EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: NRS § 295.260 addresses verification of petition signatures by county or city clerks, not public verification artifacts related to election results, device records, or certificates. This section pertains to the administrative process of validating petition signatures during the petition certification phase, which is entirely separate from the post-election verification and transparency requirements contemplated by criterion 4.1. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-01 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The statute requires that mechanical recording devices must be capable of providing a paper record of each ballot voted, which constitutes a voter-verifiable paper trail. Subsection 2 further mandates that this paper record must be printed and made available for manual audit, establishing the legal requirement for a paper record in electronic voting systems. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recount procedures for presidential elector candidates and election contests filed in court, but does not address citizens' independent right to re-tally votes from published precinct data. The recount mechanism described is limited to candidates who file formal demands and deposit costs with the Secretary of State. The section does not grant or discuss any general citizen right to conduct independent re-tallies using publicly available precinct data. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
Custody Hardware
37.5% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | This section mandates that sealed containers be used and that their seal numbers be recorded, which supports tamper-evident requirements (scoring level 2). However, it does not establish detailed tamper-evident standards, nor does it require logging beyond recording receipt, nor does it provide for tamper-responsive auto-quarantine. The section references other statutes (NRS 293.462 and others) that may contain the actual seal standards, but this section itself only requires recording of seal numbers upon receipt. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides a definition of 'facsimile machine' for statutory purposes and does not address vote-casting equipment, internet connectivity, network isolation, or any cybersecurity measures related to voting systems. It is entirely outside the scope of election integrity requirements for voting hardware. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires jails to allow the county clerk to establish a chain-of-custody documentation process for mail ballots from detained persons. However, it does not mandate that this documentation be publicly available, only that a method for documenting it exists. The criterion requires both full documentation AND public availability. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | The section explicitly establishes criminal penalties for tampering with or interfering with election equipment and computer programs. Category D felony charges apply for attempts to prevent proper operation, and category B felony charges apply when attempting to influence election outcomes, directly addressing unauthorized device access. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
Post Election Audit
44.4% · 4/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | While the statute mandates that county clerks conduct risk-limiting audits, it does not require audits for every election. Section 1(b) allows the Secretary of State to adopt criteria determining which elections must be audited, making coverage contingent on future regulatory specifications rather than universal. This leaves open the possibility that not all elections will be audited. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 4/580.0% | The statute mandates that each county clerk conduct a risk-limiting audit (RLA) of election results in accordance with Secretary of State regulations. The definition provided confirms the audit uses statistical principles and methods designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect outcome, which corresponds to the ordinal level 4 in the scoring rubric. “risk-limiting audit” | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-01 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs the disposition, preservation, and inspection of ballots and election materials after canvassing, but does not address or mandate public observation or observer access to any audit process. The section restricts inspection of voted ballots to judges, bodies, boards, or contest parties in contested election cases, and makes no provision for parties, media, or citizens to observe an audit. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires collection and reporting of audit procedures and results (subsection 1(f)), but it does not establish that audit results are legally binding on certified election results. The statute merely mandates that county clerks report audit results to the Secretary of State, who then compiles them into a legislative report. There is no provision stating that audits can override or modify certified results. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs financial disclosure statements for political candidates, not voting system source code. It addresses forms and instructions that candidates must receive when filing candidacy declarations, which is entirely unrelated to the accessibility or verifiability of voting system software. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-01 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the declaration requirements for military-overseas ballots and signature methods. It does not address cryptographic commitments, pre-election binary commitments, or software verifiability of election systems. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter education requirements for paper ballot systems, specifically the content of educational programs about overvoting and ballot correction procedures. It does not address the publication, signing, or pre-election release of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules—the core requirements of the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-01 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: NRS § 293.303 addresses the procedural mechanics of how election officials handle voter challenges at the polls—specifically what oaths challenged voters must take and what identification they must provide. It contains no provisions regarding observer rights, observer access, or observer procedures. The section is focused on voter eligibility verification, not on transparency or observer protections. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-01 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section mandates posting of voting information and instructions at polling places on election day. It addresses voter education and accessibility requirements, not the timing of precinct-level results publication after polls close. The statute is about pre-election/election-day materials, not post-election reporting timelines. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-01 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires voting systems to meet federal EAC standards but does not address whether multiple certified vendors can operate in the same election. It is a quality/approval standard, not a multi-vendor capability requirement. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes requirements for an elections procedures manual and its oversight, but does not address vote-format or device-protocol standards, nor does it require such standards to be open and publicly documented. The section is about administrative procedures and compliance, not technical standards for voting devices or protocols. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section addresses contracts for the purchase of ballots and return envelopes, and imposes requirements on vendor conduct (mail ballot deposit location), but contains no language establishing a cap on contract duration. The statute permits the Secretary of State to enter into 'one or more contracts' without specifying any time limitation or renewal restrictions that would prevent perpetual lock-in. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-01 |
Voter Access
57.1% · 4/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The statute directly requires that mail ballots be kept secret through a clerk-developed procedure, establishing an enforceable legal guarantee of ballot secrecy. This obligation to maintain ballot secrecy is a core mechanism for protecting voter-ballot unlinkability. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | The statute mandates accessibility for motor disabilities (wheelchair-accessible booths) and requires privacy and electronic recording capabilities. However, it does not comprehensively address vision accessibility beyond an optional encouragement to provide ballots in alternative audio/visual formats, and does not address language accessibility at all. The requirement also contains a broad exception for natural disasters that could render the mandate ineffective. | § view source 2026-06-01 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the establishment and boundaries of election precincts but does not specify any floor or minimum standard for the number of polling places per voter or per geographic area. It is about precinct definition and boundary procedures, not polling-place density requirements. | § view source 2026-06-01 |