EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electronic transmission of voter registration database changes and verification procedures within election administration systems. It does not address public verification artifacts, downloadable packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures—the core elements of criterion 4.1, which concerns post-election verifiability and transparency. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-11 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The section mandates that voter-verified paper audit trails must be created and preserved for direct recording electronic voting machines, establishing them as the official ballots for recounts. This requirement ensures a voter-verifiable paper record exists for all such machines. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses contribution limitations adjustments and reporting procedures for campaign finance disclosures. It does not address citizen re-tally rights, precinct-level election data publication, or audit/verification procedures related to vote counting. The section is entirely outside the scope of criterion 4.4. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Custody Hardware
50.0% · 4/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The statute mandates tamper-evident seals for ballot containers and sealed pollbooks/tally sheets that cannot be opened without visible breaking, satisfying the basic tamper-evident requirement. However, the section does not require logging of seal breaks or tamper-responsive auto-quarantine mechanisms, falling short of the higher ordinal levels. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly prohibits voting machines from being connected to the internet, which directly satisfies the criterion's requirement that internet connectivity be legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment. “A voting machine shall not be connected to the internet.” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The section requires the director to keep records of board proceedings and money, and to file and preserve records related to elections administration. However, it does not specifically mandate chain-of-custody documentation for election hardware or materials, nor does it explicitly require such documentation to be publicly available. The general record-keeping duty is insufficient to satisfy the criterion's specific requirement for full chain-of-custody documentation. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | The section explicitly establishes a criminal penalty for violations of the tampering and unauthorized possession prohibitions regarding voting machines and tabulating equipment. A felony of the fifth degree is a clear, explicit criminal penalty for unauthorized device access. “Whoever violates this section is guilty of a felony of the fifth degree.” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Post Election Audit
55.6% · 5/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | The statute mandates that the board of elections 'shall audit' the official results of any election, establishing a legally required post-election audit for every election. The use of 'shall' creates a binding obligation, not a discretionary practice. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 3/560.0% | The statute mandates that boards conduct an audit using one of three approved protocols: risk-limiting audit, percentage-based audit, or another protocol approved by the secretary of state. However, the statute does not mandate a single specific method; instead it permits either the board to choose among the protocols or the secretary of state to select which protocol applies. Since risk-limiting audit is an available option (level 4) but not required, and percentage-based audit is also available (level 2), the overall mandate falls between these methods. The statute does not mandate RLA + reconciliation (level 5). | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-11 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly requires the board to permit observers during all phases of audit preparation and conduct. This ensures public observation access to the audit process, satisfying the criterion that parties, media, and citizens are granted observer access. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | The section describes an audit process and indicates that if audit results show the canvassed results must be amended, the board should amend them, but the text is truncated before completing the board's obligation. The section does not clearly establish that audit results are automatically binding or that they mandate certification changes; rather, it appears discretionary or conditional based on what 'results indicate.' | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration records disclosure and digitized signature lists, not voting system source code accessibility. It contains no provisions regarding the legal accessibility of voting system source code to any party. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of Ohio election law concerns the identification and disclaimer requirements for political communications and advertisements. It addresses who must be named in political publications, ads, and telephone communications. It contains no provisions related to software, binary reproducibility, builds, source code, or any technical infrastructure requirements. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration records, their public disclosure status, and the use of digitized signature lists. It contains no provisions regarding software binaries, cryptographic commitments, or hash publication before polls open. The section is entirely about voter registration data management and is unrelated to the criterion. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 3517.07 addresses ballot access requirements for political parties based on loyalty oaths and affidavits. It does not address ballot contest definitions, layouts, tabulation rules, or any requirement for pre-election publication or signing of election materials. The section is about party qualification for ballot access, not software verifiability or publication of ballot specifications. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions of voting and tabulation equipment terms used throughout Ohio election law. It does not address software verification, post-election integrity checks, or the matching of running binaries to committed ones. The section is definitional in nature and does not grant any rights or procedural guarantees related to software verifiability. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Transparency Observation
62.5% · 5/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | The statute grants party and civil-society observers explicit procedural access to observe ballot casting and counting processes. Observers have the right to be present during the entire casting period at polling places and to inspect all ballots during the counting phase until certification of final returns, meeting the criterion for full procedural access. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-11 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 4/580.0% | The statute requires that the unofficial count be transmitted to state officials by noon the day following the election, which is within 48 hours of poll close. However, the requirement applies to the county's compiled count, not explicitly to precinct-level results publication to the public, and it specifies transmission to state officials rather than public-facing publication. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter verified paper audit trails in recounts and their preservation and public access under open records law, but it does not establish or require a public, signed, append-only election event log as described by the criterion. The section focuses on ballot preservation and treatment of audit trails, not on event logging requirements. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses conflicts of interest involving elected officials' ownership stakes in voting equipment manufacturers and vendors, not the ability of multiple certified vendors to operate simultaneously in elections. The criterion asks whether law permits multiple vendors; this section does not address vendor certification or multi-vendor capability. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines terms related to armed services absent voter eligibility (dependent, overseas voter, uniformed services voter). It contains no provisions regarding vote-format, device-protocol standards, or vendor independence. The section is entirely about voter eligibility definitions and does not address technical standards or open protocols. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | The statute addresses lease contracts for voting equipment and mentions lease terms, but does not explicitly cap the duration of such contracts. While leasing arrangements could theoretically be shorter-term than ownership, the section does not mandate a specific contract duration cap that would prevent vendor lock-in or perpetual arrangements. The statute allows leases but does not restrict their length. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 3506.05 establishes requirements for certification of voting equipment, including examination by a board of examiners, submission of procedural manuals and support arrangements, and disclosure of patents and copyrights. However, the text contains no mention of source-code escrow, escrow arrangements, or any requirement for the state to hold source code as a condition of certification. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Voter Access
57.1% · 4/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The section explicitly mandates that marking devices must permit and require voting in 'absolute secrecy' and be constructed so that no person can see or know for whom another elector has voted. This legal requirement for ballot secrecy is enforceable through the board of voting systems examiners' approval and the secretary of state's certification process, ensuring voter-ballot unlinkability is guaranteed at the statutory level. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | The statute mandates accessibility equipment at every polling location with specific mention of nonvisual accessibility for blind and visually impaired persons. However, it does not comprehensively address all three accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) explicitly; motor accessibility is implied through the reference to 'marking devices' but language accessibility is not mentioned. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 3505.181 addresses eligibility and procedures for casting provisional ballots. It contains no language establishing a minimum density of polling places, a minimum number of polling places per voter population, or a minimum number of polling places per geographic area. The section is focused entirely on who may cast provisional ballots and the procedures for doing so, not on polling place location or distribution requirements. | § view source 2026-05-11 |