EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voting machine requirements including voter-verified paper records and audit trails, but does not mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures. The statute requires paper records for verification and manual audits, but does not specify or require public downloadable cryptographic or digital packages with certificates and signed results.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires that each voting machine produce an individual permanent paper record that is made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time of casting, and that this voter-verified paper record serves as the official tally in any recount. This satisfies the criterion for a legally required voter-verifiable paper trail.

“By January 1, 2009, each voting machine shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast, which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires emergency ballot reports to be prepared and made available as public records for inspection and copying, but does not grant citizens any explicit right to conduct or perform a re-tally or independent verification of election results from precinct-level data. It establishes a reporting requirement and public access to documents, not a substantive right to re-tally ballots.

The statute mandates tamper-evident seals on voting machines and emergency ballot boxes with numbered seals and requires inspection to verify seal integrity before opening. However, it does not require logging of tamper events or automatic quarantine procedures (tamper-responsive mechanisms), limiting it to a basic tamper-evident standard.

“The keys to the voting machine shall be delivered to the district election officers in any manner that the county board of elections or the superintendent of elections or the municipal clerk, as the case may be, having custody of voting machines, may determine, at least three-quarters of an hour before the time set for opening the polls, in a sealed envelope, on which shall be written or printed the number and location of the voting machine, the number of the seal with which it is sealed, the number of the green seal with which the emergency ballot box is sealed, and the number registered on the protective counter or device, as reported by the custodian.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines terms related to campaign contributions and public procurement processes (business entities, fair and open processes, state agencies). It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or election infrastructure security. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion.

The section mandates visibility and oversight of provisional ballots during handling but does not require written chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such records. It establishes custody procedures and responsibility but does not address documentation or public access to custody records.

“The member shall keep the sealed envelope in full view of the voter, the other district board members and all other persons present until it is placed in the provisional ballot bag.”

The statute explicitly establishes third-degree felony penalties for tampering with ballots or documents used in an election. However, it does not specifically address 'unauthorized device access' to election hardware or custody equipment—the term 'tampers' is broad but primarily applies to physical ballot/document tampering rather than digital or hardware-specific access control violations.

“who shall knowingly certify falsely in any paper required under this act, or who, at any time, tampers with any ballot or document used in an election”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the canvassing and counting of emergency ballots—specifically the mechanical process of marking and counting votes on emergency ballots. It contains no requirement or reference to post-election audits. The section is entirely procedural regarding vote tabulation, not audit mandates.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses door-to-door voter registration canvassing and funding allocation for presidential elections. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit methods, hand recounts, comparison audits, or risk-limiting audits. The section is entirely outside the scope of the audit method criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section specifies that voter-verified paper records become the official tally in a recount, which establishes binding force for recounts. However, the criterion asks about audit results generally, and this statute addresses only recounts, not broader post-election audits. The section does not establish a general binding audit mechanism beyond the recount context.

“In the event of a recount of the results of an election, the voter-verified paper record shall be the official tally in that election.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses financial disclosure statements for political candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning voting system source code transparency or legal access for verification purposes.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines terms used in voting-by-mail statutes (election types, family member, mail-in ballot, and mail-in voter) but contains no provisions regarding publication of ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or any signing or publication requirements before polls open. The section is definitional and administrative in nature, not substantive regarding pre-election publication of ballot materials.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides only definitions of terms used in the electronic voting system statute (automatic tabulating equipment, ballot cards, counting centers, etc.). It contains no provisions regarding observer rights, access to election procedures, or transparency measures. The criterion requires procedural access for party and civil-society observers, which is not addressed in this definitional section.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the Secretary of State's procedure for obtaining missing election statements from county clerks after the canvassers' board meeting, typically several days post-election. It does not establish any requirement for publishing precinct-level results within a specific timeframe, let alone within 24 hours of poll closing.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains legislative findings and declarations regarding campaign contributions by business entities and government contracts. It addresses political corruption and procurement integrity, not election vendor certification or operations. The criterion concerns whether multiple certified vendors may operate in the same election, which is entirely outside the scope of this statutory provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns publication of notice about mail-in ballot procedures and voter information dissemination. It does not address vote-format or device-protocol standards, which are technical specifications governing how voting systems encode, transmit, or process votes. The criterion relates to vendor independence and open standards for voting technology, which is outside the scope of this notice publication statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses breaches of government contracts related to campaign contributions and political financing restrictions. It does not contain any provisions regarding contract duration caps or limits on how long vendor contracts may last. The statute is focused on preventing improper campaign contributions by business entities, not on regulating contract length or preventing vendor lock-in.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires voters to certify that they marked and sealed the ballot in secret, and requires ballot assistance providers to maintain secrecy. However, it does not establish unlinkability between voter identity and ballot: the certificate itself requires the voter's name and address, and the ballot is returned in an inner envelope bearing this identifying certificate. This design inherently links the voter to the ballot contents, failing the unlinkability guarantee that true ballot secrecy requires.

“I MARKED AND SEALED THIS BALLOT AND CERTIFICATE IN SECRET.”

The statute requires consideration of accessibility for disabled individuals and the elderly when selecting polling places other than schoolhouses or public buildings, but this applies only to a subset of polling places (when inconvenience would result from using standard facilities). It does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards nor does it mandate accessibility at every polling place. The language is permissive ('consideration shall be given') rather than mandatory.

“consideration shall be given to the use of buildings accessible to individuals with disabilities and the elderly”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses prohibited conduct and disruptions at polling places on election day, as well as exceptions for simulated voting activities. It does not establish or reference any legal floor (minimum requirement) for polling-place density, i.e., the number of polling places per voter or per geographic area.