New Yorkv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity34.9%19/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware43.8%
4/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit55.6%
5/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability5.6%
1/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation37.5%
3/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence25.0%
1/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access50.0%
4/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0.5/150.0%

§ 3-103 codifies state board promulgation of standards for computerized record-keeping with database sharing. § 9-211 audit publishes comparison reports filed with state board. § 9-120 (not in FTS top-5) codifies returns of canvass; § 9-122 public proclamation; § 9-126 unofficial tally; § 15-140 transmission of publicly available data to the NY voting and elections database. Building blocks of public verification, though not a single signed downloadable package.

§ view source
2026-05-18
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

§ 7-202(e) codifies voter-verifiable independent verification of selected votes. § 9-211 audits 'voter verifiable audit records,' codifying paper-trail existence. § 9-110 codifies hand canvass of unscanned paper ballots. NY's regime is paper-marked (or BMD-printed) + optical scan statewide.

provide the voter an opportunity to privately and independently verify votes selected and the ability to privately and independently change such votes or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted;
§ view source
2026-05-18
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0.5/150.0%

§ 9-126 codifies the unofficial tally of election results — chair of inspectors delivers tally results to the board of elections, county clerk, and (in Nassau) makes data publicly available. § 15-140 codifies transmission of publicly available data to the NY voting and elections database after each election. Precinct-level data exists publicly, though standing for re-tally is limited to candidates/parties/election officials.

§ view source
2026-05-18

Custody Hardware

43.8% · 4/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

§ 7-207 codifies preparation of voting/ballot-counting machines with party-representative observers — tamper-evident procedure for machine prep. § 7-202(g) (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) mandates locks 'to absolutely secure the voting or registering mechanism and prevent the recording of additional votes' + § 7-202(f) protective + public counters. Reinforced by § 8-510 (challenge-report completion) and § 9-106 (ballot accounting). Ordinal level 2 — tamper-evident required, but not full tamper-responsive attestation.

§ view source
2026-05-18
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 7-202 enumerates machine requirements but does not prohibit network connectivity; § 14-107, § 14-106 are unrelated. No statutory air-gap or Wi-Fi prohibition.

§ view source
2026-05-18
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0.5/150.0%

§ 8-104 (polling place) + § 8-102(h) (inspectors unlock ballot boxes / containers and allow examination by watchers, then re-lock so watchers and persons outside guard-rail may see boxes empty) codify procedural chain-of-custody at the precinct. § 8-416 codifies secure absentee-ballot drop-box requirements. § 3-107 confers investigation authority.

§ view source
2026-05-18
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?1/1100.0%

§ 5-614 governs the statewide voter registration list (FTS-surfaced for this datapoint). Article 17 codifies criminal penalties: § 17-136 makes intentional false canvass a felony; § 17-106 makes misconduct of election officers a misdemeanor; § 17-152 codifies conspiracy. The FTS-top section is registration-related but the broader Article 17 codifies unauthorized-access penalties in the elections context.

§ view source
2026-05-18

Post Election Audit

55.6% · 5/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?1/1100.0%

§ 9-211 codifies a mandatory 3% manual audit of voter-verifiable audit records after every general, special, primary, and village election. § 16-113 adds court-ordered manual audit on petition where the § 9-211 standard triggers further audit or where evidence shows substantial possibility of result change. § 16-106 codifies contest procedure.

the board of elections or a bipartisan committee appointed by such board shall audit the voter verifiable audit records from three percent of voting machines or systems within the jurisdiction of such board.
§ view source
2026-05-18
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?2/540.0%

§ 9-211 mandates a fixed 3% random sample of voting machines/systems, manual audit of voter-verifiable audit records, with discrepancy thresholds that escalate. § 9-208 codifies recanvass procedure. § 16-113 codifies court-ordered manual audit on petition. Ordinal level 2: fixed-percentage manual audit (not risk-limiting; NY does not codify a margin-driven RLA).

the board of elections or a bipartisan committee appointed by such board shall audit the voter verifiable audit records from three percent of voting machines or systems within the jurisdiction of such board.
§ view source
2026-05-18
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?1/1100.0%

§ 9-211(1) codifies that 'Each candidate, political party or independent body entitled to appoint watchers to attend at a polling place shall be entitled to appoint such number of watchers to observe the audit.' At least 5-day prior notice to candidates/parties/independent bodies of audit-selection time and place is codified.

Each candidate, political party or independent body entitled to appoint watchers to attend at a polling place shall be entitled to appoint such number of watchers to observe the audit.
§ view source
2026-05-18
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?1/1100.0%

§ 9-211(2) codifies that 'if upon the completion of [the] additional audit the criteria are met for the results of the audit to replace the canvass then the board of canvassers shall forthwith reconvene and adjust the canvass as required.' § 9-211(3) codifies discrepancy-triggered escalation. Audit is binding.

if upon the completion of such additional audit the criteria are met for the results of the audit to replace the canvass then the board of canvassers shall forthwith reconvene and adjust the canvass as required.
§ view source
2026-05-18

Software Verifiability

5.6% · 1/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 14-105 (electronic campaign-finance filing) and § 3-106 (fair campaign code) are FTS-surfaced but unrelated to voting-system source-code disclosure. NY codifies voting-machine certification (§ 7-202) but not statutory source-code disclosure.

§ view source
2026-05-18
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 3-412 (inspector training), § 5-506 (registry list maintenance), § 5-601 (disabled voter accommodation) are FTS-surfaced but unrelated to reproducible builds. No reproducible-build mandate codified.

§ view source
2026-05-18
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0.5/150.0%

§ 7-206 codifies pre-election testing of voting and ballot-counting machines (state board adopts uniform standards). § 7-207 codifies ballot-label preparation. § 7-128 (not in FTS top-5) codifies sample ballots open to public inspection 50 days before election. Public commitment of ballot definitions exists, though without cryptographic signature.

§ view source
2026-05-18
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 14-106 (political communication filings) is the only FTS-surfaced candidate — unrelated. The right to verify binary against committed version is not codified; the § 9-211 audit compares tallies, not binary integrity.

§ view source
2026-05-18

Transparency Observation

37.5% · 3/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

§ 8-502 codifies watcher and challenger rights at polling places. § 8-506 codifies challenges to absentee/early-mail ballots, with watcher participation. § 8-510 codifies post-poll verification with observer access. § 9-211 codifies audit observer rights. Comprehensive party watcher regime statutorily codified.

any person may be challenged as to his right to vote, or his right to vote by early mail, absentee, military, special federal or special presidential ballot. Such challenge may be made by an inspector or clerk, by any duly appointed watcher, or by any registered voter properly in the polling place.
§ view source
2026-05-18
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?2/540.0%

§ 9-126 codifies an unofficial tally of election results post-canvass (typically same-night/next-day). § 9-122 codifies immediate public oral proclamation of totals. § 15-140 codifies transmission to the NY voting and elections database following certification. Score level 2: precinct-level publication is fast (within hours of canvass close), but a strict statutory 24-hour deadline is not specified.

§ view source
2026-05-18
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18

Vendor Independence

25.0% · 1/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?1/1100.0%

§ 7-204 codifies that 'contracts for purchase of voting machines or systems of types approved by the state board of elections' include vendor requirements (training, support) — implying multiple approved vendors are permitted concurrently. NY uses multiple certified systems (ImageCast / DS200 / Verity) at the county level.

§ view source
2026-05-18
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 5-800 (electronic voter registration transmittal), § 8-414 (absentee ballot tracking), § 14-114 (contribution limits), § 8-712 (early mail tracking) all codify electronic systems but none mandate open vote-format or device-protocol standards.

§ view source
2026-05-18
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 7-204 codifies vendor contract content (training, support) but not maximum duration. § 4-104 (polling-place designation) is unrelated. No contract-duration cap codified.

§ view source
2026-05-18
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-05-18

Voter Access

50.0% · 4/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

§ 8-300 codifies privacy-booth procedure: 'only two voters at a time for each ballot scanner, ballot marking device, or privacy booth.' § 7-202(e) codifies private and independent vote verification. § 8-312 codifies voter retiring alone to cast ballot. Ballot secrecy is structurally codified throughout Article 8.

§ view source
2026-05-18
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?2/540.0%

§ 7-202(e) codifies private independent verification (BMD/accessibility requirement). § 5-601 codifies that physically disabled voters whose polling place is inaccessible may vote at any other accessible district. § 17-208 codifies language assistance for limited-English-proficient groups (>2%/300 individuals threshold). Comprehensive accessibility/language framework codified — beyond vision/motor, also covers language and physical access.

provide the voter an opportunity to privately and independently verify votes selected and the ability to privately and independently change such votes or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted;
§ view source
2026-05-18
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0.5/150.0%

§ 4-104 codifies board of elections designation of polling places in each election district 'in consultation with each city, town and village.' § 8-102 codifies polling place setup. § 4-132 codifies materials required at each polling place. Polling-place provision is codified; a strict statutory floor (voters-per-place) is not specified.

§ view source
2026-05-18

Other methodologies for New York