EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
31.3% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 1/1100.0% | § 181 codifies that the result is announced and the announcement (kuulutus) published in the Finnish Statute Book (Suomen säädöskokoelma). § 94 / § 95 codify result confirmation + publication. § 98 codifies entry of the result in the protocol. § 145 codifies public announcement of seat counts. Public verification artifacts codified. “Helsingin vaalipiirilautakunnan on heti ilmoitettava oikeusministeriölle vaalien tulos ja annettava tuloksesta kuulutus, joka julkaistaan Suomen säädöskokoelmassa.” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | § 51 codifies that the ballot 'used in elections must be printed on white paper' — Finland's regime is exclusively paper, with a prescribed ballot form that 'must safeguard the preservation of ballot secrecy.' § 85 codifies paper-ballot invalidity grounds. § 82 codifies small-precinct paper ballots. § 78 codifies hand-counting of paper ballots. Voter-verifiable paper-trail regime fully codified. | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0.5/150.0% | § 80 codifies that constituency committees, central election committees and polling committees publicly communicate (tiedottavat) the preliminary-count results. § 181 codifies result publication in the Statute Book. § 184 codifies observer access to counting. Precinct-level result data is publicly communicated, though a general citizen right to a raw-data re-tally is limited to the observation framework. | § view source 2026-05-20 |
Custody Hardware
50.0% · 4/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | § 64 codifies that approved ballot envelopes be placed 'in durable packaging, SEALED in the manner prescribed by the Ministry of Justice' with marked address/contents/sender. § 74 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies that the polling-committee chair must show the ballot box is EMPTY before voting and seal it; it may not be reopened until counting. § 99 codifies sealed custody after the result. § 70 codifies preparatory measures. Tamper-evident regime codified. “Muissa kuin kunnallisvaaleissa kunnan keskusvaalilautakunnan on laitettava hyväksytyt vaalikuoret kestävään päällykseen, joka sinetöidään oikeusministeriön määräämällä tavalla” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 1/1100.0% | § 99 codifies that 'if ballot counting or processing is interrupted, all ballots and tallies must be stored so that no outsider can get hold of them,' and after the result is confirmed the ballots are placed in packaging sealed in the Ministry-prescribed manner and retained until the next equivalent election. § 64 codifies ballot-envelope transport packaging. § 62 codifies envelope delivery to the central committee. Comprehensive chain-of-custody codified. “Jos äänestyslippujen laskenta tai käsittely keskeytetään, kaikki äänestysliput ja laskelmat on säilytettävä siten, ettei kukaan ulkopuolinen saa niitä käsiinsä.” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | § 186 codifies criminal penalties: 'penalties for electoral crime, electoral bribery, fraudulent voting and falsification of the election result are laid down in Chapter 14, sections 1-4 of the Criminal Code.' § 185 codifies the criminal liability of election officials. Cross-referenced criminal-penalty framework codified. “Rangaistus vaalirikoksesta, vaalilahjonnasta, vilpillisestä äänestämisestä ja vaalituloksen vääristämisestä säädetään rikoslain 14 luvun 1―4 §:ssä.” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
Post Election Audit
55.6% · 5/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | § 87 codifies the mandatory check-count (tarkastuslaskenta): 'on the day after the election at 09:00, examination shall begin of the ballots cast in election-day voting and of the tallies of the polling committees and central election committees.' Every ballot is re-examined. § 78 codifies the preliminary count. § 86 codifies advance-vote counting. Mandatory dual-count of every ballot codified. “Vaalien jälkeisenä päivänä kello 9 on ryhdyttävä tarkastamaan vaalipäivän äänestyksessä annettuja äänestyslippuja sekä vaalilautakuntien ja 82 §:n 3 momentissa tarkoitettuja kunnan keskusvaalilautakuntien laskelmia.” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | § 87 codifies the tarkastuslaskenta — a full manual re-examination of every cast ballot the day after the election, determining anew which ballots count for which candidate and which are invalid. § 78 codifies the preliminary manual count at the polling station, conducted without interruption. § 86 codifies advance-vote counting. Ordinal level 2: 100% manual count + 100% manual check-count — stronger than fixed-percentage audit (not a margin-driven RLA). | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 1/1100.0% | § 184 codifies that party / joint-list / voters'-association election agents (or their authorised persons) have the right to be PRESENT at the committee meetings held for ballot sorting, counting, and determination of the result. The same right belongs to 'a person representing the Ministry of Justice or authorised by it observing the elections.' § 54 codifies an observer present at home voting. Comprehensive observation-of-counting framework codified. “Vaalilautakunnan, kunnan keskusvaalilautakunnan ja vaalipiirilautakunnan kokouksissa, jotka pidetään ehdokkaiden numeroiden määräämistä, äänestyslippujen järjestämistä tai laskemista taikka vaalien tuloksen määräämistä varten, puolueiden ja yhteislistojen sekä yhteislistaan kuulumattomien valitsijayhdistysten vaaliasiamiehillä taikka heidän kutakin vaaliviranomaista varten erikseen kirjallisesti valtuuttamillaan henkilöillä on oikeus olla läsnä.” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 1/1100.0% | § 94 codifies that the constituency election committee confirms (vahvistaa) the parliamentary-election result on the 3rd day after election day. § 95 codifies parallel for municipal elections. § 179 codifies presidential-election confirmation by the Helsinki constituency committee. The confirmed check-count result is binding — § 100 codifies that appeal lies only against the decision confirming the result. Binding-force framework codified. | § view source 2026-05-20 |
Software Verifiability
5.6% · 1/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0.5/150.0% | § 51 codifies the ballot-paper specification (white paper, standard 148×210 mm, prescribed layout — 'no other markings may appear on the ballot'). § 82 codifies small-precinct ballots. § 85 codifies ballot-invalidity grounds. § 140 codifies second-round ballot color. Public ballot specification codified though without cryptographic signing. | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
Transparency Observation
50.0% · 4/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | § 120 codifies the election-agent (vaaliasiamies) institution — every candidate-nominating party and voters' association must have an election agent (with a deputy) in the constituency. § 131 / § 151 / § 170 codify the same across all election types. § 184 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies the presence-right of election agents AND election observers (vaalitarkkailijat) at ballot-sorting, counting, and result-determination meetings, plus a Ministry-of-Justice observer. § 54 codifies an observer at home voting. Comprehensive domestic-observer framework codified. | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 2/540.0% | § 181 codifies that the Helsinki constituency committee 'must IMMEDIATELY notify the Ministry of Justice of the election result' and issue a public announcement. § 80 codifies that committees publicly communicate the preliminary-count results (on election night). § 94 / § 95 codify result confirmation on the 3rd day. Ordinal level 2: preliminary precinct results communicated on election night, formal confirmation within 3 days. “Helsingin vaalipiirilautakunnan on heti ilmoitettava oikeusministeriölle vaalien tulos” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 1/1100.0% | § 79 codifies the vaalipöytäkirja (election protocol): the polling committee must designate a member to keep a protocol recording the date and times voting began/ended, members present, assistants, number of voters, total ballots and ballots in each group, the time ballots were sealed, and which election agents and other authorised persons were present at sorting and counting. § 98 codifies entry of the result in the protocol. § 63 codifies advance-vote-document checking minutes. Comprehensive protocol regime codified. “Vaalilautakunnan on määrättävä yksi jäsenistään pitämään vaalipöytäkirjaa, johon merkitään:” | § view source 2026-05-20 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-20 |
Voter Access
35.7% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | § 51 codifies that the ballot form 'must safeguard the preservation of ballot secrecy' (vaalisalaisuuden säilyminen). § 72 codifies polling-place order rules. § 86 codifies that ballots are dropped into the urn 'preserving ballot secrecy' (vaalisalaisuus säilyttäen). § 112 codifies the secret member-ballot for candidate selection. The Constitution of Finland § 25 enshrines the secret ballot. Comprehensive ballot-secrecy mandate codified. | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 1/520.0% | § 190 codifies transport services for disabled voters to the polling or advance-voting station. § 73 (not in FTS top-5) codifies polling-place assistance and § 71-related provisions codify assisted voting. Accessibility is partially codified — disabled-voter transport + assisted voting — but without a comprehensive standalone accessibility-standards chapter. | § view source 2026-05-20 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0.5/150.0% | § 69 codifies that 'the municipal central election committee must ensure that there is a POLLING PLACE for each voting district (äänestysalue),' with the municipality providing suitable premises and furnishings, and that the polling place 'must have sufficient space for voters waiting their turn.' § 8 codifies that the voting district is the municipality unless division is needed. § 9 codifies advance-voting + election-day polling places. One-polling-place-per-district rule codified; no strict numeric voters-per-place floor. | § view source 2026-05-20 |