on ballot boxes that leave visible traces if opened, which directly satisfies the tamper-evident standard at level 2. However, there is no requirement for logging of tampering events or auto-quarantine mechanisms, so the score does not reach higher levels.

§ view source
2026-06-06
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

The section addresses physical security measures for ballot boxes through sealing requirements that create visible traces of tampering, but it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or require public availability of such documentation. The statute describes equipment design and operational procedures but lacks explicit requirements for documenting the handling, transfer, and storage of ballots or ballot boxes throughout the electoral process.

§ view source
2026-06-06
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

The statute provides criminal penalties for tampering with voting materials and election hardware (up to four years imprisonment for falsifying polling, tampering with vote counts, and related acts). However, the criterion specifically asks about 'unauthorized device access,' which is narrower than the general tampering provisions here. The section addresses physical tampering with ballots and counting processes but does not explicitly address unauthorized electronic device access to election systems.

§ view source
2026-06-06

Post Election Audit

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the role of Registers Iceland in administering the electronic electoral register and operating computer systems for elections, including provisions for audits of performance under a service agreement. However, it does not establish a legal requirement for post-election audits of election results themselves. The mention of 'audits of performance' refers to auditing the service provider's contract performance, not mandatory post-election audits of voting accuracy or election integrity.

§ view source
2026-06-06
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the logistics and timing of vote counting in constituencies and municipalities, but contains no information about post-election audits, audit methods, hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or any verification procedures after counting.

§ view source
2026-06-06
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9

Transparency Observation

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly grants list agents (party observers) full procedural access to all critical phases of vote counting: ballot box opening, materials receipt, ballot sorting, vote counting, and results compilation. The provision ensures continuous observation rights throughout the entire process and includes a fallback mechanism to guarantee representation.

§ view source
2026-06-06
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses political organizations' access to electoral registers for monitoring elections and voter verification, but contains no requirements regarding publication timelines for precinct-level results. The criterion concerns the speed of results publication, which is a distinct topic not covered in this provision.

§ view source
2026-06-06
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

The statute requires that contracts define 'the term of the agreement,' which indicates that contract duration must be specified and is contemplated as a defined parameter. However, the text does not establish any specific cap on duration or prevent indefinite renewal or perpetual arrangements, only that a term must be defined. This satisfies transparency and definition requirements but not the substantive criterion of preventing lock-in through duration caps.

§ view source
2026-06-06
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-06

Voter Access

28.6% · 2/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly mandates that municipal council representatives 'shall be elected by secret ballot,' which establishes a legal guarantee of ballot secrecy and thus voter-ballot unlinkability. This is an enforceable statutory requirement with no exceptions noted.

Representatives on municipal councils shall be elected by secret ballot in general elections
§ view source
2026-06-06
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?1/520.0%

The section mandates voting assistance for voters who need it, which addresses some accessibility concerns such as motor or vision disabilities. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards for polling places (physical accessibility, language services, specific accommodations) nor does it mandate accessibility features at every polling location. The provision focuses narrowly on personal assistance rather than systemic accessibility infrastructure.

§ view source
2026-06-06
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes that polling stations are to be decided by municipal councils and must be publicised in advance, but contains no requirement specifying a minimum number or density of polling places per voters or per geographic area. It does not establish any legal floor or standard for polling-place density.

§ view source
2026-06-06

Other methodologies for Iceland