South Africav0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity13.2%7/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access42.9%
3/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 51-52 addresses counting procedures and verification of seals on ballot boxes, but contains no reference to downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures. The section focuses on physical ballot verification and irregularity documentation, not digital public artifacts.

§ view source
2026-06-08
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

Section 47 mandates that ballot papers (physical paper records) be counted and compared against the number issued, establishing a voter-verifiable paper trail as the mechanism for vote counting. The statute requires handling of actual ballot papers throughout the counting process, confirming that hand-marked paper ballots are the legally required voting medium.

§ view source
2026-06-08
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 107 addresses transparency requirements for electoral printed matter and advertising disclosures during election periods. It does not establish or address any right for citizens to re-tally votes from published precinct data, which is the substance of criterion 4.4. The section is concerned with campaign material labeling and publisher identification, not vote verification or citizen access to electoral data.

§ view source
2026-06-08

Custody Hardware

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The section mandates examination of seals on ballot boxes and containers to verify their integrity, which implies tamper-evident seals are expected. However, it does not explicitly require tamper-evident seals, does not mandate logging of seal status, and does not provide for automated responses to tampering. The provision addresses verification of existing seals but falls short of a comprehensive tamper standard.

the counting officer must examine whether the seals are intact on those items
§ view source
2026-06-08
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 61 addresses the determination of voting district boundaries by considering factors affecting free and fair elections, such as venue suitability, voter accessibility, and geographical features. It does not address network connectivity, internet access, or any technical specifications for vote-casting equipment. The section is entirely focused on geographic and administrative boundary-setting rather than cybersecurity or hardware isolation requirements.

§ view source
2026-06-08
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

Section 43 requires completion of a form documenting ballot materials and allows agents to affix seals, establishing chain-of-custody procedures. However, the statute does not explicitly require that this documentation be made publicly available, only that it be completed and sealed in the presence of agents. The requirement is for documentation to be created, not for public access.

§ view source
2026-06-08
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 96 addresses electoral disputes and administrative penalties for electoral law violations, not criminal penalties for unauthorized device or hardware access. The section discusses sanctions for campaign violations and electoral misconduct but does not establish criminal penalties for tamper with or unauthorized access to electoral equipment or devices.

§ view source
2026-06-09

Post Election Audit

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 48-50 of the Electoral Act addresses objections to sorting and counting of ballot papers and the procedures for announcing provisional results and managing voting materials. These sections establish complaint and review mechanisms but do not mandate a post-election audit of voting results. The procedures described are specific to counting irregularities at individual voting stations, not comprehensive post-election audits required for every election.

§ view source
2026-06-08
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 48 concerns objections to sorting irregularities and section 49 concerns objections to counting inaccuracies, with provisions for recounts at a counting officer's discretion. Neither section mandates any specific audit method for post-election verification. The recount authority in section 49(3) is discretionary and triggered by objections, not a systematic post-election audit requirement.

§ view source
2026-06-09
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

Section 47 addresses the counting of votes and handling of ballot papers at voting stations, including procedures for rejecting and disputing ballot papers. However, it does not explicitly address observer access or public observation rights during the audit/counting process. The section deals with procedural mechanics rather than transparency or observer access provisions.

§ view source
2026-06-09
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9

Transparency Observation

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly grants agents (representing registered parties and candidates) the right to observe voting, vote counting, and result declaration proceedings. This directly addresses party observer access to key electoral processes and satisfies the criterion for domestic observer rights at critical procedural stages.

§ view source
2026-06-09
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 56 addresses the Commission's and Electoral Court's powers to invalidate votes or deduct votes due to serious irregularities during elections. It does not contain any requirement, legal or otherwise, that precinct-level results be published within any timeframe, let alone within 24 hours of poll close.

§ view source
2026-06-09
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 91 addresses prohibitions on voting and election materials—printing, manufacture, supply, removal, damage, and use—and the chief electoral officer's authorization powers. It does not address vendor certification, vendor independence, or whether multiple vendors may operate concurrently in elections. The section is entirely silent on vendor operational frameworks.

§ view source
2026-06-08
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 113 addresses liability protection for electoral officials and contractors, not contract duration terms or caps on vendor agreements. It establishes immunity for good-faith electoral actions but does not impose any constraints on the length or renewal terms of vendor contracts.

§ view source
2026-06-08
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08

Voter Access

42.9% · 3/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly mandates that voting secrecy must be preserved when assistance is provided to voters, establishing a legal guarantee that even voters receiving assistance (e.g., those unable to read or with physical disabilities) maintain ballot secrecy. This ensures voter-ballot unlinkability is enforceable in the context of assisted voting.

The secrecy of voting contemplated in section 38 must be preserved in the application of illis section.
§ view source
2026-06-08
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?2/540.0%

The section requires assistance for voters unable to read and those with physical disabilities who request help, addressing some accessibility needs. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards that must be implemented at every polling place (e.g., no requirements for physical infrastructure, signage in multiple languages, or proactive accommodations). The provision is reactive rather than mandate-based infrastructure standards.

§ view source
2026-06-08
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 64 addresses the establishment and location of voting stations but does not establish any numerical floor or density requirement (e.g., one station per X voters or per Y square kilometers). The section grants the Commission discretion in determining location based on various factors including voter distribution, but imposes no minimum standard for polling-place density.

§ view source
2026-06-09

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