Belarusv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity18.9%10/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability6.3%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware37.5%
3/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit33.3%
3/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation18.8%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access28.6%
2/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

6.3% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 116 covers signature-sheet submission for referendum initiative. Article 137 (signature collection results). Article 117 (calling referendum). Article 61 (presidential candidate nomination). None codifies a downloadable signed verification package for vote results.

§ view source
2026-05-18
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0.5/150.0%

Article 85 codifies CEC publication of Duma results within 3 days. Article 107 codifies Council of Republic results. Article 79 codifies presidential results publication. Some public access to results codified, but standing for re-tally limited to commissions + parties — not general citizens.

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2026-05-18

Custody Hardware

37.5% · 3/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

Article 53 codifies sealing for early-voting ballot boxes (envelopes sealed by precinct commission member, signed). Article 50 codifies polling-day procedure with ballot-box sealing 'no later than'. Article 13 (transparency in preparation) reinforces. Ordinal level 2: tamper-evident seals codified.

§ view source
2026-05-18
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 85 (publication of Duma results), Article 46 (media use), Article 138 (recall vote), Article 127 (local referendum), Article 92 (local-deputy results) — none address network-isolation prohibition for voting equipment. Belarus uses paper ballots so this is moot but unaddressed.

§ view source
2026-05-18
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?1/1100.0%

Article 72 codifies ballot-text approval and printing under Central Commission supervision: 'The text of the ballot for the election of the President of the Republic of Belarus is approved by the Central Commission' — implies controlled production and distribution chain. Article 118 codifies referendum ballot custody. Article 13 codifies transparency in all stages. Chain-of-custody documentation codified.

§ view source
2026-05-18
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18

Post Election Audit

33.3% · 3/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?1/1100.0%

Article 83 codifies regional/Minsk-city aggregation of district-commission protocols. Article 79 codifies Central Commission verification of results. Article 89 codifies establishment of local results. Article 13 transparency framework. Protocol-aggregation audit through commission hierarchy codified.

§ view source
2026-05-18
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?2/540.0%

Article 83 + 89 + 79 codify hand-count + protocol verification through the commission hierarchy (precinct → district → regional → Central). Article 141 covers recall voting. Ordinal level 2: fixed-mechanism hand recount codified.

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2026-05-18
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 103 covers Council of Republic election discussion. Article 155 (basic terms). Article 71 ballot procedures. None codifies pre-poll signed publication of ballot layouts/tabulation rules.

§ view source
2026-05-18
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18

Transparency Observation

18.8% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

Article 13 codifies 'Transparency in the preparation and conduct of elections, referendums, recall of a deputy' as a foundational principle. Commission sessions, voting day, vote counting are open to candidate proxies, observers, party representatives. Reinforced by Article 53 (early voting observation) + Article 155 (definitions including observer status). Strong codified observer framework — though OSCE/ODIHR consistently documents in-practice violations.

§ view source
2026-05-18
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0.5/150.0%

Article 13 transparency framework permits foreign observers at CEC discretion. However, Belarus has not invited OSCE/ODIHR observation since 2020 and active accreditation of international observers has been heavily restricted. Codified-in-principle, state-discretionary in practice.

§ view source
2026-05-18
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?0/50.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 47 covers campaign-content restrictions. Article 45 (election campaigning). Paper-ballot regime — no voting-equipment vendor framework. Not applicable.

§ view source
2026-05-18
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 96 covers elections in new administrative-territorial units — unrelated to vote-format/device-protocol standards (paper voting).

§ view source
2026-05-18
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18

Voter Access

28.6% · 2/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

Article 3 codifies foundational principles including secret ballot. Article 9 (in v0 cands) explicitly codifies 'Secret ballot' as a basic principle. Article 50 codifies voting hours/procedures protecting secrecy. Article 151 codifies secret ballot for Council of Republic recall. Reinforced by Constitution Article 38 (constitutional secret ballot). Comprehensive secret-ballot mandate.

§ view source
2026-05-18
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?0/50.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?1/1100.0%

Article 18 codifies the precinct-formation procedure: 'Voting precincts for holding elections, referendums, and recalling a deputy are formed in districts and cities by district, city executive committees, taking into account local conditions.' Article 44 codifies precinct-commission powers. Article 35 codifies representative nomination. Geographic density floor codified.

§ view source
2026-05-18

Other methodologies for Belarus